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Executive Summary
Immigration is a new experience for Ireland. In a short space of time, the
proportion of non-nationals in the population has reached the level found in other
advanced countries. The effects of migration have been broadly positive. It has
increased economic activity, enhanced skills and widened the range of services
available. To date, there has not been much evidence of the negative effects to
which migration can give rise. However, the exploitation of some migrants is a real
problem and migration can create a range of other anxieties. Indeed, experience of
other countries shows that positive short-term effects are no guarantee that
migration will work out well in the long run. To make a success of migration Ireland
must connect the elements of its migration policy more closely and factor the
integration of migrants more fully into mainstream policies.
The focus of this report is labour migration. The Council sought to develop a shared
understanding of the impact of migration on the labour market, economic
development and social cohesion. It commissioned a review of Ireland’s migration
experience and policy from the International Organization of Migration (IOM),
based in Geneva. NESC is publishing IOM’s report separately (IOM, 2006).
Main Findings
Economic Impact
Research suggests that from 1993 to 2003, migration increased both the overall
size of the economy (total GNP) and average living standards (GNP per head).
Many migrants had education were skills. Their arrival improved competitiveness,
increased employment and boosted GNP. This led, in turn, to an increase in low-
skilled employment and lower unemployment. It also helped to moderate the gap
between the earnings of high-skilled and low-skilled workers.
Given the extent of migration to Ireland, we judge that there has probably been
some moderation of wage growth, in particularly areas. In the buoyant economic
conditions that have prevailed, large-scale migration has coincided with significant
growth in earnings across the economy. Unemployment has continued to be low,
participation in the workforce has been rising and employment of Irish people has
increased in most sectors. This suggests that there has not been significant
displacement of Irish people.
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The Migrants’ Experience
Many migrants work in jobs that do not reflect their level of education. In this
respect, there are parallels between Ireland’s experience of emigration in the 1980s
and immigration to Ireland today.
There is evidence that the employment of migrant workers has, in many instances,
not conformed to the labour standards which Irish society considers acceptable.
Illegal Migration and Undocumented Status 
Illegal or irregular migration is undoubtedly present, in Ireland and other countries.
There are a number of channels into the pool of irregular migrants, including
asylum, the work permit system and educational migration. But the extent of
irregular migration is unknown.
Demographic Effect
Migration is one of the main factors shaping Ireland’s demographic trajectory. In the
past decade, over half of the growth of population was due to migration. Over the
next decade, the CSO projects an increase in the population of between 437,000 and
686,000. Immigration could contribute from 150,000 to 300,000 of this.
Uncertainties
Although we know a lot about recent migration, we remain uncertain about some
of the facts, many of its economic and social effects and its future scale. For
example, we do not know how much migration is temporary, how effectively
migrants will progress to jobs that reflect their education, nor the impact of
migration on the distribution of wages in recent years. Consequently, we remain
uncertain about the effect of migration on Ireland’s long-run growth and prosperity.
The Council Draws a Number of Conclusions 
from these Findings and International Research
1. Pressure for migration—legal and illegal—is an unavoidable feature of the
emerging world order to which all societies and states must respond.
2. The enlargement of the EU was a moral, political and economic imperative. The
states that joined the EU in 2004 have higher levels of education than countries
with comparable income levels. Because of its booming economy and its
decision to open its labour market in 2004, Ireland attracted a disproportionate
share of this mobile, relatively educated, workforce.
3. Migration can enhance economic and social progress and prosperity, but this is
not inevitable. Our analysis shows that migration is most likely to enhance
Ireland’s economic and social development when it meets certain conditions. It
must support an upgrading of the economy, skills and work. It must yield
mobility and integration, rather than segmented labour markets and social
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separation. It must be combined with enhancement of social participation and
protection by means of the Developmental Welfare State and be associated
with a narrowing of income distribution.
Conversely, migration will not contribute to Ireland’s economic and social
strategy if it is driven by demand for labour at low levels of wages and condi-
tions, or if migrants are confined to low-skilled, traded, sectors that are highly
cost-sensitive. These are among the conditions in which migration is likely to
actually lower GNP per head in Ireland and widen inequality in incomes.
4. Integration of migrants is one of the main factors determining the overall
success or failure of migration. While many countries have used migrant labour
to meet labour shortages, few European countries have achieved successful
long-term integration into economic, social, cultural and political life. This 
is especially the case with low-skilled migrants or those perceived to be 
very different.
5. Migration has the potential to undermine the rule of law. It can weaken the
ability of the state institutions to define, control and monitor who resides in
Ireland. It can create situations in which some people are vulnerable to
exploitation. It can weaken trust in the ability of public institutions to ensure
the rule of law, which tends to become a self-fulfilling prophesy.
Overall Implications for Policy
1. Ireland needs to clarify its approach to migration, focusing simultaneously on
three broad goals:
s Economic and social development;
s The rule of law; and
s Integration of migrants into economic, social, cultural and civic life.
2. ‘Migration Policy’ should be defined broadly:
Ireland’s ‘migration policy’ should not focus only on the channels of entry and the
eligibility of migrants for social services. Making a success of migration also
depends on labour market policies, social policies, measures to ensure the
integration of migrants and quality public administration. In many respects,
migration increases the urgency of existing policy challenges more than it creates
entirely new ones.
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3. We urgently require a ‘whole-of-government’ approach:
The three goals of migration policy, outlined above, are interdependent and all
departments must take some responsibility for each of them. This challenges
Ireland’s public policy system to:
s Build a widely-shared understanding—and communicate a clear vision—of
the role of migration in Ireland’s long-term economic and social development;
s Achieve a whole-of-government approach to a range of cross-cutting issues;
s Ensure that the integration agenda is now mainstreamed in key service-
delivery departments; and
s Create information systems that support individual policy spheres and allow
sufficient connection between them.
The Council recommends that government now create institutional arrangements
to achieve these tasks.
Specific Policy Recommendations
Policy on EU Migration and Enlargement
As a member of the EU, Ireland adheres to the principles of free movement and
Community Preference. The Council endorses this approach.
The coming accession of Romania and Bulgaria will widen socio-economic
disparities within the Union. Within the principles of free movement and
Community Preference, Ireland retains the right to apply transitional arrange-
ments, restricting the access of Romanians and Bulgarians to the labour market for
a number of years.
In deciding on this matter, a number of factors should be taken into account:
s prevailing conditions in the Irish labour market;
s the fact that significant economic benefits and political capital accrued to
Ireland from the decision not to impose restrictions in 2004;
s transitional arrangements may have more impact on the composition of
migration than its total level.
The Council recommends that the social partners should be consulted in advance
of the Government decision.
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Policy On Migration From Outside The EU
The Council supports the policy articulated since EU enlargement in 2004—that
low-skilled workers should be sourced from within the EU. It welcomes the
reduction in the number of new work permits. Even with this, a considerable level
of legal low-skilled migration from low-income countries outside the EU is likely,
principally through family reunification.
The Council believes that only a limited level of low-skilled migration from outside
the EU should be permitted and that it should take place through high-quality
programmes. These should prevent low-skilled migrants being trapped in low-
paying, cost-sensitive and vulnerable sectors. It recommends that migrants
engaged in low-skilled work should, on certain conditions, have the opportunity for
education or training.
The Council welcomes the Government’s proposed introduction of an Irish ‘green
card’ for high-skilled workers, with the right to be accompanied immediately by a
spouse and the prospect of permanent residence after two years.
The Council believes that the attraction of students from outside the EEA must be
consistent with a well-articulated international education policy. It welcomes the
move to restrict the right to work to students who are completing full-time
courses of at least one year’s duration that lead to a recognised qualification.
However, the new measures would not appear to be effectively implemented 
and the Council welcomes the fact that students will be required to have
employment permits.
Family reunification is potentially the largest source of migration to Ireland from
outside the EU. There are anomalies and inequities in the ease with which people
legally resident in Ireland can be joined by family members who are non-EEA
nationals. The Council urges further discussion and development of policy on
family reunification.
Labour Standards and Labour Market Policy 
Core labour standards and employment rights are integral to the Council’s unified
view of economic and social development. Framed correctly, legally-binding labour
standards are not a burden on economic success or business performance, but
supportive of them. While the creation of employment across the skill spectrum is
a genuine part of Ireland’s economic and social progress, jobs that are reliant on
low standards are not.
The labour issues thrown up by migration and globalisation can put employers and
unions in uncharted territory. National social partnership can be a critical support
in finding a constructive approach. Experience shows that partnership with
government helps the partners to demonstrate that that their actions serve not
only their legitimate self-interest, but also wider social purposes.
The new social partnership agreement, Towards 2016, contains a commitment to
build a ‘new compliance regime’. The Council endorses this approach.
this is a two-liner
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A central argument of this report is that labour market policy, in key areas, is one
of the most important policy responses to migration. The success or failure of
migration depends on how well the labour market works for both migrants and
Irish citizens. In particular, migration increases the urgency of raising the
productivity of people at work and raising the employment rate. There is a danger
that the ready availability of migrants could reduce pressure to raise the skills of
the resident population and tackle the obstacles to the participation of Ireland’s
most marginalised citizens, including welfare-to-work disincentives.
Integration Policy and the Adaptation of Social Policy
Ireland’s relatively successful early experience of migration does not guarantee
that migrants will integrate sufficiently into Irish society or the Irish economy.
While government must play a leading role, successful integration hinges on a
vibrant civil society. The main approach to integration should be adaptation of
mainstream policies and services, rather than creation of separate services for
migrant groups. Language competency should be a cornerstone of integration policy.
Migration poses two challenges to social policy: increased scale and more diversity.
These differ in each service area—education, health, housing, social welfare,
policing and justice. There are some issues that arise in all areas. These include
improving the collection and use of data, enhancing the ability of staff to deal with
a diversity of users, understanding the vulnerabilities of women in the migration-
integration process and providing the public with better information on service
entitlements and standards.
Conclusion
Ireland’s transition from a history of emigration to being a country of strong
immigration marks an important threshold in its long-term economic and social
development. Our conviction that a century and a half of net emigration weakened
the country’s progress, suggests that immigration can play a role in building a
successful society in Ireland. But international experience shows that this is not
inevitable. To make a success of immigration requires effective government
policies, a negotiated international order such as the EU, innovative firms and civic
associations, an open culture and, most of all, a shared understanding that
migration can contribute to a prosperous and inclusive Ireland.
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Introduction1
In this report, the Council sets out its understanding of recent migration to Ireland
and makes recommendations on Irish policy. In doing this, it makes considerable
use of a study prepared for NESC by the International Organization of Migration,
based in Geneva (IOM, 2006). Drawing on their wide knowledge of migration and
migration policy in many countries, the Consultants argue that the success of
migration in any country depends on the creation of a shared understanding that
migration can contribute to a prosperous and socially-inclusive society.
The Council shares this view. Indeed, it believes that a first step to building such a
shared vision is to understand recent migration to Ireland. To understand Ireland’s
recent experience it is necessary to see it in the light of three factors:
1. The causes and consequences of migration;
2. The widening and deepening of the European Union (EU); and 
3. Changes at the global level—geopolitical, economic, technological and social.
Adopting this approach, Part I (Chapters 2–5) of the report outlines the Council’s
understanding of recent migration to Ireland. Because new CSO data has been
published since the Consultants undertook their work, Part I of the Council’s
document contains a fairly detailed summary of the evidence on recent migration
to Ireland.
Chapter 2 reports recent migration trends and explains the channels through
which migrants arrive in Ireland. Chapter 3 reviews the causes and effects of
migration. It draws on international research, published data on Ireland and the
increasing body of research on Ireland’s migration experience. Considerable
evidence is emerging on the origin, skill profile and employment of migrant
workers and their impact on the Irish economy and this is summarised. Evidence
and research on the social and cultural effects of recent migration has not yet
accumulated.
Chapter 4 explains why an understanding of EU enlargement and deepening is
critical in approaching the policy issues thrown up by migration. It opens by
placing Ireland’s recent experience in the context of European migration since the
Second World War and EU enlargements since 1973. It then looks in some detail at
the steps the EU has taken to make more of a reality of the ‘free movement’ of
labour, and, at the same time, protect national welfare systems from ‘welfare
shopping’ and national labour markets from erosion of standards. This has
involved a complex evolution of laws, standards and policies. The chapter finishes
by identifying significant uncertainty about future migration trends in the EU,
particularly migration from Central and Eastern Europe.
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Chapter 5 completes the understanding of recent migration to Ireland by briefly
describing the changes in geo-politics and global economic structures that have
caused a significant increase in international migration in recent decades.
International migration is a central feature of the new world order and pressure for
migration from poorer countries is likely to increase.
We open Part II (Chapters 6–12) of the report by asking: what kind of under-
standing of migration does the analysis in Part I yield? In the Council’s view, there
are three elements to our current understanding of, and perspective on, migration:
1) Awareness of the range of possible economic and social effects of migration
and of the experiences of other countries;
2) Findings on the pattern, scale and effects of migration to Ireland to date; and
3) Uncertainties about some existing elements of migration and several key
future trends and effects.
Given this understanding, the Council proposes a way of framing Ireland’s goals
with respect to migration and the means available to achieve them. It suggests
that three broad goals should inform Ireland’s policies on migration: economic and
social development, the rule of law and integration. The chapter finishes by
identifying ways in which migration can support Ireland’s economic and social
strategy and conditions necessary for migration to make this positive contribution.
Chapter 7 underlines the fact that, as a member of the EU, Ireland adheres to the
principles of free movement and Community Preference. The Council endorses this
approach. Drawing on the analysis of EU enlargement in Chapter 4, it argues that
the widening of socio-economic differences within the EU makes it more
important for Member States to monitor and protect social and labour standards.
It also increases the importance of Structural Funds that are sufficiently generous
and effective to support strong growth of living standards in the new Member
States. It discusses the fact that Ireland retains the right to adopt transitional
arrangements when Romania and Bulgaria join the Union, and identifies the
factors that should shape that decision.
Chapter 8 addresses policy options on migration from outside the EEA. Drawing on
the Consultants’ report, it highlights the degree to which Ireland’s approach has
been led by employers’ demand for workers from outside the EEA. The general
characteristics of temporary and permanent migration programmes are
summarised. As noted above, a critical policy issue is the degree to which Ireland
should issue employment permits to low-skilled workers from outside the EEA. The
case for and against such low-skilled migration is outlined and some design
options discussed. The Council argues that only a limited degree of relatively 
low-skilled migration should be permitted. Insofar as there is low-skilled
migration, Ireland should aim to create high-quality programmes for such
migrants. Low-quality programmes do little to protect the native population, do
not greatly constrain migration and have a number of negative effects. A
qualitative dimension to all migration programmes is the extent and timing of
family reunification rights which they entail. This is potentially a major channel
through which further migrants will come to Ireland and the Council makes
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several contributions to the search that is underway for policies which are, at the
one time, supportive of Ireland’s economic and social strategy, fair to all categories
of migrants and reflect Ireland’s strong commitment to the family. Attention is
also given to ways in which Ireland’s migration policy and overseas development
policy can be supportive of each other.
Chapter 9 discusses labour standards and labour market policy. One of the findings
of Part I is that some migrant workers have experienced unsatisfactory working
conditions, including violation of Irish employment law—although it is very hard
to be sure how widespread this is. The Council argues that in addressing the issue
of labour standards we need to clarify our understanding of the role of the labour
market in overall economic and social strategy, and of the role of institutions and
rights in the labour market. The chapter discusses why labour standards are
important within the Council’s unified view of economic and social development
and identifies some implications of this. While the creation of employment across
the skill spectrum is a genuine part of economic and social progress, jobs that rely
on low standards are not. We outline the Council’s support for the ‘New
Compliance Regime’ agreed by government and the social partners and draw
attention to some international innovations in monitoring labour standards and
promoting compliance. A central argument of this chapter—indeed, of this whole
report—is that labour market policy, in key areas, is one of the most important
policy responses to migration. The success or failure of migration depends on how
well the labour market works for both migrants and Irish citizens. Consequently,
we underline the importance of ensuring that migration is combined with an
upskilling of the resident population and further progress in raising the
employment rate.
In Chapter 10, the Council outlines its proposals on integration policy. Drawing on
the work of the IOM Consultants, it argues that for integration to occur, support
will need to be built on a widely-shared vision of how migration can contribute to
a dynamic, secure and socially-cohesive Irish future. Integration should be seen as
a multi-dimensional process, unfolding over a long time. International experience
underlines that language capability is a cornerstone of integration policy. Note is
made of the critical role of civil society and NGOs in facilitating integration. The
Council agrees with the Consultants that the main approach to integration should
be adaptation of mainstream policies and services, rather than creation of separate
policies and services for different migrant groups. Consequently, there is a
significant overlap between integration policy and the adaptation of social policy
migration, discussed in Chapter 11.
Chapter 11 discusses the adaptation of social policy to migration. A key requirement
is better information, both within the public system and among citizens and
migrants. The existing responses of the main service sectors are briefly reviewed
and some of the specific challenges in each sector are identified. Rather than make
detailed recommendations on each service area, the Council emphasises the need
for government and the partners in each sector to engage in appropriate policy
development and institutional change.
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Finally, in Chapter 12 the Council discusses how migration policy should now be
developed and managed. It argues that the three goals outlined in Chapter 6—
economic and social development, the rule of law, and integration—are
interdependent and need to be taken into account by a range of departments and
agencies. In thinking about institutional approaches, the Council sees four main
challenges. These include creating a whole-of-government approach to a range of
cross-cutting issues, ensuring that the integration agenda is firmly mainstreamed
in key service delivery departments, communicating a clear vision of the role of
migration in Ireland’s long-term economic and social development and creating
information systems to support individual policy spheres and to allow sufficient
connection between them. The Council suggests that in designing institutional
arrangements, government can draw on a number of recent experiences in policy
making and coordination.
The focus of this report is on labour migration, rather than refugees and asylum
seekers. While many of the issues discussed in this report are of relevance to policy
on refugees and asylum seekers, there is a fundamental difference in the
considerations which enter into policy making and implementation in the two
areas. Policy response to refugees and asylum seekers must be informed by
binding obligations, both moral and legal, which Ireland owes to those in danger.
Policies on labour and associated migration can properly be informed by a 
range of judgements on national advantage, EU processes and cause-and-effect
relationships in both the economy and society.
4
part i
Understanding
Migration
Migration Trends and Channels 2
72.1 Migration Trends: An Overview
This chapter provides a brief overview of the scale and composition of migration to
Ireland and different channels through which migrants arrive in Ireland. A more
detailed description of these trends is provided in Chapter 2 of the IOM
Consultants’ report (IOM, 2006).
The rise in inward migration has been a distinctive feature of Ireland’s recent
economic and social development. Recorded net migration became positive in 1997
and reached over 53,000 in 2005 (year ending April in each case). CSO data suggest
that there has been approximately a fourfold rise in gross inward migration from
an estimated 17,200 in 1987 to 70,000 in 2005. Estimated outward migration has
fallen, from a high of 71,000 in 1989 to 16,600 in 2005.
There has long been a pattern of return migration of Irish people and this has
continued to be a significant aspect over the past decade. Migration by Irish
nationals represented over half of all recorded migrants in the years 1996 to 1999.
Since then their share has fallen but Irish nationals still represented 27 per cent of
inward migration in 2005.
Leaving aside returning Irish people, CSO estimates suggest that the largest share
of migration to Ireland consists of nationals of other EU countries. In 1996, EU
nationals are estimated to represent around 62 per cent of non-Irish migration.
Until enlargement took place, estimated migration from other EU countries was
relatively stable and its share fell in subsequent years with the rise in migration
from other countries (including from the accession states). In the year to April
2005, following the enlargement of the EU, there was an estimated increase of
almost 23,000 (to 33,500) in the migration of EU nationals—other than UK
nationals—to Ireland (see Figure 2.1). This is partly because migrants from the ten
new Member States (NMS) are included in the EU figure for 2005 for the first time.
In previous years migrants from the accession states were not separately identified
in the data and were included as part of the rest of the world in the CSO’s
classifications. The CSO estimates that in 2005 there was a fall in migration of
nationals from the rest of the world of around 6000 (to 9,000), far less than the
rise in migration of EU nationals. Hence, the increase in migrants from the EU in
2005 is far higher than be explained by a pure reclassification of migrants from the
Eastern Europe. The estimates suggest that in 2005, almost 80 per cent of non-
Irish migrants to Ireland (40,400 people) were nationals of the EU 25.
Around two-thirds of the EU nationals migrating to Ireland in the year to April
2005 are estimated to be nationals of the NMS (26,400). These NMS nationals
represented over half (52 per cent) of the total estimated non-Irish migration to
Ireland, while 13.5 per cent of non-Irish migrants were UK nationals and 14 per cent
were nationals of the other 13 EU countries.
There has been a substantial increase over the past decade in migration to Ireland
from countries outside the EU and the US (which we will refer to as the rest of the
world). This migration is estimated to have risen from 4,200 in 1996 to a peak of
21,700 in 2002 and has been falling since then. With the incorporation of the NMS,
estimated migration from the rest of the world fell to 9,000 in 2005. This is still
more than a doubling of this external migration since 1999. Migration from
outside the EU and the US is a significant development for Ireland. However, it is
worth noting that at present it seems to be a modest share of total inward
migration (17.6 per cent of non-Irish migrants). The CSO estimates that just 3 per
cent of non-Irish migrants were from the US in 2005.
The most recent migration data refer to the year ended April 2005. More recent
data on population from the Quarterly National Household Survey (QNHS) show
an even greater influence of the NMS on Ireland’s current migration flows. The
QNHS estimates that the increase in the non-Irish population in the year to the
first quarter of 2006 was 54,700. This was three times the estimated change in the
non-Irish population in 2004. Almost three quarters of this increase (40,000
people) is estimated to consist of nationals of the NMS.
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Figure 2.1 Non-Irish Immigration Flows by Nationality (000s)
Source CSO, Population and Migration Estimates.
Note: The EU data refer to the EU (15) until 2004 and in 2005, following enlargement refer to the EU (25).
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The most recent comprehensive data on the stock of migrants is from the 2002
Census. This records that there were 400,000 people whose place of birth was
outside the Republic of Ireland in the population in that year, amounting to 10.4
per cent of the population. There were almost 50,000 (12.4 per cent) people from
Northern Ireland and almost 200,000 from Britain (49.6 per cent). A further 33,000
were from another EU 15 country. These Census estimates suggest that over 70 per
cent of foreign-born people resident in Ireland had their place of birth in an EU
country.
The Census also contains data on the nationalities of the population. Nationality is
not solely defined by place of birth; people are asked to identify their nationality in
the Census. Some of the population born outside the Republic of Ireland consists
of Irish nationals; for example, the children of Irish people born abroad. The 2002
Census estimate of the non-Irish population was around 224,000 or 6 per cent of
the population. The largest national grouping was UK nationals (46 per cent of the
non-Irish population or 103,500 people). The Census recorded around 133,400 EU
nationals, which was almost 60 per cent of the non-Irish population. The Census
also recorded almost 21,000 African nationals (9.3 per cent of the non-Irish
population), close to 22,000 Asian nationals (9.7 per cent) and just over 15,300
American nationals (6.9 per cent).
More recent, but less comprehensive, data on the non-Irish population are
available from the QNHS. This estimates that the non-Irish population aged 15 and
over in 2006 (first quarter) was 271,300 or 8.1 per cent of the total population aged
over 15. This is a substantial increase on the 6 per cent figure (for the total
population) from the 2002 Census. The composition of this estimated non-Irish
population is shown in Figure 2.2 below. Over 30 per cent, 82,000 people, were
estimated to be from the NMS. It is striking that the estimated number of
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Table 2.1 Annual Change in Irish, Non-Irish 
and Total Population (000s)
Irish Non-Irish Total
2001 33.6 25.1 58.6
2002 36.1 27.4 63.5
2003 41.6 13.8 55.4
2004 49.8 15.9 65.8
2005 38.3 48.2 86.4
Annual average 
2001 to 2005 39.9 26.1 65.9
Source Special Tabulation provided by the CSO. Data refer to the year ending in the final quarter.
immigrants from the NMS is two and a half times the number from the EU 15
excluding the UK and Ireland. The share of the NMS in the non-Irish labour force is
even higher at 37 per cent, reflecting the high labour force participation of NMS
nationals.
New estimates of the current size and composition of the migrant population will
be provided in the 2006 Census. A tentative estimate included in the preliminary
census release is that there are around 400,000 non-Irish nationals in the
population in 2006. This would represent around 9.4 per cent of the population.
2.2 Channels of Migration
A crucial distinction with regard to entry to Ireland is the treatment of European
Economic Area (EEA)1 and other nationals. Nationals of EEA countries, as long as
they can prove that they are economically self-sufficient, have unrestricted access
to Ireland for employment and other purposes such as study. Existing data shows
that EEA nationals now constitute the bulk of inward migration to Ireland.
For those living outside the EEA there are a number of legal entry routes to Ireland
(summarised in Figure 2.3 at the end of this section):
Figure 2.2 Composition of Non-Irish Population Aged 15 and Over
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Source CSO, Quarterly National Household Survey, 2006, First Quarter.
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1. The EEA consists of the EU plus Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein. Switzerland is not part of the EEA but Swiss nationals have the
same access rights as EEA nationals. References in the text to EEA nationals should be understood to include Switzerland.
s Work permits;
s Working visas/authorisations and working holiday visas;
s Asylum applications and refugee status;
s Student visas;
s Arrival as a dependant;
s Entry as a parent of Irish born children (no longer available); and
s Business permissions.
In addition to these legal channels, some people enter the country illegally and
others, having entered legally, stay illegally.
Each of these is now briefly explained.
2.2.1 Work Permits
Work permits are the main legal route of entry to employment for non-EEA
nationals. They are issued to employers for one year and are renewable. They grant
permission for a specific employer to employ a named individual in a specified
position. They are subject to a labour market test; employers are required to
demonstrate to FÁS that they cannot find suitable people from within the EEA. The
IOM consultants do not regard the implementation of the labour market test as
effective at present (IOM, 2006: 43); possible reforms are discussed in Chapter 8
below. Work permits have been an important entry route for workers from the
accession states, but following enlargement have declined in significance. In 2003,
47,707 permits were issued, while in 2005 the number issued was 27,136 (including
renewals). The number of new permits issued in 2005 was 7,354. This number
includes permits issued to those moving jobs; according to the Department of
Enterprise, Trade and Employment (DETE) this averages around two to three
thousand annually. Thus, work permits now play a modest role in the context of
current Ireland’s estimated new inward migration flows. A large number of people
have, however, entered Ireland on work permits since 1997. The Consultants point
out that Ireland’s work permit regime contains no measure to ensure return of
migrants when their permit expires, and limited procedures to monitor return.
Consequently, it seems possible that there are many non-EEA migrants in Ireland
whose work permits have expired. However, there is no data on this. Policy issues
arising from this approach are discussed in Chapters 6, 8 and 12.
Since EU enlargement the work permit system has become more restrictive. In
August 2004, DETE announced that it would no longer consider applications for
new work permits for employment in low-skilled or low-waged occupations. Data
from the IOM report on the occupational distribution of work permits before and
after this change is presented in Table 2.2 below. A limitation of these data is that
there is a very large ‘other’ category—leaving it unclear the degree to which
permits are still being issued to employers hiring low-skilled workers. It is clear
from these data that, following the changes announced in August 2004, there has
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been a substantial increase in the share of new work permits allocated to the three
higher-level groups (managers and administrators, professional occupations,
associate professional and technical occupations) — up from 12 per cent for the
period January to August 2004, to 31 per cent for the period September 2004 to
April 2005.
Ireland has operated a small-scale Seasonal Horticultural Workers Scheme since
20022. The scheme relies heavily on contacts with horticultural colleges in the
students’ home countries and the colleges’ involvement in selecting and facilita-
ting the placement of their students in Ireland.
Table 2.2 New Work Permits Issued to Non-EEA Nationals
by Job Category, January 2003 – April 2005
2003 Jan-Aug 2004 Sep 2004-April 2005
Managers & Administrators 2% 2% 4%
Professional Occupations 6% 11% 17%
Associate Professional 
and Technical Occupations 4% 6% 10%
Clerical and 
Secretarial Occupations 1% 1% 1%
Craft and Related Occupations 16% 15% 15%
Personal and Protective 
Service Occupations 22% 18% 23%
Sales Occupations 2% 1% 1%
Plant and Machine Operatives 5% 3% 2%
Other Occupations 41% 44% 27%
Total (%) 100% 100% 100%
Total number 21,965 7,438 4,944
Source: IOM (2006: 33) based on work permits data provided by DETE.
2. It is restricted to horticultural students in eastern and central European countries. Out of about 250 students to be admitted in 2005,
some 150 will be from the new EU Member States, and around 100 from the Ukraine. The horticultural industry has made special
arrangements with DETE to facilitate the issuing of work permits for non-EEA students wishing to participate in the scheme.
2.2.2 Work Visas and Authorisations
Work visas are provided to fill positions in three selected professional areas,
covering IT, construction and health. Unlike work permits, they are issued directly
to employees, provided that they have a job offer in Ireland. They are valid for two
years and may be renewed for another two. The number of visas issued has been
quite small; by 2005, 12,927 visas had been issued.
There is also a scheme of working holiday visas for people aged 18 to 30 from
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Hong Kong and Japan, allowing them to work
casually while visiting Ireland. These visas are not subject to the labour market test.
2.2.3 Students
In 2005, there were 27,000 registered non-EEA students in Ireland. Just over half of
these, 14,000, were in higher education institutions; the remainder in other educa-
tional institutions, such as private language schools. There are a further 9,000
international students from the EU registered in higher education institutions.
Until recently, people from outside the EEA with student visas had considerable
flexibility in taking up casual employment. Policy on this has changed; it now says
that only full-time students in courses of at least one year’s duration, leading to a
qualification recognised by the Minister for Education and Science, are allowed to
undertake casual work3.There is, however, a question as to how effective these new
restrictions are in practice. There is a commitment in the new social partnership
agreement, Towards 2016, to extend the work permit system to students.
2.2.4 Refugees and Asylum Seekers
The number of new applications for asylum in Ireland has fallen sharply, from
11,634 in 2002 to 4,323 in 2005, which is just over 7 per cent of estimated immi-
gration (excluding Irish people) in that year. Asylum seekers are not permitted to
work, but those whose applications are successful and become recognised as
refugees then acquire full employment and social rights. Of those who claim
asylum status, almost 90 per cent are not successful in their claim. At the end of
2004, there were 7,201 refugees in Ireland and the combined number of asylum
seekers and refugees was 10,897 (UNHCR, 2006).
2.2.5 Family Reunification: the Channels
There are no data publicly available on the annual inflows of non-EEA nationals
admitted as family dependants. For some time, all non-EEA nationals aged 16 or
over have been obliged to register with the Garda National Immigration Bureau
(GNIB) within 90 days of entering the State. Since end April 2006, those who are
family members of EU nationals resident in Ireland, including children, must apply
for a Residence Card to confirm their family relationship with an EU citizen. Both
these consequent databases—one established and one forthcoming—provide
some basis, at least, for the authorities to track the significance of family
reunification as a factor contributing to the stock of non-EEA nationals in Ireland.
The Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform (DJELR) notes that the
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3. Casual employment is defined as working up to 20 hours a week during term-time and up to 40 hours a week during term holidays.
demand for family reunification, while currently not at all as significant as in other
EU Member States, where it can account for up to 60 per cent of immigration, is
‘showing signs of intensifying and has the potential to become a major source of
migration into Ireland’ (Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform,
2005a:80). The Immigrant Council of Ireland records that queries on the family
reunification application process constitute the largest single cause of people
seeking their services (Immigrant Council of Ireland, 2006).4 Migration caused 
by family reunification—as the experience of northern European countries in 
the 1970s attests (see 4.2.2 below)—does not slow down when economic growth
slows down.
People from outside the EEA may enter and reside in Ireland as the family
dependant of a legal resident in one of five principal ways:
1. They may be the spouses or minor dependent children of resident Irish citizens.
While their entry and residence is not a statutory entitlement, the authorities
are required to have regard to their family relationship with an Irish national
and permission is almost always granted. They are entitled to apply for Irish
citizenship after three years and have immediate entry to the labour market.
There is no formal requirement on the sponsoring Irish citizen to be in work or
to demonstrate the economic viability of the family unit, though applications
can be refused on the grounds of limited financial means. While there is no
recognition of unmarried partners in Irish law, it is not unusual that
immigration decisions admit an unmarried partner, a same-sex married
partner or a partner in a civil union.
2. They may be the family members of EU/EEA nationals who moved to Ireland for
the purposes of work, including of Irish citizens who once worked in another
Member State. In this case, they ‘derive’ the same rights as the person who
sponsors their arrival into Ireland and are protected by the European acquis
prohibiting discrimination against migrant EU workers on grounds of
nationality (see Appendix to Chapter 4 below). The concept of ‘family member’
in the European acquis goes beyond the nuclear family based on marriage to
include partners, dependent relatives, family members requiring the personal
care of the EU citizen on health grounds and other members of the households
of EU citizens before they moved to Ireland. The status of partner requires
attesting a relationship lasting at least two years and is for admission and
residence purposes only; it does not involve its recognition for other purposes
within Ireland (e.g., tax, social welfare). As always with EU law on the free
movement of persons, grounds of ‘public policy, public security or public health’
may be invoked to refuse entry to or expel EU nationals themselves and not just
their non-EEA family members, but the onus is on national authorities to assess
many factors affecting the well-being of the individuals concerned before
taking such a major step.5
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4. One third (4,185) of the queries to which the Immigrant Council of Ireland has responded since opening in 2002 (12,500 in all) came
from people seeking information on the family reunification process or assistance in complying with it.
5. The transposition into Irish law (on 28 April 2006) of the 2004 European ‘Residence’ Directive has been important here. See Appendix
4.1 to Chapter 4 below.
3. They may be family members of EU/EEA citizens legally resident in Ireland but
‘economically inactive’ (e.g., in retirement, students). The broader under-
standing of family member holds here too but the family members in this
instance must be covered by private medical insurance and the family unit be
able to support itself without recourse to public funds.
4. They may be the dependants of people granted refugee status. Since the 1996
Refugee Act, married spouses, unmarried dependent children under the age of
18 and, in the case of a refugee who is a minor, the refugee’s parents have a
statutory entitlement to join the person given refugee status in Ireland, while
Ministerial discretion can include other members of the refugee’s extended
family. Again, the family members attain the same rights as are conferred with
refugee status on the original applicant; thus, they have access to the labour
market and equal entitlement to public and social services as Irish citizens.
Those granted leave to remain without satisfying the criteria for refugee status
do not have an entitlement to family reunification but may be granted it at the
discretion of the Minister.
5. They may be the family dependants of workers from outside the EEA who have
been, or are being, admitted legally for work purposes. These workers fall into
two groups. Generally, workers with full-time employment (or an offer of it) in
occupations/sectors where a shortage of skills is deemed to be at a high level6
may be joined immediately by their spouses and minor dependent children,
subject only to their having private medical insurance. The spouses must apply
for work permits if they wish to work elsewhere in the Irish economy but without
a labour market test being necessary. The second group of non-EEA workers are
those employed (currently, they require work permits) in lesser-skilled jobs which
their employers attested they were unable to fill from within the EU/EEA. If they
are from non-visa required states, these workers can have family members join
them immediately provided the working family member has sufficient resources
to ensure they do not become a burden on the state. If they are from states which
require a visa, they cannot apply for family reunification in the first 12 months,
may apply during years two and three if they have an income above the
threshold that would qualify for Family Income Supplement (FIS), a condition
that is then waived after three years. In all cases, private medical insurance is
required. When spouses are admitted to join them it is intended to extend to
them also the freedom to apply for work permits without a labour market test
when an offer of employment is made to them.
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6. The level is higher than the individual employer’s attestation that a vacancy cannot be filled and a routinely administered ‘labour
market test’ by FAS confirming that (the basis for granting work permits in the past) but arises from a more collective and long-term
assessment of a generalised skills shortage.
2.2.6 Parents of Irish-Born Children
Up to January 2003, foreign nationals who were parents of children born in Ireland
could apply for permission to remain in Ireland on this basis. Between 1996 and
February 2003, 10,500 parents were granted the right to remain in Ireland under
this provision. In January 2003, the Supreme Court ruled that there was no
absolute right to remain in Ireland on the basis of being the parent of an Irish-born
child. The facility allowing parents of Irish-born children to automatically remain
was withdrawn from February 2003. At that stage, there were 11,000 applications
outstanding.
In 2004, the Irish Constitution was amended by a referendum, removing the
automatic right to citizenship to all those born in Ireland. Legislation based on this
amendment came into force in January 2005. In the same month, the Government
also announced a once-off scheme allowing non-Irish parents who already had
Irish-born children to apply for the right to remain. There were 18,000 applications
under this scheme and just over 17,000 were successful. Of the 11,000 outstanding
applicants under the scheme that was terminated in January 2003, 7,220 applied
under the 2005 scheme and the overwhelming majority of these were successful.
The 17,000 successful applicants have been granted permission to remain for two
years; this permission is renewable. The permission to remain here does not
include the right to family reunification.
In total, over 27,000 non-Irish have been granted permission to remain in Ireland
as parents of Irish-born children. This group have legal access to the labour market.
2.2.7 Business Permits
Non-EEA nationals who wish to come to Ireland for the sole purpose of setting up
a business require a business permit, which is issued by the DJELR. Business
permits are valid for one year, and may be renewed for another year. After two
years, longer-term permits may be granted. To qualify for a business permit, a
number of conditions need to be met, including a minimum capital transfer to
Ireland of c300,000 and the creation of at least two new jobs for EEA nationals.7 In
2004, 97 persons were granted business permits, down from 134 in 2003.
2.2.8 Intra-Company Transfers
The Intra-Company Transfer Scheme was intended to facilitate the temporary
transfer of senior management and key personnel within international companies
with offices in Ireland. The scheme could be used by senior managers who could be
appointed to Ireland for a few years or by experts whose specialised knowledge
was required on a project for a few months. The scheme was suspended in 2002,
but the DETE has continued to issue a limited number of permits on a discretionary
basis. While the scheme has always been small in terms of numbers, the ability of
international companies to move key staff to Ireland without undue obstacles is an
important part of Ireland’s attractiveness as a location in which to do business.
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7. For a full list of criteria, and a more detailed description of the business permit system, see www.justice.ie
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2.2.9 Programme for Trainees
Like the Intra-Company Transfer scheme, a trainee programme was abolished in
2002. The suspension was triggered by the concern of the DETE over the potential
abuse of both schemes by both companies and workers. In particular, there was
concern that Irish companies were abusing these schemes to bypass the work
permit system and the domestic labour market. Prior to its suspension, the trainee
programme was intended to enable persons coming to Ireland from an overseas
company to engage in paid or unpaid training at an Irish-based company. The
employment permit for trainees was valid for three years.
2.2.10 Labour Market and Other Channels
This section has followed the normal practice of outlining labour market and other
channels of entry to Ireland. However, it is important to note that legal access to
labour market is not confined to those who enter under explicit labour market
channels. A number of significant categories of people with legal access to the
labour market are as follows:
s Non-EEA citizens who are family members of EEA citizens living in Ireland;
s Family members of migrant workers, work-authorisation/visa holders and,
soon, work permit holders;
s Non–nationals who are parents of Irish-born children, granted leave to remain;
s Others granted humanitarian leave to remain by the Minister for Justice; and
s Family members of refugees.
The numbers of persons comprehended by these categories in recent years is
substantial. There are almost 70,000 people currently registered with the GNIB
who could fall into these categories. In addition, there are over 7,000 people
granted refugee status who have access to the labour market.
Family members of migrant workers are a potential source of labour supply, both
high-skilled and low-skilled. This situation has become clearer as a result of
changes introduced in 14 February 2006, which widened the potential pool of
family members who may join workers in Ireland and which allows that such
family members will have access to the labour market, as noted above.
Students are also a significant influence on the labour market. There are over
20,000 students registered in Ireland who have access to casual employment.
2.2.11 Irregular Migration
The extent of illegal or irregular migration to Ireland is unknown. Internationally,
the pressures on irregular migration have continued to grow in recent years. There
are ongoing problems in the Mediterranean concerning migration from Africa. The
relative poverty of sub-Saharan Africa is a major push factor for those seeking to
travel to Europe. There is serious concern at European Union level and, in particular,
in the Member States closest to the region, most notably Spain, Italy and Malta.
While Ireland is at a greater distance from the regions of origin, this does not make
us immune to the problems. The attraction of Ireland’s economy and labour
market, the ease of air travel, the use of the English language and a number of
features of our migration policy generate conditions in which irregular migration
is an undoubted feature of Ireland’s recent experience. The view of the IOM
consultants is that illegal work is likely to be more pervasive than illegal entry
(IOM, 2006: 223-224). There are a number of ways in which people may become
irregular migrants. Some of those whose application for refugee status are refused
may subsequently become irregular migrants. As noted above, it is possible that
people whose work permits expire may remain in Ireland illegally. This raises
important policy issues, discussed in Chapters 6, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12.
Another source of irregular migration has been students who overstay the terms
of their visa. This is potentially a significant source of irregular migration since a
very liberal approach to educational migration was accepted until recently. Indeed,
as the Consultants emphasise, many of the educational institutions inviting
people to Ireland were, in reality, a conduit for labour migration (IOM, 2006: 93). It
seems possible that a significant proportion of ‘students’ coming to such
situations may also overstay their visas, thereby becoming illegal. Illegal migration
can also arise when people from outside the EEA visit Ireland legally—for tourism
or to spend time with non-EEA nationals, such as those on work permits—but stay
on after expiry of their visitor visas. Recent evidence from the UK suggests that
these sources of illegal migration are probably very significant (see Section 3.4.5
below). At the extreme end of illegal migration is the trafficking of people for
sexual exploitation or forced labour. There is limited evidence of this in Ireland—
although it does occur. It is a growing threat internationally.
Estimates of the numbers of irregular migrants vary widely. The IOM Consultants
report a range of estimates, running from 15,000 to 50,000, while others suggest
even higher figures (IOM, 2006: 20). While the number of illegal migrants is
unknown, irregular migration is a real concern. Irregular migrants are particularly
vulnerable to exploitation and irregular migration could undermine public
confidence in the ability of the State to manage migration successfully. Policy
issues arising are discussed in Chapters 6, 8 and 12.
In recent years, Ireland has passed a number of laws aimed at combating illegal
immigration. The Immigration Act 1999 provides for deportation of non-Irish in
violation of Ireland’s immigration laws. The Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act
2000 bans the smuggling and trafficking of illegal immigrants and the
Immigration Act (2003) prohibits the carrying of a passenger who does not have
proper immigration documents. The Employment Permits Act 2003 and 2006
provide for financial penalties or imprisonment of employers and workers who do
not comply with them. In addition, state benefits to illegal migrants have been
restricted (e.g., the payment of rent assistance was restricted in 2003).
To facilitate repatriation, Ireland has entered return agreements with Poland,
Nigeria, Romania and Bulgaria and has also engaged the IOM to operate voluntary
return programmes on its behalf.
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The lack of hard data or any systematic evidence makes it difficult to assess the
extent to which Ireland’s current immigration and employment laws are actually
enforced. The increased level of legislation and deportations suggests that the
government is expanding its efforts to combat illegal immigration. At the same
time, as the Consultants emphasise, there is no evidence to suggest a serious
crackdown on illegal working. As of February 2005, only three employers had been
convicted for violating the Employment Permits Act 2003 (IOM, 2006: 37)8
8. Data provided by the DJELR in March 2005.
Figure 2.3 Channels of Legal Migration from Outside the EEA
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2.3 Migrants in the Irish Economy
2.3.1 Employment of Migrants in the Irish Economy
The vast majority of migrants in Ireland are involved in the economy. Of the
estimated 271,300 people not having Irish nationality aged 15 and over resident in
Ireland at the start of 2006, almost 197,900 (73 per cent) are in the labour force. A
particularly high share (90 per cent) of the EU 10 population aged over 15 is
estimated to be in the labour force. Participation in the labour force refers to
people engaged in or seeking paid employment. Some of those not formally
classified as participating in the labour force are nonetheless engaged in work,
whether caring work in the home or voluntary activity outside the home.
The share of non-Irish in total employment is not uniquely high in Ireland, but
Ireland is at the higher end of the range of EU countries in this respect. The
estimated share of foreign nationals in total employment—8.1 per cent in the third
quarter of 2005—was the third highest among the 12 EU countries for which data
are available. There are higher shares of non-domestic nationals in employment in
Spain (11.4 per cent) and Austria (10.2 per cent).
Estimates suggest that there has been a substantial increase in the share of non-
Irish in total employment of 4.4 percentage points between 2000 and 2005. The
corresponding share has also increased in other EU Member States. The extent of
the increase has been substantially higher in Ireland, with the exception of Spain
which had a very large increase in the share of non-domestic nationals in
employment of nine percentage points.
A substantial share (almost 40 per cent for the period 2001 to 2005) of the
estimated growth of employment in recent years has consisted of non-Irish
people. In the year to the first quarter of 2006 the increase in non-Irish emploment
(47,600) accounted for just over half (53 per cent) of the total increase in
employment.
The sectors of the economy which rely most on employing migrant workers in
general, and nationals of the EU 10 in particular, are depicted in Figure 2.4. By the
end of 2005, migrants workers were employed in significant numbers throughout
the economy, accounting for 8.6 per cent of total employment, with the notable
exception of public administration and defence where their presence was slight
(1.3 per cent). One sector—hotels and restaurants—stands out for its exceptionally
high reliance on migrant workers; 21 per cent of those with employment in that
sector at the end of 2005 were not Irish nationals, with 7.4 per cent alone being
accounted for by EU 10 nationals alone. Manufacturing and construction are the
only other sectors which rely on migrant workers to a significantly greater degree
than the economy at large; 10.5 per cent and 10 per cent respectively of their
workforces were foreign nationals (and 5.5 per cent and 6 per cent of EU 10
nationals alone) (Figure 2.4).
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Table 2.4 Annual Change in Irish,
Non-Irish and Total Employment (000s)
Irish Non-Irish Total
2001 27.1 20.1 47.3
2002 11.8 11.8 22.4
2003 37.1 9.6 46.6
2004 47.8 17.4 65.2
2005 43.1 43.3 86.5
average 2001 to 2005 33.4 20.4 53.6
Source: Special tabulation provided by the CSO.
Table 2.3 Foreign Nationals as a Percentage of the Labour Force
2000 (Q1) 2005 (Q3) Change
Belgium 8.1 7.4 -0.7
Denmark 2.8 3.2 0.4
Greece 3.5 6.7 3.2
Spain 2.5 11.4 8.9
France 6.0 5.1 -0.9
Ireland 3.7 8.1 4.4
Netherlands 3.6 4.0 0.4
Austria 9.8 10.2 0.4
Portugal 1.9 3.5 1.6
Finland 1.1 1.6 0.5
Sweden * 4.8 *
United Kingdom 4.0 5.8 1.8
Source Calculated from Eurostat data.
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A complementary perspective on the contribution of migrant workers to the Irish
economy is provided by distinguishing between the EU 10 and other non-Irish and
identifying the sectors in which each are most prevalent. This is done in Table 2.5.
It shows significant differences between the sectoral presence of nationals of the
old EU 15 and those of the EU 10. Almost 30 per cent of EU 15 nationals with
employment in Ireland are engaged in providing financial and business services,
whereas the sectors to which EU 10 nationals have most recourse are
manufacturing (where 26 per cent have employment), construction (25 per cent)
and to a lesser extent hotels and restaurants and the wholesale and retail trade
(13-14 per cent in each). The significance of the hotels and restaurants sector as an
employer is most prominent for nationals from outside the EU 25 (22 per cent of
whom work there).
Figure 2.4 Percentage of Total (ILO) Employment by Sector held by 
(a) all non-Irish Nationals, and (b) EU 10 Nationals, Q4 2005
Source CSO, Quarterly National Household Survey, Fourth Quarter, 2005.
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2.3.2 Occupational and Educational Characteristics of Migrants
The characteristics of immigrants are documented in a paper by Barrett et al.
(2005) using data from the QNHS (2003). For this exercise immigrants are defined
as people who describe their nationality as not being Irish, were not born in Ireland
and have lived here for less than ten years; i.e., the focus is on non-Irish immigrants
who arrived in Ireland over the period 1993 to 2003.
In terms of education, the data suggest that immigrants in this period had
considerably higher educational qualifications than the resident population. Over
half (54.2 per cent) of immigrants are estimated to have third-level qualifications,
while just over a quarter of the native population had such qualifications. The
share of immigrants who have at least completed second-level education was
estimated at 85 per cent, compared to 67 per cent of natives. These differences in
educational attainments are influenced by the relatively late expansion of free
secondary education in Ireland. Despite the relatively high educational
qualifications of immigrants, the estimated occupational distribution of
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Table 2.5 Distribution of Employment across Economic Sectors,
by Nationality of Worker, 2005, Fourth Quarter
Economic Sector Irish All Others Specific Non-Irish Groupings
UK EC 13 EC 10 Other
% % % % % %
Agriculture etc. 6.1 2.3 1.7 3.7 3.6 0.6
Manufacturing 14.3 17.7 15.2 11.1 25.8 12.3
Construction 12.6 14.8 12.3 3.7 24.7 9.1
Wholesale, retail 14.6 12.3 12.3 8.3 13.0 13.1
Hotels, restaurants 5.0 14.2 5.7 13.9 14.0 22.0
Transport, communications 6.1 4.3 6.1 5.6 3.1 3.8
Finance, business 13.3 13.2 15.7 29.2 7.3 11.4
Public admin., defence 5.5 0.8 2.5 * * *
Education 6.7 2.3 7.9 8.3 * 3.2
Health 9.7 9.8 12.5 6.5 2.1 19.1
Other 6.1 6.4 7.9 8.3 5.8 4.9
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source CSO, Quarterly National Household Survey, Fourth Quarter, 2005.
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immigrants is close to that of the native population. One possible reason for the
apparent occupational underachievement of immigrants is that immigrants are on
average younger than natives. However, Barrett et al. (2005) show that controlling
for age, a picture of occupational underachievement remains.
The earlier NESC (1991) research on Irish emigration identified a somewhat similar
pattern of occupational underachievement among Irish emigrants to the UK. Key
findings from this research and their potential relevance to Ireland’s current
immigration are discussed in Chapter 3.
2.4 Conclusion
CSO estimates suggest that there has been approximately a fourfold rise in inward
migration from 17,200 in 1987 to 70,000 in 2005. There are three broad categories
of migrants to Ireland: Irish people, other EEA nationals and non-EEA nationals.
Migrants in the first two of these categories have largely unrestricted entry rights
to Ireland. Notwithstanding a large increase in migrants from outside the EEA, the
vast majority of new migrants—estimated at 85 per cent—were either Irish or
other EEA nationals in the year ending April 20059. Population estimates in the
QNHS indicate an increase in the non-Irish population of 54,700 in the first quarter
of 2006 and of this increase almost three quarters were nationals of the NMS.
For migrants from outside the EEA, legal entry is available through a number of
channels: work permits, work visas, student visas, asylum and family reunification.
The Council’s view on the approach to be adopted to those channels is presented
in Chapter 8 below. At present, the data show that the vast majority of new
migrants are EEA nationals with unrestricted entry rights to Ireland.
The data also suggest that the vast majority of migrants are involved in the
economy. The QNHS estimates that of the non-Irish aged 15 and over, 73 per cent
are in the labour force. Around 90 per cent of the NMS nationals aged 15 and over
are in the labour force.
The 2002 Census estimated that 10.4 per cent of the population were foreign-born;
this includes the children of Irish people born abroad and people born in Northern
Ireland. In the same year, an estimated 6 per cent of the population consisted of
people not having an Irish nationality. The foreign-born and non-Irish population
are growing rapidly. A tentative estimate included in the preliminary census
release is that there are around 400,000 non-Irish nationals in the population in
2006. This would represent around 9.4 per cent of the population. Punch (2005)
has projected that the foreign-born population could reach 18 per cent by 2030.
Population projections are presented in Chapter 3.
9. EEA nationals are not separately identified in the data but the vast majority of EEA nationals are included in EU nationals so the data
on EU nationals can be read as essentially equivalent to EEA nationals.
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3 .1 Introduction
This chapter provides the first element of an understanding of recent migration to
Ireland—its causes and effects, both economic and social. Section 3.2 provides an
overview of the different ways in which migration affects economies and societies.
Section 3.3 sets out the causes of migration. Section 3.4 examines the economic
effects of migration in Ireland; this section includes an outline of the ESRI’s
econometric model of Irish labour market and its analysis of the effects of high-
skilled and low-skilled migration. To date, evidence on the social impact of
migration is much more limited than evidence on the economic effects. However,
on the basis of available evidence, Section 3.5 discusses the social effects of
migration. This includes examination of the influence on demography, the impact
of migration on social cohesion and the social effects on migrants themselves.
3.2 Overview of Economic and Social Effects 
3.2.1 Impact on GNP and GNP per Head
At a theoretical level, there are similarities between the economic analysis of
migration and the economic analysis of trade. There are very large differences in
what workers with similar abilities can earn in different countries so that there are
obvious gains from movement in response to these differences. Given these
differences, there are potential gains from migration. Migrants can gain from
higher wages while receiving countries benefit from the enhanced supply of scarce
labour. However, there are concerns about the impact of migration on the
distribution of income as well as ‘external effects’. These external effects of
migration include congestion and changes in the social mix of the population.
The most direct economic effect of migration is that it is an additional source 
of labour supply. If immigration is a response to a buoyant economy, then
economically-motivated migrants would normally be expected to contribute to
increased employment and GNP. In regional economies—and for certain purposes
it is useful to think of Ireland as a regional economy—flows of migrants can have
substantial direct effects on GNP.
Since migration increases both GNP and population, its impact on average living
standards, GNP per head, cannot be determined from theory. There are a number of
mechanisms through which it is possible for migration to increase GNP per capita.
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The first and most significant channel is the labour market. The immigration of
high-skilled workers has the potential to substantially improve cost competitive-
ness and expand GNP by more than the increase in population. This dynamic lies
at the core of the ESRI’s analysis of migration to Ireland from 1993 to 2003 and is
discussed in some detail below. There is also scope for low-skilled workers to boost
competitiveness and GNP.
Second, where there are economies of scale in production, increased employment
through migration can boost GNP per head. It has been argued by Barry (2005) that
the continued attraction of FDI to Ireland, in conjunction with associated
immigration of labour, could enable Ireland to converge with the US in GDP per
capita, assuming that there are economies of scale in production. Much of the FDI
activity in Ireland is characterised by economies of scale. Another source of
economies of scale is public infrastructure and public transport. For example,
immigration to the Dublin region can help make viable the large scale public
investment in infrastructure, such as the Metro, needed to address congestion.
Third, in addition to their impact on costs, there is potential for immigrants to
enhance GNP per head through creativity and expertise. In an influential book on
economic development, The Rise of the Creative Class, it is argued by Florida (2002)
that the ability of a region to attract and mobilize creative people is the most
important factor in driving its economic development. It has been estimated that
about 40 per cent of the R&D jobs in the US are held by immigrants (IOM, 2005).
Such R&D activity can have a large, if hard to quantify, beneficial effect on GNP per
head. The inflow of migrants can also be a source of knowledge and add to inno-
vation across a wide range of economic activities in a way that increases GNP per
head. For some high-level FDI investments, the ability to attract the skills required
from around the world can be a key influence on the location of the investment.
This is not an exhaustive list of channels through which migration may increase
GNP per head and overall economic welfare. There are a variety of other possible
influences, including immigration as a source of entrepreneurship and a stimulus
to new trade connections.
3.2.2 Public Finance
Immigration has implications for the public finances, public services and public
infrastructure. The entry of immigrants to employment will make an immediate
contribution to tax revenue and this has been a non-trivial influence on the Irish
public finances in recent years. Immigrants also avail of public benefits and
services and add to infrastructure pressures, so that estimation of the net impact
on the public finances is very complex. Immigrants pose new pressures on public
services, such as the increased pressure on schools and the education system to
serve a larger and more diverse student population (see Chapter 11). Immigration
to Ireland in recent years has also added to housing demand, thus increasing
pressure on the housing market.
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No estimates have yet been made of the impact of immigration on the Irish public
finances. Estimates of the impact on GNP, GNP per head and other economic
variables in Ireland are presented below. Since migrants are concentrated among
the working-age population (see Section 3.5 below) it is likely that, for the moment,
migrants are having a positive impact on the public finances.
3.2.3. Income Distribution
Immigration is likely to have an impact on the distribution of income. By increasing
the supply of labour, immigration may moderate the growth of wages of native
workers. Low-skilled migration may lead a widening of the income distribution.
Employers may prefer to employ migrants with relevant skills and positive work
attitudes rather than people who are currently excluded from the labour force who
may require support and training. The Council has emphasised the desirability of
reforms to increase the participation of groups currently excluded from the labour
force. The effects of migration on public services could also have distributional
implications. For example, if migrants with limited English language skills were
concentrated in certain schools, this could disproportionately affect people on
lower incomes who tend to be less selective in choosing schools.
3.2.4. Identity and Cohesion
Immigration has further complex societal effects. Since it alters the demographic
composition of the population, it can be an influence on national identity and
social cohesion. The social interaction between migrants and the host society can
take many forms and this is a major influence on the overall experience of
migration and immigration. These social issues, along with the impact of
migration on population change, are discussed in Section 3.5 below.
3.2.5. Long-Run and Short-Run Effects
The effects of migration will manifest themselves in both the short and the long
run. The effects on the labour market are immediate but are also of long-run
significance. Migration can have an effect on long-run demographic trends.
Immigration to Ireland is disproportionately concentrated among working-age
adults; hence it increases the share of the working-age population in the national
population and thereby, if sustained, can make a contribution to offsetting the
effects of an ageing population. Migration potentially affects the long-run path of
economic development through its impact on creativity and enterprise. The impact
on the public finances, public services and infrastructure arise in both the short run
and the long run. The wider societal influences on national identity and social
cohesion are key issues for the long term.
In considering the short and long-run effects, it is worthwhile reflecting on the
Irish experience of emigration. Emigration in past decades and centuries reduced
the supply of labour and one of its probable immediate impacts was to increase
the average income of the remaining population. However, it has long been held—
by most economic analysts and successive governments—that emigration had an
adverse impact on Ireland’s long-run development (Kennedy et al., 1988, Mjoset,
1993). Emigration of young adults increased the dependency ratio of the
population. The loss of young people may have resulted in a loss of creativity and
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dynamism. The size of the domestic market was reduced. The decades of high
emigration were characterised by slow growth not only in total population and
total income (extensive growth) but also in average income or living standards
(intensive growth). Conversely, Ireland’s long-run prospects for growth in both
total income and average income may be enhanced by inward migration. As noted
above, this does not imply that there is a tight relationship between the level of
immigration and growth of GNP per head.
3.3 Causes of Migration1
Economically-motivated migration is generally explained by demand-pull factors
in the destination area, supply-push factors in the origin area, and network factors
that link them. There are three clear lessons of experience:
s If demand-pull and supply-push factors exist, approved or unapproved recruit-
ment can set labour migration in motion. If the reasons for migration persist,
the people and information networks that evolve can cause migration to
increase over time.
s If supply-push factors weaken because of wage and job growth in migrant
areas of origin, emigration can slow even if demand-pull and network factors
abroad persist, as in the Korean, Irish, Italian, and Spanish cases, where
emigration slowed with economic growth.
s If demand-pull abroad persists, migrants are likely to continue to arrive,
although their origins and networks may change, as in the case of Germany’s
shift from Turkish to Polish construction workers.
A particular supply-push influence on recent Irish immigration was the
enlargement of the EU. The effects of this are examined in Chapter 4, while 
the influence of the global environment on migration flows to Ireland is discussed
in Chapter 5.
Public policy can influence the nature and interaction of demand-pull, supply-push
and network factors. Demand-pull factors are most amenable to management by
governments at the beginnings of labour flows, explaining the aphorism that the
easiest way for a government to start a labour migration flow from a particular
area is to encourage, allow, or tolerate the recruitment of migrants there. This
highlights the importance of well thought-out and consciously chosen policies in
the early stages of migration. As the Consultants say, over time, government policy
may lose its effectiveness as migrant supply creates its own demand in destination
areas in ways that make government efforts to reduce migrant inflows difficult
(IOM, 2006: 56). For example, middle-class households who once did their own
housework can hire gardeners and domestic helpers, creating more jobs and new
industries, while migrant networks in construction, agriculture, and some
manufacturing and services can ‘take over’ recruitment and training mechanisms.
If employers in these sectors adapt to the language and nature of the migrant
work force, they may no longer seek local workers to fill vacant jobs.
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1. This section draws on the IOM Consultants report.
Governmental efforts to ‘re-nationalise’ what have become migrant sectors are
generally unsuccessful. In France in the early 1980s, and in the oil-exporting Gulf
countries today, government policies aimed at training natives and subsidizing
their wages to ‘better compete with’ migrants have generally failed because many
employers preferred the migrants to whom they had become accustomed.
Successful ‘re-nationalisation’ strategies generally involve (subsidised) mechanisa-
tion or technological changes that restructure work, as in agriculture, or provide
sharply higher wages, as with home health care workers hired by the elderly with
public support in some areas of the US. Freer trade can also affect the demand for
migrants, as cheaper imports eventually shrink or eliminate certain industries and
their demand for migrants.
In some cases, the demand-pull for migrants can be reduced with stepped-up
enforcement of labour, immigration and tax laws, especially when the demand for
migrants exists or expands because of violations of such laws. However, it has been
difficult for governments in most countries to sustain the level of enforcement
needed to transform ‘migrant jobs’ into jobs acceptable to local workers solely with
enforcement. With employers and migrants wanting to prolong their relationship,
there must be ample and sustained enforcement to prevent what publics often see
as an economic asset or at worst a ‘victimless crime’ (see IOM, 2006).
3.4 Economic Effects of Migration
The effect of recent migration on the Irish economy is a significant issue of public
concern. This section begins with an overview of the findings of the international
research on the effects of immigration on the labour market outcomes of native
workers. This is followed by a presentation of key findings from ESRI research on
the effects of migration on the Irish economy. Other recent data are then examined
with a view to gaining some further insights on this issue.
3.4.1 Evidence from Other Countries
There has been extensive empirical research on the direct labour market effects of
migration. The findings across many studies, using a variety of research
methodologies, suggest that the effects of immigration on native workers are
small. This can be seen from the following quotations, taken from extensive
literature reviews:
Most papers find effects of immigration on wages and employment prospects of
native workers which are either modest or absent (Dustman et al., 2005: F324).
Empirical estimates in a variety of settings, and using a variety of approaches
have shown that the effect on the labour market outcomes of natives is small.
There is no evidence of economically significant reductions in native employ-
ment. Most empirical analysis of the United States and other countries finds
that a 10 per cent increase in the fraction of immigrants in the population
reduces native wages by at most 1 per cent (Friedberg and Hunt, 1995: 42).
The broad conclusion of 22 years of research since Grossman’s (1982) estimates
is that the impact of immigration on wages is statistically significant but
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quantitatively small. This has indeed been confirmed by our meta-analysis
(Longhi et al., 2005: 23).
An OECD review of the literature since the mid-1970s found that studies converge:
In concluding that immigration causes no crowding-out on the labour market
and does not depress the income of nationals…This is probably the most
important contribution economists have made to clarifying the issues involved
(OECD, 1994: 164).
This general consensus in the literature is ‘not undisputed’ (Dustman et al., 2005:
F325). In particular, research by Borjas and colleagues in the US has produced
estimates of larger negative effects on less-skilled workers. Most of the research on
the effects of immigration on the US had consisted of area studies. These studies
had focused on the fact that immigration is concentrated in a number of states,
such as California. Researchers compared the outcomes for native workers in areas
with varying levels of immigration. Borjas has raised two concerns with this
approach. First, migration may be correlated with positive economic outcomes that
are independent of immigration. For example, California is a high-wage state for a
variety of reasons. The correlation of high wages and high immigration could lead
researchers to the spurious conclusion that immigration leads to higher wages.
Second, immigration to a particular state, such as California, could lead to off-
setting internal migration; for example, fewer low-skilled US workers may go to
California because of the concentration of immigrants there. This would lead to a
diffusion of the effects of immigration to California across the US labour market.
For these reasons, Borjas et al. (1997) argue that it is preferable to examine the
effects of immigration at the national level using a ‘factor-proportions approach’.
They compare the actual outcomes for wages and employment against a
hypothetical outcome that would have occurred without immigration, using
economy-wide estimates of elasticity. Their analysis distinguished different
skill categories: those who had not completed high school, high school graduates
and third-level graduates. They estimated that immigration increased the supply
of workers with less than a high school degree by 15 to 20 per cent over the period
1980 to 1995, and that this had a substantial effect in reducing this group’s
relative earnings. While reducing the relative earnings of those who had not
completed high school, immigration seemed to have relatively little effect on 
the sharp growth in the wage differential between those with college and high-
school education.
A study by Bauer (1998) examined the effects of immigration in Germany,
distinguishing between different types of labour. Three groups were identified:
low-skilled blue-collar, high-skilled blue-collar and white-collar. They found some
negative effects for low-skilled workers but these were very small; they estimated
that a 10 per cent inflow of white-collar immigrants reduces the wages of low-
skilled blue-collar workers by 0.2 per cent. Indeed all of the estimated wage effects
of immigration were numerically very small.
The findings on the limited effects of migration on the employment prospects of
native workers are consistent with economic theory. It would predict that if an
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economy is functioning reasonably well it would be capable of absorbing an
increase in labour supply. The idea that there is some given quantity of work to be
shared out among migrant and native workers is regarded by economists as the
‘lump-of-labour’ fallacy (see NESC, 2005b : 90).
The lack of much evidence regarding substantial effects of migration on the wages
of native workers is more surprising from the perspective of economic analysis.
Economic theory predicts that an increase in the supply of labour will result in
wages being lower that they would otherwise be. The adjustment mechanisms
that seem to significantly offset this effect are not fully understood. A number of
them are worth noting.
A first possibility is that the impact of in-migration on labour supply in a particular
region may be offset by out-migration of natives, as noted above. Another
explanation that has received a lot of attention is that the industry structure or
technology adjusts to changes in the skill composition of the labour force. These
possibilities have been empirically examined by Lewis (2004). Lewis estimated that
changes in the relative supply of skill groups had only limited effect on industry
structure, but found a large effect on the use by the economy of the factor whose
supply had increased. Thus, for example, a migration-induced increase in the
supply of low-skilled labour leads employers to use more labour intensive
technology than they would otherwise use. Other research has found a more a
significant influence on industry structure. For example, Altonji and Card (1989)
found that the nation-wide (US) trend in falling employment in immigrant-
intensive industries has been slower in high-immigration cities. While no research
on this issue has been undertaken in Ireland, it is possible that there could be a
significant industrial structure effect. For example, it is reasonable to suggest that
in the absence of migrant workers, the tourism sector would not have expanded to
the extent that it did.
The impact of migration on wages will also be partly offset by the increase in
labour demand arising from a migration-induced increase in population. This
effect will depend on the share of the migrant income that is spent on
domestically produced goods and services.
Another possible explanation for the absence of strong labour market effects is
that these effects are dominated by the dynamic effects of migration in inducing
technological change. For example, as noted above, migrants can bring new skills
and expertise that increase productivity and hence the real wages of natives (see
Poot and Cochrane, 2004). This would be a longer-term effect.
It can be concluded from this brief discussion of international literature that the
estimated effects of immigration on the earnings and employment of native
workers are usually found to be small but that some research finds that low-skilled
immigration adversely affects the earnings of low-skilled natives.
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3.4.2 Model-Based Estimates of the Effects of Migration 
on the Irish Economy and Labour Market
A series of papers2 by ESRI researchers have examined the effects of migration on
the Irish economy. This analysis distinguishes the effects of high-skilled and low-
skilled migrants.
The approach adopted is to first specify and measure a structural model of the Irish
economy and then examine the effects on the model of increases in labour supply
equivalent to the immigration that has occurred. The approach is broadly
comparable to that applied by Borjas to US immigration. The model is an abstrac-
tion from a complex reality and includes four key behavioural relations: output
determination, labour supply (incorporating the migration decision), labour
demand and the wage/unemployment equilibrium. The output of the economy
depends on the level of world demand and the cost competitiveness of the Irish
economy. Labour is classified as either high-skilled (completed second-level educa-
tion) or low-skilled (with less than this education). There is one type of output in
this model.
Barrett et al. (2006a) first consider the effects of an increase in labour supply of
72,000, with 85 per cent of this supply consisting of high-skilled labour; this
corresponds to the estimated level and composition of (non-Irish) net migration
over the period 1993 to 2003. This increase in predominantly high-skilled labour
was estimated to have the effect of reducing the wages of high-skilled labour (by
5.9 per cent) and improving cost competitiveness, leading to an increase in GNP
and employment. This gave rise to an increase in demand for low-skilled labour,
resulting in an estimated increase in both low-skilled employment (2.3 per cent)
and low-skilled wages (1 per cent).With a reduction in high-skilled wages and a rise
in low-skilled wages there was, this analysis suggests, a compression in the wage
distribution. It is estimated that GNP is 3.5 per cent higher, GNP per head is 0.9 per
cent higher while employment is 2.5 per cent higher than would have been the
case without any migration. 3
The relevance of this analysis could be queried on the basis that, given
occupational underachievement, the effects on the labour market of an immigrant
with a given educational level are different from the effects of a native with the
same educational attainment. For example, if people with higher-level educational
qualifications are employed in less-skilled work, then regardless of their edu-
cational qualifications, their economic impact could be the same as a low-skilled
migrant. To address this Barrett et al. (2006a) go on to examine the effects of the
same quantity of immigration, but this time assuming that immigrants have the
same educational attainments as the native population. The rationale for this is
that the occupational distribution of immigrants and natives is broadly
comparable, so that the de-facto educational attainments could also be taken as
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2. A model of the Irish labour market was first developed and used to examine the effects of immigration by Fitz Gerald and Kearney
(2000). This was subsequently used by Barrett, Fitz Gerald and Nolan (2002), Bergin and Kearney (2004) and Barrett and Bergin and
Duffy (2006a). The discussion here is based mainly on the most recently published of these papers; i.e., Barrett, Bergin and Duffy
(2006a).
3. Barrett et al. (2006a) report different results depending on whether or not the low-skilled labour market ‘clears’; i.e., whether or not
there is unemployment among low-skilled workers. To simplify the exposition, the text here only refers to the scenario in which the
labour market clears.
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comparable. Barrett et al. (2006a) regard this approach as conservative with
regard to the education of immigrants. Hence this approach provides a lower
bound estimate of the effects of skilled migrant labour on the economy.
With the assumption that immigrants have the same human capital as the native
population, the simulated effects are mostly in the same direction as before, but
the impact on the economy was estimated to be less.With a smaller increase in the
supply of skilled labour, the simulation shows a smaller gain in competitiveness
and a correspondingly smaller increase in GNP (an increase of 2.8 per cent) and
employment (an increase of 2.1 per cent). GNP per head was estimated to increase
by 0.4 per cent. This simulation also shows less of a stimulus to the low-skilled
labour market and a modest fall (0.2 per cent) in the wages of low-skilled labour
(arising from the increase in low-skilled labour supply). There was a larger fall in
skilled wages (4.6 per cent) so that there was still a narrowing of the wage
distribution, but less than occurred before. If it is assumed that low-skilled wages
cannot fall (because the social welfare system prevents such a fall) then there
would be a modest increase in low-skilled unemployment (0.2 per cent).
Finally, to illustrate the potential effects if immigration were to be predominantly
low-skilled, Barrett et al. (2006a) then reverse the shares with regard to the
composition of the labour supply; i.e., they simulate the effects of an increase in
labour supply that is 15 per cent high-skilled and 85 per cent low-skilled. Such an
increase in the supply of low-skilled labour was estimated to create a fall in low-
skilled wages (3.7 per cent). There would also be a fall in high-skilled wages (0.5 per
cent), but with a greater fall in low-skilled wages there would be a widening of the
wage distribution. Compared to the earlier simulations, the average fall in wages
would be lower, so that the gain in competitiveness would be more modest. This
would lead to a correspondingly lower increase in GNP and total employment and
a fall in GNP per head. If the low-skilled labour market does not clear, then there
would be an increase in unemployment (1.8 per cent). Even with labour market
clearing, the increase in the labour force and employment would be considerably
lower than in the previous simulations, notwithstanding the fact that the absolute
rise in population is the same. This analysis suggests immigration that is
predominantly low-skilled would have the effect of reducing low-skilled labour
force participation.
Since 1960, there has been a trend of low-skilled wages falling relative to average
wages; i.e., an increase in the earnings dispersion—a trend found in many, but not
all, countries. Interestingly, in Ireland this trend was reversed from the mid-1990s up
to 2000, with an increase in low-skilled wages relative to the average (see Figure 3.1).
Immigration to Ireland was predominantly high-skilled during this period. It is a
reasonable inference from the analysis above that the rise in relative low-skilled
wages was facilitated by the immigration of high-skilled workers in this period.
The increase in relative low-skilled wages in the late 1990s has since come to an
end and low-skilled wages declined relative to the average during the years 2002
to 2004; i.e., there was a widening of the wage distribution4. This coincided with a
large increase in migration, so that it is possible that migration was a significant
4. Preliminary data for 2005 (not shown) indicate that low-skilled wages may have increased relative to average. The 2005 figures
however are subject to revision..
influence on this widening, although this has not yet been established. This may
be a one-off effect linked to the particularly high level of immigration in the most
recent years. In view of the long-run trend evident since the 1960s, it is clear that
there are influences other than migration on low-skilled wages.
3.4.3 Other Evidence on the Economic Effects of Migration in Ireland
Introduction
As a complement to the work on the modelling of migration presented above, this
section considers the likely effects of migration in Ireland by directly examining
some recent economic trends.
Wages: The Overall Picture
One concern is that the migration-induced increase in labour supply will result in
a reduction in wages. The analysis of migration by Barrett et al. (2006a), presented
above, estimates that migration has indeed moderated wage growth but that the
results overall have been beneficial; most of the migration has been high-skilled
and it increased GNP per head and reduced wage dispersion.
It is worth noting that, notwithstanding a moderating effect of migration on
wages, a high level of inward migration to Ireland has coincided with strong
growth in both nominal and real wages on average across the economy. The
annual average real wage growth (using the European Commission’s measure of
gross real compensation per head) across the economy during the years 2001 to
2005 was 2.3 per cent which was the third highest among the EU 15 countries. Real
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Figure 3.1 Low-skilled Wages Relative to Average Wages
Source Data provided by John Fitz Gerald of the ESRI.
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wage growth has continued following enlargement. The Winter 2005 ESRI
Quarterly Economic Commentary estimates a moderation in economy-wide real
wage growth (average wage per employee in real terms) from 3.1 per cent in 2004
to 2.8 per cent in 2005.
Figure 3.2 Annual Percentage Change in 
Gross Real Compensation Per Head
Source European Commission (2005), Autumn Economic Forecasts.
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Sectoral Wage Developments
While wage growth has been strong on average, the question arises as to whether
migration causes wages to fall in particular sectors. An obvious candidate for
examination are the earnings of workers in the sector of the economy termed
‘hotels and restaurants’. As we have seen, in our discussion of Quarterly National
Household Survey, by the end of 2005 21 per cent of people at work in this sector
were migrants (Figure 2.4 in Chapter 2), and it is estimated to have absorbed more
than one in five nationals from beyond the EU and 14 per cent of those coming
from within the EU (Table 2.5, also in Chapter 2). Data on earnings in ‘accommoda-
tion and catering’ are available since early 1998, which correspond closely to the
‘hotels and restaurants’ sector on which the employment data are based. Table 3.1
shows that estimated average weekly earnings in accommodation and catering in
Ireland have grown at the same rate as gross average industrial earnings over the
period, 1998–2005, by a cumulative 50 per cent. However, by remaining at about 70
per cent of gross average industrial earnings (GAIE), the absolute gap between
average earnings in accommodation and catering and GAIE has widened appreci-
ably, as Figure 3.3 illustrates. Figure 3.3 also suggests that the year 2001 and first
half of 2002 were a period when growth in earnings paused in accommodation
and catering (detected cases of foot-and-mouth disease in Spring 2001 and 9/11 in
New York that autumn impacted severely on the tourism industry). It seems that
no impact from EU enlargement is discernible in either of the two series. Separate
scrutiny of the employment figures (not shown) establishes that employment in
the sector increased by 23 per cent over the eight-year period, with the proportion
classified as full-time employees rising some five percentage points, to 54 per cent
of all engaged.
One caveat to the earning figures in accommodation and catering is that they refer
to full-time employees—defined as those working for more than 30 hours per
week—in enterprise with five or more persons employed. This applies to all of the
CSO data on earnings in distribution and business. Analysis by the CSO showed
that it would not be possible to derive reliable earnings estimates for part-time
employees or for small enterprises with less than five persons engaged. It is
possible that migrant workers employed on a part-time basis could be depressing
earnings without this showing up in the data. Information on hours worked and
hourly earnings are not collected in this survey. The ESRI has combined weekly
earnings data with data on hours worked in the QNHS to produce estimates of
hourly earnings. These are presented below.
Figure 3.3 widens the picture by including average weekly earnings in two further
sectors which receive a large number of migrant workers: ‘other business activity’
and construction. ‘Other business activity’ includes call centres, labour recruitment
and provision of personnel, security activities, and industrial cleaning (while
earnings data are regularly published for this sector, there is no closely corre-
sponding employment data). For construction, where an estimated 10 per cent of
all workers were migrants by the end of 2005, the earnings data for unskilled and
semi-skilled operatives is selected. Finally, a sector largely immune to market
forces and with few migrants, local authorities, is included as an additional
comparator along with industrial earnings.
The overall picture is one of growth in real earnings occurring across the economy
with no obvious tendency for earnings in those sectors with the largest inflows of
migrant workers to lag behind average industrial earnings. The above average
growth in earnings in the sheltered local authority sector reflects, in part, the
beneficial impact of public sector wage settlements on the lowest paid public
sector workers in particular.
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Figure 3.3 Gross Average Weekly Earnings Series, 1998–2005
Source CSO, various earnings series, available at www.cso.ie
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Estimates of Earnings in Construction
There was particularly strong growth in estimated construction earnings
reflecting the unprecedentedly high levels of building and infrastructural
investment that took place over the period. The CSO data on earnings in
construction, as emphasised in recent public debate, refer specifically to those who
are direct employees (in businesses in which there are at least 10 people engaged).
The QNHS estimates that there were a total of 59,300 people self-employed in
construction in the final quarter of 2005, representing 23.4 per cent of all those
engaged in construction. This share has fallen in recent years and is now
somewhat below the EU average share of self-employment in construction (27.1
per cent in 2005). Other data on self employment in construction are available
from a review of the pensions scheme for construction workers by Mercer
Consultants. This review distinguished operatives, who comprise around two
thirds of all those engaged in construction, from others, including managers,
professionals, apprentices and some public sector employees. Based on Revenue
Commissioners data, Mercer estimated that in the final quarter of 2004, of the
150,000 operatives in construction, 70,000, or 46.6 per cent, were self-employed.
In addition to self-employed, the Mercer Consultants also noted that there are
operatives employed through employment agencies, but there are no data
available on this. Such people would also not be covered by earnings surveys.
Hence there is a substantial share of people in construction for whom earnings
data are not collected. If data were available on the earnings of all operatives in
construction, including the self employed, then it is possible that earnings growth
would not be quite as strong as shown in Figure 3.3. The high earnings in the
construction sector at present would be expected to attract migrant workers and
to moderate earnings growth. This is not in itself problematic provided it does not
lead to an undermining of standards. The ESRI’s Medium Term Review of December
2005 points out that the expansion of the construction sector has required it to bid
scarce resources from other sectors of the economy and from abroad and that the
resulting higher labour costs and higher housing costs are putting pressure on the
rest of the economy and contributing to the loss of manufacturing jobs.
Table 3.1 Indices of Growth in Weekly Earnings and Employment,
Selected Sectors, and Consumer Price Index, 1998–2005
(1998=100)
Consumer Other Accommodation Industry Local Construction
Price Business and Catering Autorities (unskilled and
Index Activity semiskilled)
Earnings 1.31 1.48 1.51 1.52 1.74 1.87
Employment 1.49 1.23 1.22 1.88
Source CSO, various series, available at www.cso.ie
The Overall Picture on Weekly Earnings
The overall picture that emerges, as summarised in Table 3.1, is that notwith-
standing certain gaps in the data, a period characterised by the emergence of
major migration into Ireland has seen significant growth in employment and
earnings across the economy, both in sectors which have absorbed large numbers
of migrants and in those which have not. It is acknowledged that there are certain
gaps in the data; for example, much of the CSO data on earnings in services
excludes part-time workers and the CSO series on earnings do not cover the self-
employed. The Council welcomes the proposal in the new agreement, Towards
2016, to initiate new data series on earnings and to establish a group to track
changing patterns of employment and earnings. This will include the hourly
earnings of workers and, ‘as a priority, both of workers from overseas and of the
self employment of skilled and unskilled workers’ (98).
Hourly Earnings
The discussion so far has focussed on weekly earnings data. There is the possibility
that an increase in hours worked has disguised a fall in hourly earnings. An
overview of hourly earnings in the economy as a whole and in the main sectors is
presented in Table 3.3 below, taken from the ESRI Quarterly Economic
Commentary. This hourly earnings series presents a more comprehensive picture
of hourly earnings than is available from CSO series. This table shows continuing
strong growth in economy-wide hourly earnings over recent years. In 2005,
estimated growth in economy-wide hourly earnings was 5.3 per cent, which was
lower than growth than the previous year (7.1 per cent). Barrett et al. (2006b)
suggest that migration probably resulted in slower wage growth in 2005 than
would have otherwise occurred. Evaluations of this are bound to differ; Barrett
et al., suggest that in a rapidly growing economy it is a positive development.
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Table 3.2 Self-Employment in Construction 
(as Percentage of Total Engaged in Construction)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Self-employed 
(no paid employees) 14.7 14.6 15.7 14.2 13.8 12.8
Self-employed 
(with paid employees) 12.1 11.5 11.3 12.0 11.3 10.7
Total self-employed 26.8 26.1 27.0 26.2 25.2 23.4
Source Special Tabulation provided by the CSO from the QNHS.
Most sectors have continued to experience buoyant growth in hourly earnings.
One sector in which there has been a slowdown in earnings growth is the
industrial sector (essentially manufacturing); estimated hourly earnings growth
for this sector fell from 5.4 per cent in 2004 to 3.7 per cent in 2005. Earnings growth
was similar in both high-tech and other manufacturing. CSO data confirm a
slowdown in earnings in industry. It is estimated that hourly earnings for all
industrial workers increased by 5 per cent in 2004 and by just 3.1 per cent in 2005.
This slowdown in industrial earnings growth is more evident when one looks at
the quarterly CSO data as shown here in Figure 3.4.
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Table 3.3  Average Hourly Earnings by Sector*
Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual
Hourly Cumulative Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth
Sector Earnings Growth Rate Rate Rate Rate Rate Rate
Q1 2000-
Q3 2005 Q3 2005 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Euro %age %age %age %age %age %age %age
Economy** 17.7 42.6 7.2 9.7 5.7 4.7 7.1 5.3
Industry 14.1 39.5 8 7.8 6.9 4.7 5.4 3.7
Hi-Tech 14.4 42.6 7.8 5.1 8 5.3 9.2 3.6
Other Manufacturing*** 13.7 36 8.2 11 5.4 4.1 1.3 3.7
Construction 18.6 52.2 6.6 11.2 12.5 2 6.5 6
Services
Non-Market Services 23.5 42.8 2.6 10.3 4.2 4.6 10.2 6.2
Transport & Comm 17.7 31.9 6.4 10.9 -0.1 4.4 5 5.1
Distribution 16.4 41.4 13 7.7 7.1 5.1 4.4 4.8
Hotels and Restaurants 10.5 40.3 7.9 4.6 3.1 7.1 6.6 5.5
Other Market Services 18.0 32.5 9.1 9.3 0.6 5.3 5 3.5
Quarter 1 - March, Quarter 2 - June, Quarter 3 - September, Quarter 4 - December.
* Annual growth rates are calculated using earnings in September of each year.
** Excludes agricultural and health sector earnings.
*** Excluding utilities and mining and quarrying.
Source ESRI, Quarterly Economic Commentary, Spring 2006.
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The ESRI data also show a slowdown in hourly earnings growth in one part of
market services, ‘other market services’. Hourly earnings growth in this sector was
estimated at 5 per cent in 2004 and 3.5 per cent in 2005. This includes financial
services and international services.
It is possible that there is a connection between the slowdown in hourly earnings
growth in manufacturing and migration. However, this sector is under strong
competitive pressure so that one would expect this pressure to result in slower
earnings growth.
It can be concluded from the hourly earnings data that while there is some
evidence of moderation, particularly in manufacturing and certain exposed
services, overall hourly earnings growth has continued to be buoyant.
Accession and Hourly Earnings Growth
A study by researchers from the ESRI and a Swedish research institute (SIEPS)
examined the impact of accession of the new member states on earnings growth
by comparing hourly earnings growth in the five quarters before accession (March
2003 to May 2004) and after accession (May 2004 to September 2005) (Doyle et
al., 2006). They found a larger and more widespread decline in hourly earnings
growth than are evident in Table 3.3.The economy-wide increase in hourly earnings
in the five quarters before enlargement was 8.8 per cent while it was 5.7 per cent
Figure 3.4 Percentage Change in Quarterly 
Hourly Industrial Earnings
Source CSO, Industrial Earnings and Hours Worked. The changes shown are the year-on-year change in each quarter for the index of
hourly earnings for all industrial workers in all industries.
200
0Q
1
200
0Q
3
200
1Q1
200
1Q3
200
2Q
1
200
2Q
3
200
3Q
1
200
3Q
3
200
4Q
1
200
4Q
3
200
5Q
1
200
5Q
3
200
6Q
1
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
10.0
12.0
44
in the five quarters following enlargement, a fall of over three percentage points.
Doyle et al. also found that earnings growth was slower in the post-enlargement
period in eight out of ten sectors.
The authors of this study infer that the slowdown in earnings that they observed
could be due to enlargement. However, they also point out that the slowdown is
within historical experience and could reflect seasonal and other factors. They
point out that construction and retailing were the two sectors in which the
percentage increase in employment of accession state nationals was the highest
and that these two were the only sectors that did not experience a slowdown in
earnings growth. This is an indication that there are significant influences other
than enlargement on the slower earnings growth.
Minimum Wage Trends 
If migrants were having an adverse effect on wages at the lower end of the wage
distribution, this would be expected to result in an increase in the share of those
earning the minimum wage. Obviously there are other influences, in particular the
level of the minimum wage. A recent ESRI study (Nolan et al., 2006) commissioned
by the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment reports the findings of a
survey of minimum wage employment in late 2005. The survey covered the non-
agricultural private sector. This survey found that 2.2 per cent of all employees in
the private sector were paid below the full minimum adult rate while a further 3
per cent were on the full adult minimum. This was a slight increase over the
previous survey in 2002. The 2002 survey found that 1.9 per cent of employees
were paid below the full adult minimum and a further 2.6 were paid at this
minimum. However, the authors point out that ‘these differences are not
statistically significant—in other words they fall within the standard sampling
variation expected in such surveys’ (Nolan et al., 2006, section 6.3).
For the first time, the survey sought data on the nationality of employees in low
wage work (defined as earning c8 or less an hour). It estimated that non-Irish
employees were more likely to be engaged in low-wage work: overall, 9.9 per cent
of employees were paid c8.00 per hour or less; this estimated share was 8.5 per
cent for Irish employees, 24 per cent for those from other EU countries, while 14 per
cent of those from outside the EU were paid at this level. These data do not
necessarily imply that non-Irish employees are paid less for similar work. The
higher incidence of low-waged work among non-Irish employees could reflect
differences in occupation, skills, experience and age-profile. Nevertheless,
anecdotal evidence does suggest that some migrants are paid less than Irish
workers working alongside them or in similar occupations.
Despite the lower representation of Irish workers in low-waged work, this survey
evidence suggests that it is still the case that the vast majority (three quarters) of
those engaged in low-waged work are Irish people.
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Employment, Unemployment, Labour Displacement and Replacement
The displacement of Irish workers by migrants is potentially a serious concern.
Although the terms are not very precise, it seems important to distinguish
between displacement and replacement. It would seem appropriate to use the
term ‘displacement’ where Irish people are replaced in jobs and either become
unemployed, withdraw from the labour force or obtain less desirable employment.
The term replacement seems appropriate where Irish people move to better
opportunities and are replaced by migrants.
As noted above, the studies of migration in the international literature typically do
not find much evidence of a significant level of displacement. Based on the
evidence available for Ireland, the following observations can be made. The
aggregate data in the QNHS strongly suggests that the increase in the
employment of non-Irish people has not meant a contraction of employment
levels for Irish people. Over the past year (to the first quarter of 2006), there has
been a very large expansion in employment, estimated at almost 90,000.
Employment by non-Irish people increased by 47,600 (53 per cent of the total)
while employment by Irish people increased by 42,200 (47 per cent of the total).
Looking at the sectoral distribution of employment over the past year, the
estimated employment of Irish people increased in nine of the eleven sectors
identified in the QNHS. In other production industries there was a substantial
decline in the employment of Irish people, of over 19,000 accompanied by an
increase in employment of non-Irish people (6,900). In hotels and restaurants
there was a decline in the estimated employment of Irish people of 4,500,
accompanied by an increase of people of other nationalities of 5,400.
Hence, in these sectors some form of replacement would certainly seem to be
occurring. The issue is whether it is a positive process of upward mobility or
whether it involves the displacement of Irish people to unemployment or less
favourable situations. It is not possible to infer from the data whether there is
displacement occurring in these sectors.
While some displacement may be taking place, it is worth noting that
unemployment in Ireland has remained at a low level in recent years, at around 4
per cent, and the latest data indicate that the Irish rate of unemployment is lower
than in any other EU country. This implies that there is not any widespread process
of Irish people being displaced into unemployment.
Displacement of Irish people may not necessarily show up in increased
unemployment; it could be reflected in people dropping out of the labour force.
Participation in the labour force in Ireland has been rising in recent years, from an
estimate of 56.8 per cent in 1998 to 62.2 per cent in 2006 (first quarter in each
case). Again, this does not suggests that increased migration has, in the past seven
years, led Irish people to withdraw from the labour market. There is a variation in
the trend in participation rates by gender. Participation in the labour force among
women has increased more than among men. Since 1998, estimated male labour
force participation has increased by 2.7 percentage points. Over the same period,
the cumulative increase in female labour force participation was estimated at
eight percentage points. Both male and female participation have continued to
rise in the period since enlargement (see Appendix Table A3.4).
While unemployment is low and participation generally is rising, there is the
possibility that particular segments of the population could be adversely affected
by migration, such as young people or people with limited educational
qualifications. We now examine the situation among some key age and
educational groupings.
Young People in the Labour Market
The ESRI has published an ongoing survey of the labour market performance
among school leavers approximately one year after leaving school. The most
recently published survey was conducted in 2004 among those who had left
school during the 2002/2003 academic year. This survey estimated an increase in
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Table 3.4 Change in Employment by Sector and Nationality 
(000s) over the year to 2006 (First Quarter)
Non-Irish 
Irish Nationals EU 10 Total
Agriculture, forestry,
and fishing 1.8 1.3 0.9 3.0
Other production industries -19.2 6.9 8.5 -12.3
Construction 12.3 8.4 7.9 20.7
Wholesale and retail trade 14.1 4.5 4.9 18.5
Hotels and restaurants -4.5 5.4 2.4 0.8
Transport, storage,
and communication 3.0 1.8 2.3 4.8
Financial and other 
business services 6.6 9.6 4.4 16.3
Public administration 
and defence 6.6 0.1 * 6.7
Education 12.2 0.9 0.3 13.0
Health 5.0 5.8 0.7 10.8
Other services 4.4 3.1 2.0 7.4
Total 42.2 47.6 34.2 89.8
Source CSO, Quarterly National Household Survey, 2006, First Quarter.
unemployment from 11 per cent in 1999 to 21 per cent in 2004. Unemployment has
increased both for those with the Leaving Certificate and those without formal
qualifications, although the estimated rate of unemployment is far higher in the
latter case (50.4 per cent for those with no qualifications in 2004). There was an
associated fall in employment among this group. This rise in unemployment
among young people may be caused, in part, by migration, although other
explanations might be offered.
CSO data on labour market performance are available for the larger grouping of
young people aged 18 to 24 for the years 2002 to 2005. For this larger group, there
was a modest rise in unemployment, from 7.5 per cent in 2002 to 8.1 per cent in
2005. This was in the context of rising employment and labour force participation.
The share of this group in employment rose from 58.5 per cent in 2002 to 60.3 per
cent in 2005. Hence, young people generally would not seem, to date, to be losing
out to migrants in the workforce (see Appendix Table A3.1).
Those young people who leave school early are more vulnerable to the increased
competition from migrants and the CSO has also published data on this group
(people aged 18 to 24 whose highest level of education is lower secondary or below
and who not received education in the four weeks prior to the survey). In 2005,
there were 54,600 people in this category, down from 65,100 in 2002. Almost 62
per cent of them were males (33,700). There was an increase in the unemployment
rate for this group from 16.9 per cent in 2002 to 22.3 per cent in 2005. The numbers
involved here are low and the absolute increase in unemployment was just 700
people. The number of unemployed males in this grouping fell slightly by 200 to
6,100, while the number of females rose to 2,800. The share of this group not in the
labour force increased from 25.5 per cent in 2002 to 26.9 per cent in 2005. In
absolute terms, there was a fall from 16,600 in 2002 to 14,700 in 2005 (see
Appendix Table A3.1).
While the data reviewed here do not provide compelling evidence that early school
leavers have been significantly affected by migration, it is clear that this is a
particularly vulnerable group that merit policy attention.
Unemployment and Participation among those aged 25 to 64 
Turning to the main adult workforce, the rate of unemployment has been stable
over the period 2002 to 2005. This stability holds for each educational cohort,
ranging from those with primary education or below to those with third level
degrees (see Appendix Table A3.2). The only exception is those in a miscellaneous
‘other’ category for whom unemployment rose from 2.8 per cent in 2004 to 4.2 per
cent in 2005. Those with only primary education have a noticeably higher rate of
unemployment (7.4 per cent) than other groups. This position has become neither
better nor worse in recent years. Men with only primary education have a higher
rate of unemployment (8.3 per cent) than women with the same level of education
(5.2 per cent).
The total participation rate among the population aged 25 to 64 increased
modestly from 74.2 per cent in 2002 to 75.9 per cent in 2005. The data do not show
any tendency for participation rates to fall among those with low educational
levels in recent years (see Appendix Table A3.3). For those with primary education,
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the participation rate rose from 51.8 per cent in 2002 to 52.6 per cent in 2005, while
for those with lower secondary (i.e., the Junior Cert) the participation rate rose
from 70.9 per cent in 2002 to 71.7 per cent in 2005. For females with primary
education the rate of participation rose from 31.9 per cent in 33.2 per cent in 2005.
The level of participation for this group remains very low and this is an issue of
much concern to the Council (NESC, 2005a and b). For males with only primary
education there was a fall in the participation rate from 69.7 per cent in 2002 to
66.7 per cent in 2003; two thirds of this fall was immediately reversed in the
subsequent year with a rise in participation to 68.9 per cent in 2004.
The combination of widespread gains in employment by Irish people, stable
unemployment and rising labour force participation would all suggest that
migration has not to date been associated with widespread negative displacement
of Irish workers—although this may have occurred in certain instances. The
recently-published ESRI/SIEPS study (Doyle et al., 2006) on the impact of EU
enlargement on Ireland and Sweden also reached the conclusion that the evidence
did not indicate that widespread displacement was taking place.
Implications of Migration for Those Outside the Labour Force
While migration has coincided with rising labour force participation, the
availability of migrants may reduce the pressure to effectively address the
obstacles to labour force participation among Ireland’s marginalised citizens. The
share of the working age population in employment in Ireland is lower than
among the high EU performers (Denmark, Sweden, The Netherlands and the UK).
Analysis of the employment rates of different groups, in the Council’s report, The
Developmental Welfare State (NESC, 2005a), showed that Ireland’s relative under-
performance compared to the best-practice countries reflected lower employment
rates by women in general, especially for women with lower levels of educational
attainment and older women. There is also a low rate of labour force participation
among people with disabilities. Migrants with high levels of education and strong
work motivation are often willing to undertake low-wage work and can represent
a more attractive option for employers than recruiting Irish residents who are at
present not in, or marginally attached to, the labour force5.
In The Developmental Welfare State (DWS) report, the Council identified a range of
integrated reforms that are necessary to support higher employment among
currently excluded groups. Likewise, the NESF in its 2006 report, Creating a More
Inclusive Labour Market, argued that barriers causing labour market vulnerability
must be addressed as ‘otherwise low-qualified people will face increasing
competition for available jobs in the future’ (NESF, 2006: xxii). These policy issues
are discussed further in Chapter 9.
Exploitation of Migrant Workers
There is no doubt that there have been many instances of exploitation of migrant
workers, as documented by trade unions, the Migrant Rights Centre of Ireland
(MRCI) and others. In some instances exploitation may begin before the migrant
arrives in Ireland and be continued by agencies located outside Ireland. Migrants
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5. Research among UK employers found a very positive attitude to employees from East and Central Europe; see the next sub-section
3.4.5 below.
may be pressured to sign away part of their future earnings before leaving home
and to pay exorbitant fees for the cost of the journey. The MRCI has documented
instances of unscrupulous employers in Ireland using tactics that include paying
less than the promised wage (and sometimes less than the legal minimum),
making illegal deductions from salaries and worse.
The conclusion of the IOM Consultants on the issue of exploitation was as follows:
The currently available information is too limited to draw conclusions about the
extent to which the extensive rights and protections offered to migrant workers
under Ireland’s equality legislation are implemented and enforced in practice. In
the absence of systematic evidence, the suggestion that the exploitation of
migrant workers may be fairly widespread remains an open question. What
can be said, based on the anecdotal evidence, is that at least some migrant
workers employed in Ireland do experience limitations of their rights that
exceed those provided for by Ireland’s labour immigration policies. There is 
also some evidence that the hours worked by migrants in some sectors (e.g.
health and social care, hotels and restaurants) are much longer than the average
(IOM, 2006: XVI).
The limited mobility of work permit holders and the transition of some to illegal
status after the expiry of their permits may lead to exploitation. With the enlarge-
ment of the EU, the work permit system has declined substantially in significance
as a source of new entry and this may reduce the scope for exploitation.
3.4.5 Experience of East Europeans in the UK Labour Market
There has not been any systematic research of the recent experience of East
European migrants in the Irish labour market. The UK has also experienced a large
increase in migrants from the EU 10 following enlargement. The EU 10 migrants in
Ireland and UK feature prominently in the same sectors. A study of the experience
of EU 10 migrants and their employers in the UK has recently been published by
the Oxford-based Centre on Migration Policy and Society (COMPAS) (Anderson et
al., 2006). The study was based on survey and interviews of over 500 employers
and 600 East European migrants. The nationals of four of the accession states
were chosen: Czech and Slovak republics, Lithuania and Poland as well as nationals
from two other states: the Ukraine and Bulgaria. The surveys and interviews were
conducted both pre- and post-enlargement.
A caveat to the study is that most of those included were purposely selected rather
than selected through random samples. Thus, the study is not based on a represen-
tative sample of migrants. Notwithstanding this caveat, the results can be seen to
provide an indication of potential patterns and relationships. It is likely that there
are strong similarities in the experience of migrants and their employers in the UK
and Ireland so the findings of this study are of considerable interest.
The sectors covered were agriculture, construction, hospitality and au-pairs. Within
these sectors migrants were typically employed in the less-skilled (referred to as
elementary) occupations. An exception to this was construction, in which around
two thirds of migrant were employed in skilled trades.
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The study found that average pay levels of migrant workers were generally lower
than the average of all employees in the relevant sectoral and occupational
groupings. For example, among the migrants surveyed, the average hourly wage
for skilled workers in construction was £8.29, which was 85 per cent of the average
for all employees in this category (£9.77). In view of the complexities of the
minimum wage regulations, the data were not sufficiently detailed to determine
the share of workers earning less than the minimum wage. ‘Nevertheless the
survey data do suggest that a significant number of respondents were working at
gross hourly pay rates that were close to—but not necessarily below—the national
minimum wage, especially in hospitality and agriculture’ (Anderson et al.,
2006:32). The hours worked by migrants were relatively long compared to the
average worked by all employees in the same category. The average weekly hours
worked by sector were: hospitality (45.3 hours), construction (45.6 hours) and
agriculture (47.9 hours). Many of those surveyed reported that they did not receive
paid holidays. For example just half of those in hospitality and agriculture reported
that they benefited from paid holidays. Even fewer benefited from sick leave (29
per cent in hospitality and 17 per cent in agriculture).
There was evidence that the educational qualifications and skills of the migrants
were considerably higher than those normally required for the positions held. For
example, more than half of those engaged in elementary occupations in
hospitality had post-secondary education. The question arises as to why migrants
accepted work that was often below their apparent qualifications and skills. In
some cases this was related to their immigration status. Some migrants were
participants in scheme that limited them to certain agricultural employers. Others
were on student visas and working part-time, often in hospitality. The money that
could be earned in these jobs compared to what was possible at home was a key
factor for some. Other attractions of working in the UK were the ability to improve
English skills and also the overall experience of living and working in another
country6. Migrants typically perceived their positions to be temporary which is a
factor in being willing to accept the trade-offs involved.
A substantial share—18 per cent—of those surveyed were employed through
agencies rather the directly by the business for whom they were working. Some
interviews regarded it as easier to find employment through agencies when they
lacked the required documents. Most viewed agency work less positively than
direct employment. The disadvantages cited included the temporary and casual
nature of the work, commission charged, lack of pensions and sick pay.
The employers surveyed identified several obstacles to obtaining UK residents to
fill the positions for which they were seeking migrants. These included jobs being
hazardous or dirty, working hours being considered too long, salary not being
attractive and the work being regarded as low status.
The study found that employers were ‘extremely positive’ about their experience
of employing migrant workers. They recognised that they were able to obtain
‘high-quality’ workers at low wages. As noted above, migrants often had higher
educational qualifications than would be the norm for the positions that they
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6. For a discussion of the reasons why Irish emigrants in the UK often experienced occupational under-achievement, see Section 3.5.6 below.
filled. Employers also referred to the ‘soft’ skills of migrants: their manners, high
motivation and flexible attitudes. For example, one employer who had employed
migrants for the work of cauliflower harvesting explained:
One of the reasons why the East Europeans have come and work so well is
because they do have somewhat higher intellect and their understanding….
unless the job is done well, there really isn’t any point in doing it… we find them
lovely people we really do (Anderson et al., 2006: 70).
The study found indications of widespread evasion of migration regulations. Of the
548 migrants surveyed in April 2004 (pre-enlargement), the authors estimated
that at least 22.4 per cent were illegally resident. Those who were illegally resident
often experienced vulnerability, fear and anxiety. Exploratory analysis in this study
did not find evidence of a statistically significant relationship between being
illegal and earnings. Working beyond the terms permitted by a visa was more
common than illegal residence. It was estimated that three quarters of those on
student visas and more than half of au-pairs were working in breach of their
conditions. Furthermore, a quarter of migrants surveyed said that they or their
employers were not making national insurance contributions.
The picture that emerges of East European migrants in the UK is one of high-
quality migrants in low-wage jobs, working long hours. The authors do not
regard it as necessarily a story of exploitation; migrants are making choices and
trade-offs, albeit difficult ones. The pattern of widespread irregular working and
lack of paid holidays and sick leave is possibly replicated in Ireland. The evidence in
this study indicates that concerns about the role of employment agencies may
well be justified. The findings reinforce the importance of enforcement of
employment regulation.
3.4.6 Summary of Economic Evidence
A summary of the wide-ranging evidence presented in this section is presented in
Chapter 6. It is clear that there are certain gaps in the data. These include data on
earnings of self-employed workers and also limited CSO coverage of hourly
earnings. There is a commitment in the new social partnership agreement,
Towards 2016, to develop new CSO quarterly series and to establish a group to
monitor labour market trends and employment standards.
3.5 Social Effects of Migration
The impact of migration reaches far beyond the confines of the economy.When we
get migrants we do not simply get labour units we also get people with all the
complexity that this entails. This section examines the wider social effects of
migration. The section begins by examining the implications of migration for
demographic change. Migration raises issues of identity, social cohesion and social
interaction both for the host community and for migrant themselves and these
dimensions of migration are examined in this section. In 1991 the Council
published a study on Ireland’s experience of migration (NESC, 1991). The final part
of this section recalls findings from that study that are of relevance to
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understanding the social implications of today’s immigration to Ireland. In its
recent Strategy report, the Council noted that the effects of migration on the
economy, social policy and culture are probably related in complex but important
ways. Making a success of migration in any one sphere will make it easier to make
a success of it the others. Failure in any one sphere will tend to create problems in
the other two (NESC, 2005b: 104).
3.5.1 The Demographic Implications of Migration
Migration is a key driver of population growth and population growth in turn has
wide-ranging social and economic effects. The scale of population growth has
implications for the provision of infrastructure and services. In addition, there are
potential dynamic benefits of economies of scale and increased enterprise
opportunities. Economies of scale can make a contribution to solving infrastruc-
ture problems; thus, while migration adds to congestion, the higher population
resulting from migration can also underpin improved infrastructure provision,
such as for example, investment in the Dublin metro. This sub-section describes
the influence of migration on recent population trends and projections for the
next two decades.
Population Trends
The population has grown strongly over the past decade (1996 to 2006) with an
average annual growth of almost 61,000 people. The cumulative increase in
population was 16.8 per cent or 609,000 people. Well over half of this increase
consisted of net migration (56 per cent). Ireland’s population growth is the second
highest in the EU at present. The structure of Ireland’s population growth is unique
in the EU in that it comprises both a strong natural increase and a high level of net
migration. Spain had a slightly higher increase in population in the years 2002/2003,
but this consisted almost entirely of net migration.
Age Composition of Migration
Immigrants to Ireland are disproportionately concentrated in the prime adult
working age-group of 25 to 44 year olds: there were 172,700 people or 49 per cent
of all immigrants in this age category over the period 2000 to 2005. These adults
often had accompanying children: over the same period there were almost 40,000
immigrants (11.4 per cent of the total) aged 0 to 14. There were a further 105,400
immigrants (30 per cent) in the 15 to 24 age group.
Emigrants from Ireland are typically younger than immigrants. Emigrants are
concentrated in the 15 to 24 age group (91,600 or 68 per cent of emigrants over the
2000 to 2005 period) and generally do not have accompanying children. This
pattern of concentration of emigration among young people under 24 was also a
feature of emigration in the 1980s and 1990s.
Looking at net migration since 2000, this is strongly concentrated among those
aged 25 to 44 and their children. Hence the net effect of migration to Ireland on the
age structure of the population is to increase the share of the prime working age
share of the population.
52
Population Projections
The CSO published population projections in December 2004. Population
projections are built up from projections of births, deaths and net migration. The
number of births is determined by the number of women in the child bearing age
groups and the fertility rates7 of these women. The fertility rate declined from 3.2
in 1965 to 1.85 in 1994. Since then it increased to 1.98 in 2003 before falling to 1.95
in 2004. Together with an increase in the number of women in child bearing age
groups, this resulted in an increase in the number of births from 48,400 in 1994 to
61,400 in 2005. There is some uncertainty in projecting fertility rates forward. The
CSO used a range of projections; its highest fertility projection (F1) was for the
fertility rate to rise to 2.0 by 2011 and remain thereafter at that level, while its
lowest projection was of a fertility rate falling to 1.7 (F3) and remaining at that
level. In the projections below the focus is on the F1 scenario; i.e., assuming the
fertility rate stabilises at around 2.0.
There is greater certainty in projecting mortality trends. Life expectancy is steadily
rising and the CSO projections assume that the trend continues at its current rate.
Life expectancy at birth is projected to reach 86.9 years in 2036 for women and 82.5
years for men.
Migration is the most uncertain element of population projections. The CSO
develops both a high (M1) and low (M2) migration scenarios. Under the high
scenario, migration continues at 30,000 until to 2016 and then falls to 20,000 in
the decade to 2026. In the low migration scenario, the level of net migration is
20,000 for the period 2006 to 2011 and then falls to 10,000 and falls again to 5,000
from 2016.
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Table 3.5 Total Migration by Age Group 2000-2005
Immigrants Emigrants Net Migration
0-14 39.9 3.9 36
15-24 105.4 91.6 13.8
25-44 172.7 33.4 139.3
45-65 25.2 2.1 23.1
65+ 5.7 3.3 2.4
Total 349.1 134.2 214.9
Source CSO, Population and Migration Estimates, Sept. 2005.
7. The fertility rate is defined as the average number of children that would be born to a woman over her lifetime if she were to
experience the current age-specific fertility rates through her lifetime. It is obtained by summing the age-specific rates for a given
time-point.
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Based on these assumptions it is possible to project the growth of population. In
the high migration scenario, in conjunction with a fertility rate of 2 (M1F1), there is
a very substantial increase in population over the next decade (to 2016) of 686,000
people. This is approximately equivalent to the entire population of Dublin City
and Dún Laoghaire-Rathdown in 2002. Over the decade 2016 to 2026, there is a
further increase in population of 545,000. The level of population is projected 
to reach 4.8 million in 2016 and 5.4 million to 2026. The projected increase 
in population is driven both by a substantial contribution from a natural increase
(a projected 56 per cent of the total increase) and net migration (44 per cent).
The level of migration could obviously be lower than the CSO’s high migration
scenario. Even with the CSO’s low migration scenario, there is still a substantial
increase in population: under the M2F1 projection, population still increases by
over half a million (520,000) over the decade to 2016 and by a further 325,000 in
the decade to 2026. Net migration in this projection contributes 29 per cent of the
population growth in decade to 2016 and 15 per cent in the decade to 2026. The
level of population rises in this scenario to just over 5 million in 2026.
In addition to contributing substantially to the rise in population, net migration is
also changing the composition of the population. In 2002, the foreign-born
population in Ireland was 400,000, while the non-Irish population (i.e., those not
having Irish nationality) was 225,000. Under the assumption of high migration,
Punch (2005) has projected that the foreign-born population could reach 1 million
by 2030 which would be around 18 per cent of the total population. This is higher
than the present rate in the high migration countries of Sweden, US, Germany and
Table 3.6 Population Growth, Natural Increase 
and Net Migration (000s)
(A) High Migration (M1F1)
Natural Increase Net Migration Change in Population
2006-2016 + 386 +300 + 686
2016-2026 + 345 + 200 + 545
(B) Low Migration (M2F1)
Natural Increase Net Migration Change in Population
2006-2016 + 370 + 150 + 520
2016-2026 + 275 + 50 + 325
Source CSO (2004), Population and Labour Force Projections 2006-2036.
Austria but lower than present rates in Canada, New Zealand and Australia. Since
the foreign-born population includes Irish people born abroad, the non-Irish
population would be somewhat lower, although there are no projections of this.
Projections of the Dependency Ratio
The CSO projects that the dependency ratio will continue to increase in the years
ahead. Over the next decade this is due to increases in both the young and elderly
dependency ratios and, thereafter, due to a rising elderly dependency ratio8. Even
with the high migration scenario (M1F1), the dependency ratio is projected to rise
by 5.7 percentage points over the next 20 years. With low migration (M2F1), the
increase would be somewhat higher at 6.7 percentage points. While migration
helps to moderate the rate at which the dependency ratio increases, it is clearly
unable to offset the underlying dynamics that are projected to increase the
dependency ratio.
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Table 3.7 Projections of Dependency Ratios
(A) High Migration (M1F1)
Young Old Total
2006 30.6 16.4 47.1
2016 32.9 19.9 52.8
2026 31.1 25.1 56.1
(B) Low Migration (M2F1)
Young Old Total
2006 30.6 16.4 47.1
2016 33.2 20.6 53.8
2026 30.4 26.7 57.1
Source: CSO (2004), Population and Labour Force Projections 2006 to 2036
8. The total age dependency ratio is defined as the number of people aged below 15 and over 64 as a percentage of people aged 15 to
64. The young dependency ratio is defined as the number aged under 15 as a percentage of those aged 15 to 64 while the elderly
dependency ratio is defined as the percentage over 64 as a percentage of those aged 15 to 64.
The potential of migration to offset the effects of population ageing in developed
countries generally has been examined in research by the OECD and the United
Nations (UN). There is a consensus that the potential for migration to offset the
effects of population ageing is modest. A UN report (United Nations, 2000)
developed projections of the dependency ratio in 2050, based on its assumptions
of what it considered to be the likely level of migration, and compared these to
what the dependency ratio would be in the absence of migration. There was little
difference between the two estimates, reflecting its assumption that migration
flows would not be large. For example, in the case of the EU, the assumed level of
migration was just over 16 million between 1995 and 2050.
This UN report also estimated the level of migration that would be required to
maintain the dependency ratio at its 1995 level. The level of migration required 
to achieve this is very high and would result in countries having between 59 per
cent and 99 per cent of the population composed of post-1995 migrants and their
descendants. These results show that migration alone cannot solve the problem of
a falling dependency ratio (see also OECD, 2001).
Implications
While there are considerable uncertainties, all of the CSO’s projections point to
substantial population growth over the next two decades, with net migration
making a significant contribution to this growth. These increases pose significant
challenges for public services, housing and infrastructure. Ireland has struggled to
cope with the implications of a rising population over the past decade. Housing
output increased hugely but this there was not a corresponding provision of
essential public services in rapidly growing places. The next two decades will see a
significant further expansion of the built environment. In its housing report (NESC,
2004) the Council compared the challenge of achieving a sustainable pattern of
development to accommodate the rising population to earlier challenges of
opening up the economy and the establishment of partnership in the 1980s.
Migration helps to reduce the dependency ratio from what it would otherwise be,
but can only modestly offset the projected rise in the dependency ratio due to the
ageing of the population.
In addition, the changing composition of the population has additional societal
implications for identity, social cohesion and social interaction. The next sub-
sections address these complex societal concerns.
3.5.2 Migration, Culture and Identity
The effects of migration on national identity and social cohesion are not to be
found in as developed a body of theoretical and empirical knowledge as is the case
with the economic effects of migration. Questions about migration’s impacts on
national identity and social cohesion generally run far ahead of the ability of
research to provide answers with a general applicability. On the other hand,
different historical periods and different countries and cities provide rich and
extremely diverse case studies illustrating, variously, how a national or regional
identity is enriched and social cohesion strengthened by migration, particularly
over the long run and, sometimes, how, especially in the short term, some people’s
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identity may be threatened, conflict may arise and social cohesion may be
undermined. The following observations may be made:
s The scale and composition of migration can contribute, usually in a gradual way
and over a long period of time, to influencing a nation’s identity. Some of the
cultural characteristics and specific history of the new migrants become
interwoven with those of the host society and influence how it is seen by
others and how it perceives itself. History is full of different instances of the
length of time and the degree of social conflict that host societies have taken
to absorb waves of economic migrants (migration based on conquest and
colonisation can be considered a separate subject).
s The large, cosmopolitan urban centres that function as magnets for many
knowledge-intensive economic activities today, develop urban identities that
are, at the one time, unmistakably unique because of their geographic location
and long histories (London, Paris, Brussels, Madrid, etc., could never be
confused) and, at the same time, similarly cosmopolitan because the scale and
mix of activities carried on in them can only be carried on with a very large
presence of, and contribution by, migrants.
s It is at the level of urban neighbourhoods and small towns that identity can
change in the most rapid and visible way (creating a ‘Chinatown’, ‘little Italy’
and the like) for it is at that level that migrants can come to constitute a
significant proportion of all residents in a short space of time. The members of
a host society may—and often do—feel and react differently to what they
experience as the increased diversity of people on high streets and in public
places and the extent to which a specific migrant group may have become a
major influence on their own locality.
It also seems clear that societies absorb waves of economic migration most easily
when certain contextual features hold, viz.:
s Buoyant economic growth provides opportunities for the migrants to
contribute as workers and entrepreneurs and ensures that employment levels
and wages for the indigenous population continue to improve.
s The host society is characterised by a confidence and openness towards
globalisation and the future.
s The culture of the host society is vibrant and shaped in an on-going fashion by
the population rather than having the status of a fixed and normative set of
attributes and dispositions that can be used to define full belonging.
s Social interaction develops steadily between the native population and
migrants, which keeps stereotyping and prejudice short-lived and speeds up
some convergence in how those who have come to share the same society see
that society and value it.
s The state articulates and operates a clear migration policy and develops a policy
framework which is supportive of integration, hostile to discrimination and
works with social organisations to combat racism.
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The corollary of these features is that migration is most usually claimed to be
diluting a cherished identity and contributing to undermining social cohesion in
contexts where:
s Unemployment is high.
s Living standards are stagnant or falling.
s Globalisation is seen a priori as a threat and there is a deep anxiety about the
future.
s The national or local culture is considered to need vigorous state-subsidised
protection and dissemination.
s Segmentation in employment, housing, schooling, etc., is pronounced and
reduces opportunities for social interaction, enabling stereotypes to survive
unchecked.
s Public policy on migration is unclear to either migrants or the indigenous
population.
These observations may seem to imply that migration should only be welcomed
for its specific impacts on identity and social cohesion because, under the right
conditions, these impacts are positive. However, the right conditions are not
always within the capacity and competence of public authorities to provide at will.
To promote large-scale migration, when some of the essential conditions for it not
to generate existential unease in the host population and social conflict between
the local population and new arrivals do not exist, would be poor judgement and
bad policy.
3.5.3 Migration and Social Interaction
Several trends have increased academic and policy interest in what accounts for
high levels of social interaction between the members of a society, the level of
social trust that these interactions build upon and help to generate, and the extent
to which social interaction contributes to a convergence in values, attitudes and
behaviour among members of different social, ethnic, age and regional groups. It
is clear that, quite separate from international migration, certain trends have
modified the traditional channels of social interaction in many Western societies.
These include the increased dominance of large cities, shifts in patterns of
household formation (as more people live in independent households and a
growing proportion of all households have no children), declining church
attendance, trade union membership, political party membership and the like, and
the growing opportunities that a more affluent and individualised society offers to
people to tailor their own lifestyles. These trends are independent of the level of
in-migration to a country. Nevertheless, significant in-migration of people, whose
command of their host society’s language and customs is initially weak, and
elements of whose outlooks and lifestyles are wholly new to the indigenous
population, can result in reduced levels of social interaction between people
residing in the same area and contributing to the same regional economy.
It is interesting in this regard that an Oireachtas Joint Committee should already
observe that even migrants ‘who have succeeded in every material sense complain
that their greatest difficulty is integration. They find it difficult to make friends
with Irish people or to become part of Irish social networks, and are constantly
thrown back on expatriate circles. The pace of change in Ireland in recent years has
been so rapid that for many Irish people just ‘riding the wave’ is a challenge and
the capacity to reach out and form new relationships and social links is difficult’
(Houses of the Oireachtas Joint Committee on European Affairs, 2006: 28).
A provisional conclusion must be that there is nothing to be lost and, potentially,
much to be gained if, at some level in the public system, systematic attention is
given to fostering ‘bridges’ between migrants’ networks and mainstream Irish
society. This does not detract from the initial and wholly valid purpose of ‘bonding’
co-nationals who are sharing the experience of being expatriates. Policies to
promote integration are discussed in Chapter 10 below.
3.5.4 Migrant Identity and Attitudes to the Host Society
Migrants, as well as the host society, face issues of identity and relationship to their
social environment. For the first generation of migrants strong elements of
ambiguity can exist. On the one hand, there may be an appreciation of the
opportunities which the host society has afforded, in work, living standards and
opportunities. On the other hand, this may be strongly coloured by regret and
perhaps resentment that their country failed to offer such prospects.
The Council’s earlier study on Irish emigration (NESC, 1991) offers a useful set of
tools with which to appreciate the migrant perspective. The report presents a
range of Irish migrant approaches to integration in Britain. At either extreme are
strategies of total immersion, adopting fully the host culture, or alternatively
separation and ghettoisation. The report identifies negative features of both
approaches. Both demonstrate an unease and uncertainty regarding identity and
background. As the report highlights, both strategies are frequently played out in
the intergenerational conflicts between over-identified ‘Irish’ parents and their
over- identified ‘English’ children.
A third approach, confined to the first generation, is that of ‘temporary exile’. In
this context the migrant never finally resolves the nature of their status in the host
society. They continue to entertain notions of ‘returning home’, long after this
possibility may have ceased to be realistic in the context of a migrant’s life.
The final, and in the view of the report the most ‘successful’ strategy is what is
termed ‘self-confident Irishness’. This approach seeks to engage with the complex
multi-cultural nature of contemporary Britain, finding a place within what has
become an increasingly fluid context.
This strategy, and the possibilities of its realisation, raises a vital component in the
question of migrant adaptation, namely, the host society context. Once again the
Irish emigrant experience may prove helpful. In America, Irishness, being an Irish
American, came to represent a positive feature within American society and
culture9. By contrast, Irishness within British society had traditionally been
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9. Clearly positive perceptions of Irish American identity was an historical ‘achievement’ not a fixed reality. .
problematic and difficult. Thus the host society can either provide an open and
broadly supportive context for exploring the fluid matter of identity, or it can
demand of migrants simplistic choices regarding allegiance which can prove
problematic for migrant and host alike.
The personal conflicts and tensions, which the first generation may experience, cut
into the different experience of their children, some of whom may consider
themselves fully part of the society in which they were born or grew up, sharing
little of the provisional nature of their parents’ engagement, feeling little loyalty
to the ‘old country’. Alternatively, second-generation migrants, in particular those
who feel they have not found an acceptable way to express their identity within
the host society, may build a cultural identity which can take on oppositional
features expressive of separateness from and perhaps even hostility to the host
society. Such a dynamic may reflect some features of the sending society but also
the host society’s inability to offer cultural space for the children of migrants to
experience the range, complexity and fluidity of their identity.
The engagement of migrants in a society changes and ideally enhances both host
and migrant. It is an encounter in which the greatest pressure of adaptation and
engagement is demanded of the migrant, regardless of their status—first, second
or even third generation. It is they who have the primary experience of uncertainty,
experiencing feelings of conflict over one’s identity. However, as noted above, such
conflicts of identity and pressures to address and cope with change also arise for
the host society. Some may assert that the presence of cultural distance separating
migrants from the host society makes the impact of migration somewhat more
challenging.
A substantial share of migrants—over one quarter in 2005—constitute returning
Irish people. Returning Irish migrants would include people who left in the 1970s
and 1980s or their children. Returning Irish migrants can face challenges in
adjusting to life in Ireland, depending on how long they have been away. The
Ireland encountered by returning Irish migrants is not the Ireland they left or the
country that they have become used to while away. One of the changes for
returning Irish migrants is the presence now of many non-Irish migrants.
Returning Irish migrants should be borne in mind in the challenge of supporting
integration.
3.5.5 The Emergence of Migrant Communities
Migrant concentration, particularly in cities, is a feature of migration across the
world, its rationale readily understandable. The Irish migrant experience in Britain
and America is illustrative, with much migration driven by the stock of previous
migrants, ‘the family-and-friends effect’. These people assist and encourage new
migrants, funding their fare, accommodating them when they arrive, providing an
important introduction to the host country. Migrant communities serve a variety
of vital needs—support, cultural identity and a link back to one’s home, familiar
foods, music and other cultural and social reference points. In addition, they
provide networks to source employment, housing and information on services.
Clearly there are a wide range of positive features of the emergence of migrant
communities. Indeed, the Consultants identify migrant communities as a valuable
bridge to integration (IOM, 2006: 161).
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Despite these valuable features, visible migrant communities, particularly if they
become associated in the public mind with marginalisation and poverty, can
become problematic. They may provide a context in which migrants themselves
feel they have little interest in or desire to integrate into the culture and social life
of the host society—that all their needs can be met from within their own
community. Equally, it could provide a context in which stereotypes of the host
culture may develop and flourish. Thus a sense of exclusion could, in part, be self-
imposed through continued reliance on networks which are exclusive to the
migrant population, blocking the need, or desire, to reach out to the indigenous
population, to form friendships and links with the host society.
3.5.6 Learning from Irish Emigration in the 1980s
The 1991 Council study, cited above, explored the economic and social implications
of emigration for Ireland’s society and economy (NESC, 1991). There are sufficient
parallels between the outflow that Ireland experienced in the 1980s and today’s
inflow of migrants from Central and Eastern Europe to merit reference to several
findings of the 1991 study.
There is a parallel in the contexts. The resurgence in emigration from Ireland in the
1980s was of a more educated outflow than in previous decades. This reflected the
heavy incidence on young cohorts then leaving the educational system. Ireland’s
labour market experienced a triple shock in the 1980s. Industrial employment
‘marked time’ as new jobs created by inward investment were offset by job losses
in indigenous industry; public sector employment was held back by the need for
fiscal retrenchment; agriculture continued to contract as an employer. Frustrated
school leavers and graduates availed of ready access to the UK and other EU 15
labour markets and of not so easy access to the USA.10 A labour market shock on a
similar scale has been produced in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) by the
transition from planned to market economies. In those countries, people with a
good education have experienced a contraction in the opportunities open to them
domestically. Many of them have availed of EU membership and Ireland’s decision
not to adopt transitional arrangements to access Ireland’s labour market.
There is, as yet, little systematic research into just who is coming to Ireland from
CEE and why, much less into how they are faring over time. It is suspected,
however, that significant numbers of them are working in jobs below their
potential, while a minority are made up of individuals insufficiently prepared 
for the challenge of finding and holding employment in the Irish labour 
market. Both these developments were prominent findings of the 1991 study on
Irish emigration.
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10. The proportion of graduates from full-time third-level education who emigrated to find work rose from 8 per cent of the outflow in
1980 to nearly 30 per cent of the 1988 outflow (NESC, 1991: 85).
Occupational Underachievement
The 1991 study found that Irish emigration in the 1980s was no longer
predominantly low-skilled, but drew from across the full spectrum of education
and skills in Irish society, with the higher social groups, if anything, over-
represented (93). Most migrants left after a substantial period in the Irish labour
force, more than 40 per cent after a period of current unemployment, one in six
from temporary or part-time jobs and over a third from permanent full-time jobs
(160).11 A large number of them (in Britain, where the data were available) ended up
in employment that was significantly below their potential. Wherever and
whenever this ‘occupational underachievement’ occurs, it entails losses on several
fronts: to migrants themselves as their skills do not develop (and may even erode)
and their prospects of following successful career paths recede; to the host
economy because it is under-using a resource; and to the sending country because
of the reduced likelihood that it will benefit one day from the enhanced human
capital of its returning nationals. Occupational underachievement also raises the
prospect that the weaker members of the host-society workforce are ‘bumped
down’ or out of the labour force by superior competition for types of employment
they would normally be expected to fill.12
The 1991 study found that occupational underachievement was occurring for
several clear reasons:
s Migrants chose jobs beneath their ability because, in the short term, they paid
well and allowed them to save quickly. For example, some Irish graduates chose
building work in Britain and waitressing jobs in the USA.
s Non-manual jobs with prospects typically took four to six weeks to fill, and
migrants needed to arrive with sufficient own-resources to support a period of
job-search of that length if they were to fill them. If they arrived already
indebted or with very limited resources, they were under pressure to take the
immediate, best-paying employment they could find, whatever its prospects.
s Non-manual jobs with prospects typically had more formal recruitment
procedures. Migrants’ unfamiliarity with British culture and lack of local
knowledge could tell against them.13
s Employers in Britain were ignorant of the Irish educational qualifications and
suspicious of their quality.14 
s Emigrants relied on migrant networks to find their first job and tended, for this
reason, to enter occupations that already had a substantial migrant presence
(construction, hotels, retail, etc.).
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11. These findings were based on migrants to Britain, of whom British data sources enabled information to be captured.
12. This was the experience within Ireland in the 1980s as a surplus of young people leaving the educational system competed to fill a
fixed or slowly growing pool of jobs and ‘qualification inflation’ resulted.
13. The 1991 study noted that Irish applicants for jobs in Britain were frequently considered not to ‘sell themselves’ well and to be lacking
in self-confidence.
14. The Leaving Certificate was often interpreted as equivalent to ‘O’ levels while qualifications awarded by Ireland’s new Regional
Technical Colleges (now Institutes of Technology) were largely unknown to employers in Britain.
s Emigrants encountered discrimination, prejudice and racism in British society,
particularly when the Irish identity of people who were threats to British
society emerged prominently in the media.
These mechanisms suggest ways in which occupational underachievement can be
redressed and the desirability of facilitating the upward mobility of migrants in
line with their qualifications and of diluting their occupational segregation, to the
greatest extent possible. These issues are discussed in Chapters 8, 9 and 10, below.
Social Vulnerability
A second major finding in the 1991 study that throws further light on the current
migration into Ireland was that, despite the generally educated aspect of Irish
emigrants to Britain in the 1980s, some 15 per cent of them were highly vulnerable.
This minority tended to be young males from urban centres with low levels of
educational attainment who left Ireland from unemployment and arrived in
British cities with little preparation. In a short period of time they were in difficulty
with accommodation, finding and retaining employment, and accessing social
welfare (167-168). Homelessness, alcoholism and conflict with the law were the
most visible signs of failed integration into British society for some of them. The
authors of the 1991 study were led to reflect that economic ‘push’ factors appeared
to dominate the migration decisions of the more poorly educated, while
occupational status and ‘pull’ factors were much more important in the decisions
of the better educated middle class (160).
Applying the Lessons
The Council believes that the Irish authorities should be pro-active in informing
governments, public bodies and NGOs in various countries of Ireland’s experience
with emigration in the 1980s. These lessons would include informing intending
migrants as fully as possible of the opportunities, costs and requirements of being
successful in Ireland’s labour market,15 ensuring that migrants receive their full
entitlements while in Ireland, complementing their entitlements in Ireland with
additional support from their home countries, ensuring that the qualifications of
migrants are vouched for by recognised bodies and transparent to employers in
Ireland, and keeping migrants in Ireland informed of developments and
opportunities in their home countries from which they might benefit.16
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15. The ‘know before you go’ campaign of FÁS is one example of this.
16. Similar to the National Manpower Service’s advertising campaign in the UK in the 1970s which alerted Irish emigrants to the
improved opportunities in the country they had left.
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The Council recognised in 1991 that high levels of emigration on the part of
graduates and high-skilled persons would be a significant long-term loss to the
Irish economy if many did not subsequently return. If return flows materialised,
however, ‘losses’ would prove temporary and even convert into ‘gains’ where the
returnees had acquired expertise, enhanced their skills and saved capital while
abroad. The Council could not, and did not, foresee then the extent to which this
positive development was to occur. Rather, it was aware of the potential for a much
less favourable scenario to develop: one in which the freedoms and protection that
Irish citizens enjoyed in the more advanced EU economies would lead many to
settle there, in which return migration remained below the level of out-migration
and in which Ireland’s educational system continued to supply the more advanced
economies of other Member States (NESC, 1991: 35).
Similarly today, countries in Central and Eastern Europe experiencing significant
out-migration on the part of high-skilled workers and graduates do not know when,
or how many, will eventually return. This will be discussed further in Chapter 4.
3.6 Conclusion
The conclusions which can be drawn from this review of the causes and effects 
of migration are outlined in Chapter 6, where the findings of Part I of the report
are summarised.
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Appendix Table A3.1 All Persons (000s) Aged 18 to 24 and Early School
Leavers, Classified by ILO Employment Status.
2002 2003 2004 2005
Early Early Early Early
School School School School
Leaver Total Leaver Total Leaver Total Leaver Total
Males
In employment 29.0 144.4 24.0 146.3 24.8 145.9 22.4 145.7
Unemployed 6.3 13.5 5.3 13.1 6.1 13.4 6.1 14.4
Not economically active 6.0 72.2 4.6 72.3 5.5 71.0 5.1 71.9
Total 41.3 230.1 34.0 231.7 36.4 230.3 33.7 231.9
Females
In employment 11.3 121.2 9.5 125.5 8.2 121.7 8.5 130.4
Unemployed 2.0 8.0 2.0 8.9 3.1 9.4 2.8 9.8
Not economically active 10.6 95.1 9.8 93.3 9.8 91.3 9.7 85.2
Total 23.8 224.4 21.3 227.6 21.2 222.5 21.0 225.4
All persons
In employment 40.3 265.7 33.6 271.8 33.0 267.6 31.0 276.0
Unemployed 8.2 21.5 7.2 22.0 9.2 22.8 8.9 24.2
Not economically active 16.6 167.3 14.4 165.6 15.3 162.4 14.7 157.0
Total 65.1 454.5 55.2 459.4 57.6 452.8 54.6 457.3
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Appendix Table A3.2 Unemployment Rates of Persons Aged 25 to 64 
Classified by Highest Level of Education attained
Highest education level attained 2002 2003 2004 2005
Male unemployment rate
Primary or below 8.2 8.4 8.6 8.3
Lower secondary 4.5 5.4 5.8 5.1
Higher secondary 3.0 2.7 3.2 2.9
Post-Leaving Cert 2.0 2.5 3.5 3.2
Third-level non-degree 2.5 3.1 2.6 2.3
Third-level degree or above 2.0 2.3 1.8 1.8
Other 2.4 4.3 5.4 3.8
Total 3.8 4.1 4.3 3.9
Female unemployment rate
Primary or below 5.7 4.8 4.1 5.2
Lower secondary 5.0 5.1 5.4 4.9
Higher secondary 3.0 3.1 2.7 2.9
Post-Leaving Cert 3.1 3.2 3.2 3.4
Third-level non-degree 1.8 2.6 2.3 2.3
Third-level degree or above 1.5 2.0 1.6 1.8
Other 3.3 5.4 3.6 4.9
Total 3.1 3.3 3.0 3.1
All persons unemployment rate
Primary or below 7.4 7.3 7.4 7.4
Lower secondary 4.7 5.3 5.6 5.1
Higher secondary 3.0 2.9 3.0 2.9
Post Leaving Cert 2.4 2.8 3.3 3.3
Third-level non-degree 2.1 2.9 2.5 2.3
Third-level degree or above 1.8 2.1 1.7 1.8
Other 2.8 4.7 4.7 4.2
Total unemployment rate 3.5 3.8 3.7 3.6
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Appendix Table A3.3 Labour Force Participation Rate of Persons Aged 
25 to 64, Classified by the Highest Level of Education
Attained, March-May 2002 to March-May 2005
Highest education level attained 2002 2003 2004 2005
Male participation rate
Primary or below 69.7 66.7 68.9 68.9
Lower secondary 89.7 89.3 89.2 89.6
Higher secondary 92.3 91.0 91.7 91.4
Post-Leaving Cert 93.2 93.2 93.0 92.9
Third-level non-degree 93.4 93.9 93.2 93.8
Third-level degree or above 93.4 93.5 93.2 94.4
Other 85.6 81.8 83.5 87.2
Total 87.0 86.6 87.2 87.8
Female participation rate
Primary or below 31.9 31.1 30.5 33.2
Lower secondary 49.8 49.4 48.7 50.2
Higher secondary 64.5 63.1 64.2 65.1
Post-Leaving Cert 72.5 70.9 70.4 71.5
Third-level non-degree 80.7 81.3 80.5 80.1
Third-level degree or above 85.4 84.5 84.2 86.3
Other 64.7 58.1 64.7 62.4
Total 61.3 61.3 62.0 64
All persons participation rate
Primary or below 51.8 50.2 51.2 52.6
Lower secondary 70.9 70.9 70.8 71.7
Higher secondary 77.3 75.9 76.8 77.4
Post-leaving cert 83.2 82.0 81.3 82.2
Third-level non-degree 86.2 86.9 86.2 86.0
Third-level degree or above 89.5 89.2 88.8 90.4
Other 76.3 70.9 74.8 76.4
Total participation rate 74.2 74.0 74.6 75.9
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Appendix Table A3.4 ILO Participation Rates by Age and Gender
1998Q1 2000Q1 2001Q1 2002Q1 2003Q1 2004Q1 2005Q1 2006Q1
Aged 15 
and over All Persons 56.8 58.6 59 59.6 59.5 60.1 61.0 62.2
Male 69.8 71.0 70.9 70.9 70.6 71.1 71.4 72.5
Female 44.2 46.7 47.6 48.7 48.8 49.5 50.9 52.2
Aged 15-19 All Persons 27.8 29.1 29.4 27.4 27.0 25.1 25.3 26.2
Male 32.1 32.8 33.3 30.7 30.4 28.4 28.0 29.6
Female 23.3 25.2 25.2 23.9 23.5 21.7 22.4 22.7
Aged 20-24 All Persons 74.4 74.7 73.3 72.3 70.6 72.0 72.6 73.6
Male 76.1 78.9 78.0 76.3 75.9 76.2 76.7 79
Female 72.5 70.4 68.4 68.2 65.3 67.7 68.6 68.3
Aged 25-34 All Persons 83.2 85.0 84.6 84.4 83.6 84.2 84.6 85.6
Male 93.3 94.1 93.2 92.1 92.1 92.5 92.3 92.7
Female 73.2 75.9 76.0 76.8 75.1 76.0 76.8 78.2
Aged 35-44 All Persons 76.3 77.6 78.7 79.3 79.4 79.4 79.8 80.4
Male 93.5 93.3 93.4 93.2 92.8 93.1 93.4 94.0
Female 59.4 62.2 64.2 65.6 66.2 65.7 66.3 66.8
Aged 45-54 All Persons 67.1 69.8 70.1 72.2 72.2 73.9 75.7 76.9
Male 87.7 88.0 87.0 87.9 87.1 88.7 89.0 89.2
Female 46.0 51.4 52.9 56.3 57.1 59.1 62.4 64.6
Aged 55-59 All Persons 52.5 55.0 55.6 56.6 57.9 59.1 60.3 62.1
Male 73.3 74.8 74.9 75.4 74.8 75.7 75.0 76.8
Female 31.1 34.6 35.8 37.3 40.6 42.0 45.3 47.2
Aged 60-64 All Persons 36.0 36.3 38.0 38.7 39.3 40.2 41.9 44.7
Male 53.9 53.5 54.7 55.3 55.2 56.4 57.8 58.8
Female 18.2 19.1 21.3 22.0 23.2 23.8 25.9 30.4
Aged 65 
and over All Persons 8.3 7.9 7.5 8.2 7.9 7.9 7.8 8.0
Male 15.4 15.1 13.7 15.3 14.0 14.4 13.6 14.0
Female 2.9 2.4 2.8 2.8 3.2 2.8 3.2 3.4
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Appendix Table A3.5 ILO Unemployment Rates by Age and Gender
1998Q1 2000Q1 2001Q1 2002Q1 2003Q1 2004Q1 2005Q1 2006Q1
Aged 15 
and over All Persons 8.5 4.7 3.7 4.3 4.6 4.4 4.1 4.2
Male 8.5 4.8 3.7 4.6 5.0 4.7 4.5 4.4
Female 8.5 4.5 3.6 3.9 4.0 3.9 3.6 4.0
Aged 15-19 All Persons 15.0 9.6 8.2 10.3 12.0 10.5 10.2 11.8
Male 14.8 9.5 8.6 10.7 13.0 10.9 11.1 12.8
Female 15.3 9.8 7.7 9.8 10.6 9.9 9.1 10.5
Aged 20-24 All Persons 11.0 5.7 4.8 6.8 7.0 7.0 6.7 6.8
Male 11.3 5.5 4.9 7.6 8.1 7.3 7.4 7.4
Female 10.6 5.8 4.7 5.9 5.8 6.7 6.0 6.1
Aged 25-34 All Persons 7.7 4.4 3.5 4.4 4.6 4.3 4.1 4.5
Male 8.0 4.8 3.5 5.0 5.3 5.1 4.6 4.9
Female 7.4 3.9 3.7 3.7 3.8 3.4 3.4 4.1
Aged 35-44 All Persons 8.1 4.5 3.0 3.4 3.7 3.8 3.4 3.2
Male 8.2 4.5 3.1 3.6 4.1 4.1 3.6 3.1
Female 7.9 4.4 2.8 3.1 3.2 3.4 3.2 3.3
Aged 45-54 All Persons 8.8 4.4 3.3 3.4 3.6 3.3 3.2 3.3
Male 8.9 4.8 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.7 3.7 3.7
Female 8.5 3.8 2.9 2.8 3.2 2.6 2.4 2.8
Aged 55-59 All Persons 6.0 3.3 3.1 3.0 3.0 2.6 3.5 2.9
Male 5.9 3.4 3.3 3.1 3.2 2.8 3.5 2.7
Female 6.1 3.0 2.8 2.7 2.8 2.2 3.4 3.2
Aged 60-64 All Persons 4.4 2.1 2.4 2.3 1.6 2.5 2.2 1.3
Male 4.6 2.3 2.1 2.5 1.8 2.6 2.5 1.3
Female 3.7 1.7 3.4 1.8 1.2 2.3 1.4 1.5
Aged 65 
and over All Persons 1.1 1.4 0.8 0.4 0.4 0.9 0.5 0.7
Male 0.8 1.2 0.2 0.4 0.3 1.0 0.4 0.8
Female 2.6 2.3 3.0 0.5 0.8 0.5 0.6 0.4
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4.1 Introduction
This chapter places the large inflow of EU 10 nationals to Ireland in the wider
context of the EU’s experience with migration generally and of the steadily deeper
ties that membership of the EU and participation in its procedures have created
between Member States. Section 4.2 examines whether Ireland’s recent experi-
ence is unusual in the EU history of enlargements and explores similarities and
differences with the large south-north migration of the 1960s. Enlargement apart,
the deepening of the EU has facilitated intra-EU migration and affected the
obligations of Member States towards migrants; these are reviewed in Section 4.3.
The next Section discusses how the EU seeks to manage the interaction and
tension between extending the freedom to work and reside anywhere in the EU
with the protection by Member States of their own labour markets and social
standards. Finally, Section 4.5 reviews the more speculative issue of whether the
EU should now expect a significant rise in the historically low number of EU
citizens who, hitherto, have chosen to live in a Member State not their own.
4.2 EU Enlargements and European migration
4.2.1 Migration to Ireland of EU Nationals
When Ireland joined the then European Community in 1973, the prospect of a
significant inflow of workers from the other Member States was negligible. The
prospects and rights of Irish nationals who went elsewhere in the EC to work were
the more prominent concerns. After membership, the Continental EU assumed
major significance as a destination for Irish emigrants. It did not supplant the UK
as their principal destination but regularly overtook the USA as the second most
important destination by the 1990s (Hughes and Quinn, 2004: 7). Currently, some
one fifth of Ireland’s now small number of emigrants each year moves to parts of
the EU other than the UK (CSO, 2005).
The enlargements of the EU after Irish membership—the southern expansion that
took in, first, Greece (1981) and then Spain and Portugal (1986), the ‘silent’
enlargement of German reunification (1990) which added significantly to the
population and workforce of the EU without adding another Member State, and
the EFTA enlargement which took in Austria, Sweden and Finland (1996)—raised
concerns in several Member States of significant labour inflows, but not in Ireland.
The eastern enlargement on 1st May 2004 was the first to entail major
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implications for Ireland’s labour market of the EU’s commitment to provide equal
access to private-sector employment for workers across its entire territory.This was
both because of its timing (the strength of labour demand in the Irish economy
was creating opportunities) and the severity of the push factors in several of the
new Member States.
The 2004 Watershed
Data reviewed in Chapter 2 confirm the speed and scale of the response by
nationals of the new Member States to opportunities in Ireland’s economy. There
have been remarkable developments. Over a 12-month period, the number of new
arrivals from the EU 10 exceeded the stock of EU 15 nationals (excluding the UK),
which had taken more than 30 years to build up. By mid-2005, the 2 per cent of
Ireland’s resident working age population comprised of EU 10 nationals was five
times the EU 15 average (0.4 per cent) and even greater than in Austria (1.4 per
cent) (Table 4.1). Prior to enlargement, Austria, on account of its history (the legacy
of the Austro-Hungarian Empire) and land borders with four of the acceding
countries, had the largest presence of EU 10 nationals while Ireland had virtually
none (Kvist, 2004).1 Ireland, in a short space of time, has become the Member State
to achieve most parity between the proportion of its population made up of EU 10
nationals and that made up of third-country nationals. By mid-2005, there were
two EU 10 nationals in Ireland for every three third-country (non-EU) nationals; in
the other EU 15 countries, the number of third-country (non-EU) nationals far
outweighed the number of EU 10 nationals (Table 4.1). The net result of a large
presence of EU 10 nationals and low presence of third-country nationals, by EU 15
standards, was that Ireland had an overall population of foreign nationals
comparable to the EU 15 average (7.8 per cent as against 7.6 per cent).
The large presence of EU 10 nationals in Ireland’s population was built up almost
entirely after May 2004. This is in contrast with the experience the larger Member
States had of southern enlargement in the 1980s. In that instance, substantial
migration took place prior to enlargement and the actual entry of Greece, Spain
and Portugal to the EU had little further impact on migration flows. Transitional
arrangements applied at that time also. Greeks ( joined 1981) could not exploit free
movement opportunities until 1988; Spaniards and Portuguese ( joined 1986) had
to wait until 1992. However, upon attaining full rights to move, settle and work in
other Member States, no new increases in emigration took place. It seemed that
‘the stock of foreign residents from the Southern EU members had already reached
its equilibrium when free movement was introduced’ (Boeri and Brücker, 2001: 12).
Their composition changed, however, and became dominated by family
dependants joining workers in the industrial heartlands of the EU.
Table 4.2 confirms the strong focus on employment of nationals from other
countries living in Ireland and of EU 10 nationals in particular. The latter’s
employment rate was 85 per cent as against 69 per cent for EU 15 nationals and 67
per cent for Irish nationals. In fact, EU 10 nationals in Ireland had a higher
employment rate than their fellow nationals living anywhere else in the EU 15,
including in the UK or Sweden, the two other Member States that opened their
labour markets fully to them in May 2004.
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1. The likelihood of Ireland leading in this regard was not foreseen. For example: ‘The smallest population share of Central and Eastern
European Country nationals [in EU 15 Member States on the basis of 2001 data, ed.] is in Ireland and Portugal. … Germany and Austria
are expected to receive two-thirds or more of coming migrants, whereas the projected inflows to Ireland and Portugal are negligible’
(Kvist, 2004: 308).
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Table 4.1. Composition of Resident Working Age Population 
by National Groupings, 2005 (row percentages)
Nationality
EU 15 
Country of residence National (inc. UK) EU 10 non-EU
Belgium 91.3 5.8 0.2 2.8
Denmark 96.4 1.1 : 2.4
Germany 89.5 2.8 0.7 7.0
Greece 94.0 0.3 0.4 5.3
Spain 90.5 1.2 0.2 8.1
France 94.4 1.9 0.1 3.6
Ireland 92.3 3.0 2.0 2.8
Netherlands 95.7 1.4 0.1 2.8
Austria 89.2 1.9 1.4 7.5
Portugal 97.0 0.4 : 2.6
Finland 98.3 0.4 0.3 1.0
Sweden 94.8 2.3 0.2 2.7
United Kingdom 93.8 1.7 0.4 4.1
EU 15 92.4 2.1 0.4 5.1
Source European Commission (2006a).
Notes Italy is excluded as it does not disaggregate by nationality, and Luxembourg for its small size.
Italy is also excluded from EU 15 total.
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Why Such a Preference for Ireland?
The eastern enlargement of the EU undoubtedly occasioned a major migration
flow to Ireland. It is also clear that it was unforeseen that Ireland would attract an
inflow of EU 10 nationals of the scale that it did (e.g., Boeri, Brücker et al., 2001;
Kvist, 2004). It was estimated that between 2 and 4 per cent of the populations of
Central and Eastern Europe would take up residence in the EU 15 as a whole in the
long run in the wake of enlargement (Boeri et al., 2002: 101); yet, for example, the
equivalent of 2.4 per cent of Lithuanians aged 20-44 had received PPS numbers in
Ireland alone by December 2005.2
Several contextual features contributed to Ireland’s strong attractiveness to
mobile EU 10 workers in the period immediately after their countries’ accessions to
the EU:
Table 4.2 Employment rates by Nationality, EU 15 (Q2, 2005)
Nationality
Country of Residence Nationals EU 15 EU 10 Non-EU
Belgium 62 60 55 35
Germany 67 68 51 48
Greece 60 53 47 71
Spain 62 64 78 71
France 64 69 62 44
Ireland 67 69 85 57
Netherlands 74 76 64 41
Austria 69 72 66 60
Finland 69 67 55 45
Sweden 74 73 62 45
United Kingdom 72 69 75 58
EU 15 67 68 62 55
EU 10 65 67 62 55
Source European Commission (2006a).
Notes Italy excluded for lack of data on nationality; Denmark, Portugal and Luxembourg excluded due to small sample size.
2. An indicator of the significance of migration to Ireland on the demography of the sending countries in the EU 10 is the number of
their nationals who have applied for a PPS number in Ireland expressed as a proportion of the age groups most likely to emigrate. PPS
numbers are issued to those whose stay may be very short (e.g., student workers), who seek but do not find employment, and who
are not candidates for employment in the first place (e.g., children). However, they are unique to individuals. Thus, by December 2005,
the 90,000 PPS numbers issued to Polish nationals were equivalent to 0.6 per cent of Poland’s population of 20-44 year olds (the age
group most likely to migrate), the 15,000 issued to Latvian nationals equivalent to 1.8 per cent of its 20-44 year olds, and the almost
30,000 issued to Lithuanian nationals equivalent to 2.4 cent of that country’s population of 20-44 year olds.
s The Irish economy’s strong and sustained demand for labour;
s The poorer employment and much lower earnings prospects facing EU 10
nationals in their own states;
s The weakness of the large EU economies (principally Germany) whose labour
markets might otherwise have absorbed many of the EU 10 migrants who came
to Ireland;
s The high profile enjoyed by Ireland in the media and referendum campaigns of
Central and Eastern Europe as they debated the merits of membership. Ireland
served as an example of how a country could benefit, a profile enhanced when
the ceremony of enlargement took place in Dublin during an Irish presidency of
the EU;
s The attractiveness to young EU 10 nationals (shared with the UK) of English as
the single best language to learn during an employment spell elsewhere in the
EU; and
s The fact that 12 of the EU 15 states did not open their labour markets fully to
workers from the new Member States at the time of their accession but
continued to require them to apply for work permits under ‘transitional
arrangements’ (discussed further below).
How Unusual is Ireland’s Experience?
The impact on Ireland’s demography and labour market of the eastern
enlargement of the EU in 2004 is a new chapter in a still unfolding story of how EU
enlargement and deepening are affecting settlement patterns and labour markets
across Europe. Each enlargement has been unique and reflected the socio-
economic conditions pertaining in the existing Member States and the acceding
states at the time in question.
The 2004 enlargement was not unusual in increasing significantly the total
population of the EU. At 19.5 per cent, this increase was similar to the 20 per cent
that the accession of Greece, Spain and Portugal added in the 1980s. The 1973
enlargement, which made Ireland a member along with the UK and Denmark, had
added 31 per cent to the population of the then EC 6. The 2004 enlargement was
unusual because of the gap in living standards between the states that joined and
the existing members. At purchasing power parities, the average per-capita
income in the 10 accession states was 45 per cent of the EU 15 level in 2001; it
ranged from as low as 34 per cent in Latvia to some 70 per cent in Slovenia. By
contrast, at the time of the southern enlargement in the 1980s, per capita income
levels in Greece, Portugal and Spain were around 65 per cent of the EU 10 average.
The southern enlargement occurred in the same decade as the inauguration of the
Single Market (1987). The juxtaposition of the two occasioned a major expansion
of the EU’s Structural Funds and the creation of the Cohesion Fund through which
the richer EU Member States supported the infrastructural and human skills
development of the poorer MS with the ultimate objective of lessening income
and wage differentials. Ireland was a major beneficiary of the Delors-I (1989-93)
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and Delors-II (1994-99) Community Support Frameworks through which these
structural and regional funds were channelled. It appears that the EU was able and
willing to commit to a higher level of transfers to Ireland, Spain, Portugal and
Greece in the late 1980s than it has subsequently done for the EU 10. For example,
the level of net EU transfers still being received by Ireland and the southern three
(as a percentage of GNI) in 2004 was matched in only four of the EU 10 (Lithuania,
Latvia, Estonia and Malta) (European Commission, 2006c: 24).3
Some commentators describe the extent of the per-capita income differentials
between the EU 15 and the new Member States as the ‘one-core problem’ around
which the economic implications of the eastern enlargement revolve (Sapir et al,
2003: 100). The EU is set to acquire further experience of these economic implica-
tions. The accession of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007 or 2008 will embrace two
populations whose living standards (as indicated by GDP per capita in PPS) are only
some 30 per cent of the EU 25 average (itself significantly lower than the average for
the EU 15).4 This next enlargement is discussed in Chapter 7.
4.2.2 South-North Labour Migration in Europe
The income gap between the EU 15 and EU 10 countries in 2004 was similar to that
between northern and southern Europe at the time of major south-north
migration in the 1950s and 1960s. In several countries, in-migration was on a large
scale and initially entered predominantly low-paying jobs. These features suggest
that the experience of some northern European labour markets and societies with
south-north migration at that time may be of interest to Ireland. One major
difference, however, suggests the comparison should not be overdrawn. Migrants
from the south in the 1960s were largely poorly educated whereas migrants into
Ireland after 2004 have much higher levels of schooling. Another difference — that
migration from the south took place prior to the southern expansion when their
nationals needed work permits — whereas that into Ireland from the EU 10 has
taken place after eastern enlargement, can, interestingly, be considered of less
significance (see 4.2.3 below).
Between 1955 and 1973, an estimated five million people moved from the south to
the north of Europe. Italians moved first in the 1950s, Spaniards followed in the
early 1960s, while Portuguese and Greeks gathered momentum after the mid-
1960s. These movements were largely initiated by employers in Germany, France
and the Benelux countries actively seeking to recruit large numbers of Italian,
Spanish and Portuguese nationals as guest workers (Maddison, 1995). Several
factors contributed to creating a largely positive experience initially of this
migration, even on its large scale, in host and sending countries alike. There were
real labour shortages which migrants were filling and they facilitated upward
economic and social mobility on the part of natives. The migrants were seen to
make a major contribution to northern cities and economies. There was, also, little
sense of an uncertain future being created as it was assumed that many migrants
would return home once they had saved sufficient or if they became jobless. There
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3. Net EU transfers to all the EU 10 together (taking into account their contributions to the EU budget) are estimated to vary from some
1.6 per cent to 3.3 per cent of their aggregate GDP in the period 2007-2013 (Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs,
2006: 25). By contrast, net receipts from the EU Budget to Ireland ranged from 4 per cent to 6.5 per cent of GDP in the 10 years after
the launch of the Single Market.
4. The two countries will add 8.8 per cent to the EU’s total population, similar to when Austria, Sweden and Finland joined in 1995.
was a belief that national control could be exercised in the last instance, based on
the assumption that simply deciding to issue no new work permits would see
inflows and, later, stocks of, foreign workers begin to dwindle.
There was a distinct profile to these migrant workers from the south (similar, save
in gender, to that of Irish emigrants to Britain in the 1950s). They were,
predominantly male, in their prime years, poorly educated and from rural
backgrounds. They entered predominantly low-skilled employments.
The established model of mass Mediterranean migration to North European
cities was that migrants were required for the lowest-status and most poorly-
paid jobs which, in a tight labour market characterized by rising standards of
education and thus employment aspirations, were shunned by the local
workforce. Construction, factory employment and low-grade service occu-
pations were typical employment sectors into which migrants were channelled
(King, 1993: 23).
An analysis of 1999 French census data (Constant, 2005) found evidence of
significant occupational segregation with immigrants occupying ‘jobs shunned by
natives’. ‘While men are frequently in the construction, automobile or other heavy
industry, women are in domestic services, hotels and restaurants. Over the years,
immigrants have remained in these jobs and, a quarter of a century later, their
children are also in these same jobs’ (270, emphasis added). The consensus from
the few French studies of this occupational segregation is that migrants were not
displacing natives from these sectors of the labour market, but were either
replacing French nationals moving up the labour ladder or holding employments
that would otherwise have closed (and which, subsequently, a significant number
did anyway).
The very different macroeconomic conditions in Europe after 1973 occasioned the
abrupt cessation of guest-worker recruitment and a revision of many of the
assumptions and policies governing migration. During the economic recession of
the 1980s, in particular, industrialised Europe ‘woke up’ (Baganha et al., 2005) to
the fallacy of the ‘return myth’. While some migrant workers from the south
returned there, more were joined in the north by their spouses and other
dependent family members. Northern cities also discovered that they had created,
in instances where the sending countries had experienced no meaningful
convergence with EU standards (North Africa, Turkey), concentrated communities
of migrants particularly vulnerable to redundancies and low pay, who suffered
disproportionately from the delocalisation of manufacturing and were poorly
equipped to access much of the new services employment.
Several dynamic processes helped to mitigate the impact on Mediterranean
migrant populations of the harsher economic and policy context after 1973.
Children who joined their parents increased the latter’s engagement with their
host societies and accelerated their social integration; on becoming adults, they
were more likely than their parents to marry a native than seek a spouse in the
home country. Preparations for EU membership improved the sending countries’
economic performance, facilitating the frequency and ease of communications,
stemming the flow of new migrants, and ensuring that those who continued to
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leave were better prepared, including by having higher educational attainment.
Although, as already explained, no new surge in emigration took place when
southern countries became EU members and the high level of pre-membership
emigration flows was not reached again, to this day, traditional south-north
migration continues. Work opportunities in construction and tourism in the richer
Northern EU states are still sought by a sizeable proportion of the migrant
population from the EU’s southern Member States (Recchi, 2004).
Awareness of these aspects to the south-north migration experience of Europe
prompts several observations about the east-west migration that has impacted on
Ireland with singular strength in the wake of the May 2004 enlargement.
s The profile of the inflow to Ireland is younger and more educated than that of
the south-north migration of earlier decades. We do not know the extent to
which seeking employment in Ireland is a step in the training and career
trajectories of these young people (e.g., learning English).
s Many of them are, nevertheless, going to economic sectors similar to those
filled by the earlier south-north migrants (construction, factory employment
and lower-grade service occupations). In Ireland today, as in the industrial
heartlands of the EC in the 1960s, this means migrants are currently
concentrated in employments particularly vulnerable to economic restruc-
turing and the business cycle.
s The east-west migration is occurring at a time when transport and
communications links are swifter, easier and cheaper than before. Temporary
migration, migration for ‘student’ employment, repeat migration—in fact,
multiple forms of ‘light’ attachment to Ireland’s labour market on the part of
Eastern European nationals—are more feasible for them than was the case for
nationals from the Mediterranean countries in the 1950s and 1960s.
s A significant proportion of the inflow has already proven itself to be temporary
(witness the much larger number of EU 10 nationals given PPS numbers since
May 2004 than of EU 10 nationals resident 15 months later). However, we do 
not know what proportion of the new inflow may settle permanently in
Ireland, or from where those that are currently single will predominantly
choose their spouses.5
s The large stocks of nationals from several Central and Eastern European (CEE)
countries already in Ireland can be presumed to generate further inflows. The
influence of interpersonal networks that contained emigrant friends or
relatives was of major significance in fuelling emigration from Ireland in the
1980s (NESC, 1990: 160). It is likely to be significant also as a factor increasing
migration into Ireland of EU 10 nationals.
s Some convergence in income per capita with the EU 15 took place in CEE
countries during the years preceding their accession but the current income
gap will take decades, not years, to close.6 While most of the EU 10 economies
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5. Two thirds of the gross inflow from the EU 10 are currently males (CSO, 2005, Table 8). Again, we do not know how many may have
spouses/partners, with or without dependent children, in their home countries.
6. Per capita income in the EU 10 rose from an average 44.25 per cent of the EU 15 level in 1997 to more than 50 per cent in 2005. This
was helped by pre-accession financial transfers.
have an educated and skilled workforce and a long industrial tradition, they
face major institutional and structural challenges: coping with the legacy 
of industrial plant that is environmentally destructive, establishing greater
transparency and probity at the interface between business and public
administration, and establishing the quality and credentials of their workforces
with employers in the EU 15 (Sapir et al, 2003). Convergence will be neither
automatic nor swift: ‘if the growth rate of the EU 10 is about twice the growth
rate of the EU 15, these countries per capita incomes could be catching-up with
EU 15 levels in around 35 years’ (European Commission, 2006c: 35).
s The large German economy was assumed to be the primary recipient of east-
west migration and a return to higher growth there can yet be expected to
exert a major pulling power. We do not know whether few or many of the
current individuals in Ireland would re-route themselves to a faster-growing
German economy, or whether the networks already established between
Ireland and EU 10 societies have established a lasting appeal for employment in
Ireland.
4.2.3 Enlargements and Transitional Arrangements
When enlargements of the EU have embraced countries with lower income levels,
incumbent Member States have been concerned that their domestic labour
markets would be disrupted by the immediate extension of free movement for
workers from the acceding states. Transitional arrangements were adopted that
delayed, in specified ways and for limited periods, the full opening of their
domestic labour markets to job-seekers from the acceding states. (Enlargements
that took in rich countries generally gave their workers free movement
immediately on accession). These transitional arrangements cannot challenge
freedoms constitutive of the very identity of the EU—the free movement of
persons and the entitlement of workers to apply for employment anywhere
without discrimination by nationality. They are, essentially, temporary measures
aimed at smoothing the adjustment of national labour markets to a new
environment.
The 2004 enlargement, because of the scale of the income gap it was bridging and
because of the levels of unemployment existing at the time in much of the EU 15,
saw recourse to transitional arrangements on the part of 12 existing Member States.
Ireland, out of principle and confidence, was one of only three countries willing to
give nationals of the new EU 10 countries immediate access to its labour market. At
the last moment, Ireland shared the concern of other EU 15 countries that its welfare
state could be exposed unfairly to ‘benefit shopping’ on the part of EU 10 nationals
and adopted a ‘habitual residency condition’ governing access to social assistance
payments. In keeping with the principle of non-discrimination by nationality, this
was a change in Ireland’s welfare state for everyone (as some returning Irish
nationals subsequently discovered) and not the introduction of special
arrangements for EU 10 nationals only (prohibited by EU law).
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When the transitional arrangements (TA) came up for obligatory review after their
first two years, the European Commission found no evidence that migration flows
from the EU 10 had caused significant labour market disturbances anywhere
(European Commission, 2006a; 2006c). It accepted that TA had probably created
‘biased’ destination patterns, with a country like Ireland receiving more migrants
than would have selected it if the EU 15 had provided a ‘level playing field’. It argued
that countries which adopted TA had possibly received less-skilled inflows, inflows
more skewed towards short-term and seasonal workers, and greater proportions
of posted workers, self-employed workers and illegal workers than would have
arisen in the absence of TA. Perhaps its key conclusion was that ‘ultimately,
mobility flows are driven by factors related to supply and demand conditions’
(2006a: 9). In other words, the actual prospects of improving earnings influenced
where EU 10 nationals went more than greater or less complexity in the regulatory
and administrative arrangements governing their access to national labour
markets. This would suggest that, had Ireland adopted TA itself in 2004, given the
strength of aggregate labour demand in the Irish economy (and assuming the
same switch in policy on work permits to reflect the principle of Community
Preference), it may have altered the terms and conditions under which many EU 10
nationals arrived rather than severely reduced their numbers.
In mid-2006, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Finland joined Ireland, Sweden and the
UK in lifting all restrictions on access to their labour markets by EU 10 nationals7;
France, Belgium, Luxembourg and Italy lifted them only for specified sectors where
they had labour shortages; Germany, Austria and Denmark decided to continue
with the restrictions they had in place.
4.3 EU Deepening and European Migration
Successive enlargements of the EU have become steadily more challenging for
new and existing Member States because the Union itself has become a more
developed entity over the years with ‘deeper’ integration between its Members.
The deepening of the EU refers to the degree of integration created by its law and
procedures between the economies and societies of the Member States. While
each enlargement of the EU has extended the territory throughout which its law
and institutions apply, the state of development of this law (the acquis
communautaire) and the interaction between national institutions and EU bodies
which membership involves have become more demanding and complex. On the
one hand, this has tended to prolong negotiations for membership and candidacy
periods; on the other, it has entailed a closer embrace by existing Member States
of new economies and societies once their accession periods and the associated
transitional arrangements have been completed.
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7. The Netherlands may still do so by the end of 2006.
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4.3.1 The Influence of Economic Integration on Social Policy
The story of the deepening of the EU and, within that, of the ebbs and flows in
balancing the drive towards economic integration with the more effective co-
ordination of national social policies, is long and complex.8 A familiarity with this
story can improve our understanding of the current EU migration taking place into
Ireland and of how its potential impact on Ireland’s labour market standards and
social conditions can, and should, be managed. Some of the essential elements of
the story are well known. The construction of the Common Market and then Single
Market (SM) had a strong Treaty base and the central institutions of the EU are
empowered to play a major pro-active role in seeing that it is built. Social policy
and the welfare state, however, remain the prerogatives of the Member States. EU
action on social policy needs either to have a defensible ‘treaty base’ which links
the need for EU action to health and safety at work (maternity, working time, etc.),
gender equality or the task of constructing the SM9, or to take the softer form of
engaging the Member States in a mutual learning exercise (via the Open Method
of Co-ordination). The influence of the process of European economic integration
on national labour market and social policy-making can be presented as taking one
of three forms (Leibfried, 2005):
1. Direct, ‘positive’, initiatives: high-profile initiatives to develop uniform social
standards at EU level, in areas such as gender equality, health and safety, and
anti-discrimination;
2. Direct,‘negative’, pressures of integration: adaptations of national social policy,
sometimes deriving from decisions by the European Court of Justice, necessary
to ensure the ‘four freedoms’—particularly the free movement of workers—
often requiring extension of social security rights to workers who come from
other member states;
3. Indirect, ‘market’, pressures: where the actual mobility of capital, labour,
services and goods creates a range of indirect pressures that do not legally
require, but nonetheless encourage, Member States to adapt their approach to
social security or taxation.
Thorough assessments of the net impacts on labour standards and social
protection of these three types of influence support neither the thesis of a ‘race to
the bottom’ nor that of an automatic ‘levelling up’. A complex interplay is
continuing to unfold between the interests of low-wage and high-wage Member
States, between national measures and the strategies of social partners, and
between the social benefits of employment gains and the employment costs of
social gains.
8. Good introductions include Wallace et al, (2005), Policy Making in the European Union; and Adnett and Hardy (2005), The European
Social Model: Modernisation or Evolution?
9. The treaty base ‘game’ currently features the hugely important exploration by the European Court of Justice of the extent to which
welfare institutions (e.g., public health bodies), particularly when they have recourse to market instruments, can be considered
‘enterprises’ and engaged in ‘economic activity’. Where this is the case, the requirements of EU competition law can be considered
applicable to them too.
4.3.2 More Developed Entitlements for More in the Population
Responding effectively and fairly to the large inflow to Ireland of EU migrant
workers requires diffusing widely in Irish society an appreciation of the protection
and entitlements now provided to all EU worker-citizens under Community law, be
they Irish nationals elsewhere in the EU 25 or EU 10 nationals recently arrived in
Ireland. Appendix 4.1 to this Chapter records some of the major milestones in the
50-year development of this part of the EU’s acquis communautaire. Figure 4.1
summarises the twofold direction in which this acquis has developed, the steady
increase in the set of labour market conditions and social standards subject to
mutual recognition or the harmonisation of standards and the growing proportion
of Member States’ populations empowered to choose where in the EU they will
reside and work.
The horizontal axis depicts the steady growth in the set of working conditions
which the EU has sought to co-ordinate at the national level in order to ensure
both that national standards did not function as obstacles to the free movement
of workers and that the free movement of workers did not lower standards. From
such early conquests as the 1957 requirement that EU migrant workers with
employment could no longer be refused residence permits, the list has developed
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Figure 4.1 The Evolving European Acquis Communantaire
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Recognition/ Harmonisation of Standards
through health and safety, gender equality and the portability of social insurance
entitlements/benefits, to touch on aspects of work/life balance and of workers’
rights to information and consultation. While the list has lengthened, some key
issues have been kept resolutely from any sphere of EU competence, principally,
pay, the right of association, and the rights to strike and to impose lock-outs.
The vertical axis depicts the steady growth in the proportion of Member States’
populations who have become the subjects of EU-guaranteed rights. Beginning
with qualified workers in the coal and steel industries of the Member States of the
1953 European Coal and Steel Community, the 1957 Treaty of Rome then focussed
on the right to seek and take work in another Member State of all private sector
employees and their family members. Over further decades, it became steadily
more difficult for Member States to withhold or withdraw the status of ‘worker’
from individuals when their employment was interrupted or ended, or to
withdraw rights from family dependants when their link with a worker was broken
(by separation, bereavement, or other causes). Further groups of workers also came
steadily into focus. The right of Member States to restrict public sector
employments to their own nationals was made subject to more transparent and
demanding criteria. Self-employed workers began to benefit from a growing focus
on the freedom to provide services and to establish in another Member State.
Finally, in the wake of the 1992 Treaty on European Union (Maastricht), the creation
of EU citizenship gave a new impetus to clarifying and strengthening the residence
rights of migrants not engaged in economic activity, viz., students, pensioners 
and others who move to another Member State but for purposes other than 
paid activity.
As many EU 10 nationals have come to Ireland for employment purposes, both they
and many members of Irish society have had to become aware of the finer details
of how the acquis communautaire seeks to ensure, on the one hand, that workers
enjoy genuine mobility and, on the other, that Member States are protected from
inflows of people coming to ‘live off’ higher social standards to which they have
not contributed. In fact, the current obligations of a host state to EU migrants vary
significantly depending on whether the migrant in question is (i) in employment,
(ii) a job-seeker who previously worked, (iii) a job-seeker with no work record, (iv) a
self-employed worker, or (v) a person who is not economically active. These are
summarised in Appendix 4.2 to this Chapter.
As with so much else in the process of EU deepening, the balance struck between
fostering genuine free movement for workers and protecting tax payers in
Member States which fund high levels of social protection out of general taxation
is provisional and will continue to change as experience and European Court of
Justice (ECJ) decisions accumulate. Ireland’s Habitual Residency Condition10 is an
example of a change induced in a Member State’s social assistance system by the
perception of a potential for ‘welfare shopping’. Sweden is watching closely for
evidence of ‘social raiding’ whereby migrants from elsewhere in the EU hold
employment for just as long a period as brings them entitlement to that country’s
generous insurance benefits (Kvist, 2004). Interpreting such developments as a
‘race to the bottom’ quite ignores the major benefits being reaped from EU
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10  To be entitled to apply for most means-tested social welfare payments, applicants must have been ‘habitually resident’ in the State
or any other part of the Common Travel Area for a continuous period of 2 years at the date of making the application.
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enlargement and deepening. Interpreting them as poor Member States and
regions ‘catching up’ with the higher standards of richer States and regions risks
implying that the process is more automatic and inevitable than is, in fact, the
case. Across the EU 25, each MS is engaged in adjustments to its national system
which ensure, on the one hand, its due contribution to creating the freedom of
movement that is at the heart of EU citizenship11 and, on the other, that standards
of protection which its own nationals currently enjoy are not reduced. The
hallmarks of the process continue to be the coordination, not harmonisation, of
what remain national insurance systems and that nationally determined and
administered floors to social assistance are neither forced down or up, but remain
for individual countries to tailor in the light of their own economic and social
conditions and cultural traditions.
The Council believes there is a need for national authorities in every Member State,
and not just in Ireland, to communicate more vigorously the principles, reciprocity
and successes which characterise the progressive implementation of the rights to
freedom of movement, residence and work that are a significant part of the value-
added of European citizenship.
4.4 Managing the Impact on Standards
Irish society and its welfare state are, in fact, caught up in an unfolding process
that is extending and deepening the individual freedoms that all nationals of the
EU Member States enjoy in their complementary and common identity as EU
citizens. The process is neither smooth over time nor even in its impact on different
groups. EU measures that support the unimpeded movement across borders of
workers and the freedom to provide services necessarily and inevitably conflict at
times with specific national labour market standards and the diversity of institution-
al systems. The story of how these measures have developed, however, illustrates,
on the one hand, the lack of a template or detailed blueprint that can guarantee a
risk- and tension-free path in developing mutual recognition and harmonisation
and, on the other, the ability of diverse actors working through a sophisticated set
of institutions and procedures to forge new arrangements for doing so. It is, clearly,
neither a systematic levelling down, nor forcing up, of existing national standards
of social protection. Two contemporary examples of this process at work concern
the situation of posted workers and the draft Services Directive.
4.4.1 Posted Workers
Posted workers are employees who, for a limited period, carry out their work in the
territory of a Member State other than the State in which they normally work for
their employers. In 1996, the Posted Workers’ Directive (96/71) applied the ‘host
country principle’ to companies which carry out project work in other Member
States by bringing their own workforces with them. It specifies that they are to
comply with all the national regulations on pay and working conditions of the
‘host’ Member State where they carry out the project work.12 This requirement was
11. Described, for example, by the European Parliament (2001) as ‘a fundamental right of citizens of the European Union which has not
yet been carried fully into effect’.
12. Unless the terms of the individual’s contract are more ‘generous’, in which case their contract rights apply. In this way, clarity is
provided on the terms and conditions that apply in particular circumstances.
adopted largely to close off opportunities for companies in one Member State to
win contracts to carry out work in another Member State purely on the basis that
the lower living standards where its workers habitually live enable them to pay
lower wages than workers receive in the country where the work is carried out.
Underlying the directive and its adoption is the acknowledgement that ‘social
dumping’ is a threat, that it is undesirable and that companies are expected to
seek competitive advantage on the basis of higher productivity and not of lower
labour standards.
The 2004 enlargement significantly increased the number of employers in the new
Member States with an interest in posting their workers to carry out work in the
EU 15. Imprecision and ‘grey areas’ in the wording of the 1996 Posted Workers’
Directive have come more sharply into focus, particularly the manner in which the
Directive specifies the body of national measures that describe the pay and
working conditions of the host state which are to be applied to posted workers.
Prior to 2004, several Member States took individual action, little noticed beyond
their borders, to adjust their national legislation in the light of the Directive
(Bilous, 1999).13 Sweden, however, has experienced that the Directive seems to
favour industrial relations regimes that rely on centralisation and statutory and
regulatory provisions, over a system like its own which is decentralised and reliant
on collective bargaining at the sectoral and local level (see Box 4.1).
The Laval case highlights two poles that are in tension. In the first place, it
highlights the interest of lower-wage states and that the actual levels of wages,
taxes and social welfare transfers are for Member States to determine. For
example, there is concern not to replicate at the EU level the situation that arose
in Germany’s eastern länder after reunification. When wages and social benefits
were raised to West German levels, the region’s economic development was
slowed to an extent which even massive federal transfers could not counteract.
Ireland’s own economic development is a case in point. It was required by EU law
to raise labour market standards in several spheres (gender equality, health and
safety, working time, etc.) and induced by the Open Method of Co-ordination to
meet exacting targets for outcomes in key areas (employment rates, take-up of
training, etc.), but without hindering its ability to benefit from wage levels, social
insurance rates and tax policies of its own choosing. Ireland’s wages and social
spending were pulled up by its economic success, not forced up by the interest of
richer Member States in containing competition from enterprises operating from
Ireland. The Structural and Cohesion Funds were a significant mechanism in
Ireland’s case, helping to reassure its richer EU partners that the country’s low
living standards and costs would not last indefinitely and Ireland herself that
businesses based in the country would eventually be able to compete in the Single
Market on the basis of productivity rather than of low costs.
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13. For example, Germany was concerned that posted workers (e.g., Portuguese and Irish) would put downward pressure on German
construction workers wages because, while working in Germany they paid the lower contributions and were covered by the lesser
entitlements of their home countries’ Insurance Funds. It introduced binding minimum wages for construction work in its economy.
Its 1996 Posted Workers Law made required the Minister of Labour to extend the collective wage agreement in construction to the
whole sector in order to set a minimum construction wage that embraced posted workers.
In second place, the Laval case highlights the possibility that employers, whose sole
basis for competitive tendering in a richer Member State is the level of wages they
pay in a Member State with lower living standards, may undermine labour market
standards in the region where they intend to carry out the work, rather than
promote the economic development of the region where their workers are based.
The resolution of the Laval case, therefore, is a further test of the collective
commitment and capacity of the social partners, national labour market
institutions (in this case the Swedish Labour Court), EU bodies and Member States
(the opinion of each of whom has been sought by the ECJ) to balance market
widening with the protection of labour standards.
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14. Popularly known as the ‘Lex Britannia’ after the ship, M/S Britannia, whose arrival in a Swedish port prompted a dispute. The law
established that it is lawful for a Swedish union to impose a loading or unloading ban or take other forms of industrial action
against, for example, a ship sailing under a foreign flag and with a foreign crew, regardless of the fact that the shipowner has
concluded a collective agreement with a foreign union.
Box 4.1 The Laval Case
In April 2005, the Swedish Labour Court
referred a high-profile industrial dispute 
to the European Court of Justice. A Latvian
company (Laval un Partneri) had won a
public sector contract to build a school in
Sweden and ‘posted’ its own workers to 
the Swedish construction site. It did not
affiliate temporarily to a Swedish employ-
ers’ body and, thus, did not become party 
to the sectoral collective agreement in
construction that would have protected it
(unconditionally) from industrial action
while obliging it to follow through and
negotiate a rate for the job through a site-
specific collective agreement. The Latvian
company concluded a collective agreement
with unions in Latvia instead. A 1991
Swedish law, however, gives precedence to
Swedish collective agreements over those
concluded in other countries.14 The Swedish
unions took strike action, construction
work was halted, the Latvian company
withdrew but took an action against the
unions in the Swedish labour court. The
latter referred the case to the ECJ, seeking
clarity about the status of Swedish collective
agreements in applying the Posted Workers
Directive. As these agreements are not
‘declared universally applicable’, nor
‘national’ or ‘law’, it is not clear that the
Directive regards them as constituting part
of the Swedish pay and conditions to be
extended to posted workers. The Latvians
argue that they were, in effect, blocked 
as foreigners from carrying out short-term
work under pay and conditions they
regarded as satisfactory; the Swedish
unions argue that the pay of the Latvian
workers was undercutting going rates in a
local labour market. The Irish government’s
position is that this dispute has arisen in
the specific context of the Swedish labour
market model and that EU law should
continue to respect and uphold the integrity
of national traditions in the area of social
partnership, industrial relations and dispute
resolution mechanisms and practices.
4.4.2 The Draft Services Directive 
A major example of the European process is the debate that took place about
appropriate measures for fostering the provision of services across national
borders while, at the same time, ensuring that service providers who undertake
activities in Member States are adequately regulated.
Services activity is dominant in modern economies and extremely diverse. Some
services require significant levels of trust and inter-personal knowledge in order to
be provided effectively. To the extent that its regulation remains a national matter,
however, there is significant scope for national regulations to restrict national
service users to national providers, even where providers based in other Member
States have the capacity and ability to provide services of equal or better quality
and to do so more efficiently.15 After a long build-up, the Commission proposed a
Draft Services Directive in 2004, designed to make it easier for service providers
based in one Member State (and SMEs in particular) to provide their services to
users in other Member States, either by moving temporarily into them or
establishing there. Several aspects of the draft gave rise to a major debate that
caught media and public attention and culminated in the European Parliament, in
February 2006, proposing major amendments to it. These were substantially
adopted by the Commission and the European Council subsequently gave its
political agreement to the Commission’s amended Directive in April 2006.16
The chief areas of controversy, and the major amendments made to the draft by
the Parliament, serve to illustrate well both the ‘work-in-progress’ nature of the
‘European’ labour market and the prospect of eventual success in the fraught
process of adjusting national labour markets to the opportunities and challenges
of a genuine Single Market and mobile EU workforce.
From ‘Country-of-Origin’ to ‘Freedom-to-Provide Services’
The 2004 draft had proposed a ‘country-of-origin’ principle, whereby the providers
of services would be subject only to the law of the country in which they are
established when providing services in another Member State. Strong concerns
that this principle gave service providers in countries with the lowest standards a
competitive advantage, so that their standards would in effect be ‘exported’, led to
the country of origin principle being dropped and replaced with a ‘freedom-to-
provide-services’ rule. This requires a Member State to respect the right of service
providers from other Member States to supply services and to guarantee them
‘free access to and free exercise of a service activity within its territory’.17 MEPs also
expanded the list of reasons allowing Member States to exempt certain services
from application of the rule; these include public policy, public security,
environmental protection and public health.
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15. A Commission report of July 2002 provides a formidable list of the obstacles preventing the creation of an internal market in services
(European Commission, 2002). See also Vogt (2005).
16. The next step will be a second reading in the European Parliament in the Autumn with the aim of adopting a final text during the
Finnish Presidency in the second half of 2006. For the text of the Commission’s amended Directive and updates on progress, see
http://ec.europa.eu/
17. This guarantee is underpinned by a ban on a number of obstacles to the free movement of services. For example, in general it will no
longer be possible to require a service provider to open an office in the country where he/she is temporarily providing a service nor to
prevent him/her from setting up ‘certain infrastructure’ in that country. The provider must not be forced to register with a
professional body nor be banned from using his normal equipment at work. In addition, Member States must not apply ‘contractual
arrangements between the provider and the recipient which prevent or restrict service provision by the self-employed’.
From Monitoring From Afar to Monitoring Near at Hand
The 2004 draft proposed that compliance should be the responsibility of
authorities in the country of origin, no matter where in the EU the service is
provided. Doubts surfaced over the feasibility of monitoring in this way at,
potentially, a great distance from where the service is received. The European
Parliament proposed, instead, that the ‘member state of destination’ be
responsible for supervising service providers in its territory. This, for example,
removes the fear that workers working for a service provider from another
member state or domestic users of its service would have to pursue labour law or
consumer claims in the provider’s home state (and language).
Ring Fencing Labour Law
The text now clearly says that the directive does not affect labour law in the
Member States. It further specifies that Member States continue to apply their
own rules on conditions of employment, including those laid down through
collective bargaining agreements. However, any requirements placed on service
providers in/from other Member States must comply with the principles of the
treaty: non-discrimination (for example on grounds of nationality), necessity
(public policy, public security or protection of health or the environment) and
proportionality (the requirements must be appropriate for achieving the
objective). The new draft of the Directive allows member states to give legal effect
to collective bargaining agreements, which would have to be respected by service
providers from other EU states.
Services Not Included 
Services of general interest, which mean most public services, have been excluded
from the revised directive's scope. The power to decide which services belong to
this category has been left to the Member States. Industries already covered by
sectoral legislation were excluded in the 2004 draft and continue to be so, e.g.
financial services, electronic communications services and networks, and
transport. In addition, an activity on which a proposal for specific legislation has
been stalled, temporary work agencies, is excluded. This exemption is intended to
restore impetus for proceeding with specific legislation in this area. Other areas
excluded are legal services, audiovisual services, gambling and lotteries,
professions and activities linked to the exercise of public authority (e.g. notaries)
and tax services.
4.5 Secular Trends in the Mobility of Europeans
There are extensive rights of which the individual EU citizen can now avail across
a wide territory marked by significant differences in living standards, climate and
personal security. Up to the time of the eastern enlargement, the consensus was
that, by comparison to the US, EU citizens showed surprisingly little mobility (e.g.,
European Commission 2001). It was usual to point out that the presence of third
country nationals living in EU Member States was typically larger than the
presence of other EU nationals (as Table 4.1 above confirms) and that, within the
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larger states, migrants were more mobile than nationals and contributed
disproportionately to containing regional imbalances (Boeri et al., 2002). Indeed,
there has long been a concern that a reluctance on the part of Europeans to move
contributes to the lesser efficiency and competitiveness of the European Single
Market as compared to the US (e.g., Sapir et al, 2003: 105). Sapir goes further to
argue that this has facilitated a continued reliance on income, payroll and
consumption taxes to provide public goods:
Although freedom of establishment and freedom of movement for individuals
belong to the very basic principles of the EU, the mobility of persons has been so
negligible that its impact on the Member States’ ability to tax residents for
financing public goods has remained of a second order.’ (100)
It is also the case that passing the major milestone of EU citizenship appears to
have done little to alter the traditional distribution of EU nationals living outside
their own country established before 1993. These are still dominated by (a) the
labour migration of the 1955-1973 period (France is still the second largest
Portuguese-speaking and Spanish-speaking country in the EU; Germany is still the
principal second home abroad for Greeks and Italians), and (b) ‘neighbour effects’,
reflecting historical links, language or simple territorial proximity. For example,
most Irish nationals living elsewhere in the EU are to be found in Britain, most
Finns in Sweden and Swedes in Finland, more Austrians in Germany than
elsewhere, etc. (Recchi, 2004: 10).
In this context, Ireland’s experience subsequent to the eastern enlargement begs
the question as to whether Europeans’ traditional reluctance to move has been
overstated, or is undergoing something of a slow sea change.
Are Europeans reluctant to move? The contrast with the USA, which appears to
confirm that they are, may be unrealistic as the USA is a single nation, has a strong
common language, and a dense network of federal institutions. Using mobility
levels across states within the USA as a benchmark may only serve to conceal the
significance of a rise that is taking place in intra-EU migration. The EU is bigger and
more diverse, and offers a range of earnings opportunities, costs of living and
styles of living arguably broader than within the USA. As EU citizens, 440 million
people now have historically unprecedented rights to choose where to work and
live throughout an immense territory, and significant new frameworks are
protecting them and facilitating them in doing so. The traditional observations—
that most Europeans stayed put because life was not that different in other
Member States, they were strongly attached to their national identities and life
habits, and they associated well-being and affluence strongly with geographical
stability (Recchi, 2004: 14)—may not apply as the 21st century unfolds.
In particular, migration may rise within the EU because of the greater ease with
which it can be short-term and circulatory. This could make it more attractive to
more people (‘bite-and-go’ migration, particularly evident on the part of young
people living in cosmopolitan centres). It should not be assumed either that
settling for years at a time in other EU Member States will be an option exercised
primarily by educated young people. People targeting lower-skilled jobs and/or
seeking alternative lifestyles are also becoming more informed and empowered to
live elsewhere in the EU.
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It is possible to identify several current developments that are likely to raise the
historically low level of intra-EU migration:
s The growing recourse to ‘temporary migration’ (limited stays in another
Member State);
s Growing corporate migration (occasioned by management at a European level
of their human resources by large companies, and by the increasing number of
businesses with operations in several countries);
s Growing mobility between industry and academia (fuelled by rising R&D
spending);
s Increased cross-border commuting (e.g., ‘weekend’ commuting, facilitated by
cheaper travel);18
s Increasing retirement and resort migration (as pensioners from Northern
Europe seek more favourable weather and a lower cost of living in the South—
they may also activate network effects on relatives and friends; second homes
abroad are also more widespread);
s Institutional and policy developments at EU level that facilitate working and
living in another Member State (the freedom of movement and residence
constitutive of European citizenship, the co-ordination of social security
systems for workers who move, the establishment of EURES, improved
recognition of qualifications, the creation of the European Research Area, etc.);
s The extent to which a greater mobility across the EU of qualified and
professional workers is being proactively sought as integral to attaining the
growth and employment objectives of Lisbon. Mobility across the EU allows
individuals to improve their job prospects and employers to recruit the people
they need with higher employment and productivity as a consequence; and
s The growing ‘Europeanisation’ of young people in third-level education in
particular (through exposure to the Erasmus/Socrates programme, improved
language skills, and the proposal for a European Higher Education Area).
The contrary developments, that can be considered to reduce the propensity of
Europeans to reside and/or work in Member States other than their own, are fewer:
s The ageing of the workforce. People aged 16-30 are the most likely to work in
another Member State and, other things being equal, the growing proportion
of the EU workforce aged over 30 will mean less migration;
s The extent to which ‘country-specific’ human capital is sought by employers in
providing particular services. Limited language skills and poor ‘local’ knowledge
reduce the productivity of mine workers or factory hands (as were many of the
guest workers of the 1950s and 1960s) less than that of employees recruited to
provide customer care or home-based care; and
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18. Salt (2005) emphasises the widening diversity of motivations behind migration today and distinguishes no less than 10 different
categories of high-skilled migrants alone, viz., corporate transferees; professionals (health, etc.); project specialists and visiting
“firemen”; consultant specialists; people seeking opportunities that promote their training and career development; clergy and
missionaries; entertainers, sports people and artists; business people and the independently wealthy: academics; military personnel.
s The growing proportion of third country nationals in the EU workforce (who,
generally, do not have rights to free movement).
Overall, Sapir concludes that ‘the no-mobility assumption… is less and less correct…
If (current) trends continue and accelerate, they could end up producing a sea
change in the EU rules of the game, as an increasing number of public and social
services would stop being of exclusive national concern’ (112). The speedy intro-
duction of the Habitual Residency Condition, already referred to, is an example of
a significant change, in this case in the rules of the game governing access to
Ireland’s social assistance payments, occasioned by an awareness that an age of
considerably increased mobility could be dawning.
Sapir’s conclusion points to a rise in the historically low level of intra-EU migration
and in the stocks of EU nationals resident in Member States not their own. A net
inflow on the scale Ireland experienced in the immediate aftermath of the 2004
enlargement, however, is extremely unlikely. Consideration of the contextual
features (4.2.1 above) that served to make Ireland a particularly attractive
destination for mobile EU 10 workers in the immediate post-enlargement period
reinforces an important observation arising from empirical studies and theory in
the international literature on migration: the levels of inflow from the EU 10 into
Ireland in the first period after enlargement are extremely unlikely to be sustained.
The empirical evidence points to stocks of migrants produced by intra-EU flows
reaching equilibrium levels, with return flows balancing new arrivals. While the
theory posits that the propensity to migrate is not evenly spread across the
population of a sending state but that, the more who leave, the lower is the
average propensity of the remaining population to move (notwithstanding
network effects) (Boeri et al., 2002: 93-103). There is not a compelling case,
therefore, that Irish policy should now be shaped to anticipate a scenario based on
the extrapolation of current trends. There is a strong case that it should address
the consequences of ensuring the lasting success of the quite exceptional level of
inflows which marked a unique combination of circumstances.
Appendix 4.1: Major Milestones in the Development
of the Freedom of Movement of Persons 
within the European Union
1951, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), harbinger to the European
Economic Community, gave workers with ‘recognised qualifications in a
coalmining or steel making occupation’ (art 69) the right to accept offers of
employment in other Member States.
1957, the Treaty of Rome affirmed the right of workers who are nationals of one
Member State to accept offers of employment (outside the public sector) in other
Member States, to move freely within the European Economic Community (EEC)
for that purpose, and to reside and remain in another Member State after having
been employed (art 48). The objective was to improve the mobility of workers
rather than the free movement of persons as such, in line with the initial definition
of the EEC in economic terms. A core distinction was established between two
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groups—which remains to this day, though with much greater blurring between
them being progressively acknowledged— (a) Community nationals who move to
another Member State to engage in economic activity (as employees or self-
employed) and (b) Community nationals residing in another Member State who
are not economically active (students, pensioners and others). Generally, the latter
had—and still have—to be self-sufficient.
Community nationals migrating for work in the early years still had to apply for
residence permits and these could be discretionarily denied. Regulating the
movement of persons remained a highly guarded national prerogative. Workers
from other Member States could be denied entry or expelled ‘on grounds of public
policy, public security and public health’, and this remains the case today. However,
progressively greater deliberation and transparency came to be required of
Member States if they refused entry to a Community national or expelled him,
and the individual concerned has been given steadily stronger grounds for
judicial redress.
For example, in 1968, Directive 68/360 specified that only an identity card or valid
passport may be required of workers who are Community nationals entering
another Member State (and not a visa or additional documentation) and gave
these workers, including the self-employed, the entitlement to a residence permit
of at least 5 years, and to its automatic renewal, on presentation of an employment
certificate (or appropriate evidence of activity if self-employed). Neither could this
permit be withdrawn in the wake of involuntary unemployment.
Also in 1968, Regulation 1612/68 forbade discrimination on the basis of nationality
between a country’s own workers and those from other Member States in the
operation of tax and social welfare codes and for training and housing benefits.
The European Court of Justice subsequently clarified that social advantages not
expressly linked to the status of worker—such as, for example, Ireland’s Child
Benefit and the recently introduced Early Childcare Supplement—had to be paid to
all EU workers equally.19 Otherwise they would constitute an advantage enjoyed by
workers who were home nationals (and their employers) over workers who were
nationals of other EU states (and their employers).
In 1971, the coordination of national social insurance systems received a major
impetus with Regulation 1408/71. It was clear that freedom of movement for
workers would mean little unless they were able to retain their social insurance
benefits when they moved within the EU. What those benefits were, and the
contributions or residence records that conferred an entitlement to them, was—
and remains—a national prerogative to determine, but it was important that a
worker would not find himself in situations where he was paying contributions to
two national systems in order to insure the same employment, and that he would
not have to start qualifying periods and contribution records from scratch each
time he took new employment in another Member State. Initially, the focus was
restricted to employees and their families but, subsequently, it widened to include
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19. In 1979, the ECJ first clarified that the social advantages which Member States had to extend to EU migrant workers in their territory
included those which, ‘whether or not linked to a contract of employment, are generally granted to national workers primarily
because of their objective status as workers or by virtue of the mere fact of their residence on the national territory and the
extension of which to workers who are nationals of other Member States therefore seems suitable to facilitate their mobility within
the Community’ (emphasis by Barnard, 2004: 221). It quickly became clear that this included family benefits, paid no matter where in
the EU the dependants of the worker were living.
the self-employed (1981), students (1999), third country nationals20 (2003) and, by
2004, any person with statutory social insurance cover in one Member State who
takes residence in another (Regulation 883/2004).21 The principles and adminis-
trative procedures governing this coordination of national social insurance
systems were steadily clarified and brought to function more smoothly.22
In general, case law of the ECJ progressively widened the scope of free movement
by extending the right to free movement and residence of workers as individuals
to members of their families. The rights of workers to equal treatment and non-
discrimination on the grounds of nationality were seen to imply the access of their
family members also to the host country’s labour market and their acceptance by
society in every sphere (social, cultural and educational). This applied even if family
members of an EU worker were third country nationals; it also applied when the
EU national on whom they depended became unemployed, died, departed to
another Member State, or—under certain conditions—where marital dissolu-
tion occurred. In effect, ECJ jurisprudence established that the EU migrant
worker has equal opportunities only when fully accepted as a person by the host
Member State.
The ECJ was also instrumental in opening up public sector employment more to
nationals of other Member States. Initially (art 51 of the 1957 Treaty of Rome), the
primary focus was on the right to work as an employee in the private sectors of
other Member States, while Member States were entitled to reserve public sector
employment to their own nationals if the posts in question involved ‘the exercise
of public authority and responsibility for safeguarding the general interest of the
State’ is involved (Article 39[4]). The ECJ, however, has been increasingly active in
ensuring that such criteria in effect apply and, in practice, there has been a fairly
wide opening of public sector recruitment to nationals of other Member States.
1989, the European ‘Social Charter’ (Community Charter of the Fundamental Social
Rights of Workers) recapitulated the freedoms and conditions that should
characterise Europe’s labour market (the UK opted out until 1997). It was inspired
partly by the fear that the higher labour market standards of some Member States
could be undermined as the Single European Market became more of a reality
(‘social dumping’). Despite its status as a non-binding political declaration, the fact
that it was a high-level declaration of intent created a dynamic for further
Community action programmes and legislation and was used by the ECJ in support
of several significant directives (e.g., on pregnancy and maternity, the organisation
of working time and young workers). Its focus on the social rights of workers not
citizens reflected the preference of a majority of MS that using the discourse of
understanding migration:
eu enlargement and deepening 93
20. Third-country nationals are not given the right to move to another Member State but, should they legally take up work/residence in
another Member State, they are covered by the regulation in the same way as EU nationals).
21. The seminal Regulation 1408/71 was accompanied by Regulation 574//72 which fixed the procedures to be following in
implementing it. Over the next two decades, these two basic regulations were repeatedly modified to reflect evolutions in national
codes and the ambition to protect the freedom of movement of additional groups. The heavily amended Regulation 1408/71 was
replaced by a new Regulation 883/2004 in 2004. It will only apply when a new implementing regulation to replace 574/72 is also
adopted. On 31 January 2006, the Commission adopted its proposal for this implementing Regulation {COM(2006) Final} but it still
has to be formally adopted by the Council and the EP.
22. Three basic principles were refined. The ‘applicable legislation’ principle establishes that a worker is subject only to the requirements,
and entitled to the benefits, of the country in which the activity in question is being carried out (there are exceptions, the best
known being that of the ‘posted worker’ discussed below). The ‘aggregation’ principle ensures that contribution and residence
records built up in different Member States are transparently and fairly aggregated in establishing a worker’s rights to benefits. The
‘export’ principle establishes that the benefits to which a worker has acquired entitlement on the basis of a work or residence record
in a Member State must be paid without any reduction or modification to that person wherever in the EU he subsequently resides. A
prominent exception is unemployment benefit which is ‘exportable’ only in specific circumstances and for a maximum of three to
six months.
fundamental social rights should not entail extending the EC’s competence in social
policy but only to protect further and improve minimum standards for workers.
1990, two Directives (90/364 and 90/365) clarify that the right of EU nationals to
reside in another MS when they are not engaged in an economic activity or have
had retired after doing so is conditional on their having ‘sufficient resources to
avoid becoming a burden on the social assistance system of the host Member
State’ and being covered by sickness insurance.
1992, the Treaty on European Union (the ‘Maastricht Treaty’) establishes that,
henceforth, ‘every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a
citizen of the Union …’ (Article 8). The established right to move and reside freely
within the territory of the Member States is solemnly and formally linked to
European citizenship. Henceforth, the strong language of citizenship began to
figure more in the case law of the ECJ. The Treaty also formally recognised a
contractual role for the social partners and inaugurated procedural arrangements
for consulting them prior to adoption of Community legislation on social matters.
It also acknowledged the possibility of this consultation issuing in contractual
agreements between them instead of regulation. Leibfried (2005) describes this as
drawing in major representative organisations of the social partners at the EU level
to provide a ‘Euro-corporatist’ anchor; Falkner (1998) speaks of the ‘corporatist
policy community’ at EU level.
1996, the Posted Workers’ Directive (96/71) applied the ‘host country principle’ to
companies which carry out project work in other Member States but bring their
own workforces with them. They are to comply with all the national regulations on
pay and working conditions the Member State where they carry out the project
work.23 This 1996 Directive built on case law of the European Court of Justice which
first ruled, in 1989, that a Portuguese construction company which had won the
contract for a public construction project in France and brought its own
Portuguese workforce to carry out the work had to comply with the statutory and
regulatory provision of French labour law.
1997, the Amsterdam Treaty includes an Employment Title that, for the first time,
makes attaining ‘a high level’ of employment and developing ‘a skilled, trained and
adaptable workforce’ Union objectives. This led to stronger Commission initiatives
for facilitating the mutual recognition of qualifications, improving the mobility of
persons in general and of researchers, students, trainees and others in particular,
and—generally—strengthening the transparency of EU-wide labour markets
(through EURES and other services).
2004, a new ‘Residence Directive’ was drawn up (Directive 2004/38/EC) which
summarises, simplifies and gives a new coherence to all the measures that govern
the right of Community nationals and their family members to move and reside
freely within the territory of the Member States. (In several areas, it adds to this
right also.) It was transposed into Irish law at the end of April 2006.24 By 2004,
legislation was particularly well developed around the residence rights of salaried
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23. A posted worker is an employee who, for a limited period, carries out his work in the territory of a Member State other than the
State in which he normally works for his employer. He is temporarily dispatched abroad but remains in the social insurance scheme
of his home Member State.
24. The European Communities (Free Movement of Persons) Regulations 2006 of 28 April, 2006, have introduced some important
innovations, e.g., a new status of permanent residence for EU citizens and their family members (including those who are non-EEA
nationals), a residence card for non-EEA children of EU citizens resident in Ireland (previously only those aged 16 or over had to
register their presence in Ireland). For more see INIS website.
and self-employed workers (specifying, for example, how and when the status of
workers was retained, and for how long, by people who became unemployed or
who retired from work). Other legislation articulated independently a more
circumscribed right to residence for—respectively—students, retired people, the
providers and recipients of services, and inactive Community nationals in general.
The 2004 Residence Directive recast this corpus of existing legislation from the
single vantage point of the ‘Union citizen’. The fundamental ordering classification
it adopted was between the Union citizen on a short stay (less than 3 months), the
one residing for between 3 months and 5 years, and the citizen whose legal stay
lasts more than 5 years and who, thereby, acquires a right to permanent residence
(termed as such for the first time by this Directive). It further classified Union
citizens as either (i) workers or self-employed persons, (ii) persons who are self-
supporting and have their own sickness insurance cover, (iii) students, or (iv) family
members of one of the first three. This fourfold classification particularly affects
the conditions under which Union Citizens have a right to residence for stays of
between 3 months and 5 years.
Differential progress in clarifying the requirement of being self-supporting for
Union citizens who are not workers or self-employed (the ‘inactive’) and what the
obligations of a host state are to them has also been made for the different areas
of social protection. In health, considerable progress has occurred in ensuring
prompt access to healthcare in the public systems of other EU member states
should nationals of one Member State become ill or injured during temporary
stays elsewhere in the EU (the European Health Insurance Card, adopted by Ireland
on 1st June 2004). In income support, the entitlement of Union citizens to social
assistance in Member States other than their own is more complex. Generally, EU
measures have evolved to make it steadily more difficult for Member States to
refuse social assistance to bona fide job-seekers from other Member States while
also consistently reiterating that there is no obligation to extend it to nationals of
other MS on their territory who are not seeking work with a prospect of success or
did not hold employment on their territory for a period of time. Academic analysis
of ECJ jurisprudence confirms that the duration of (legal) stay has, in fact, been the
key dimension along which the right of Community nationals to apply for social
assistance in Member States other than their own as been interpreted by the Court
(Barnard, 2005).
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Appendix 4.2: Key Distinctions Among EU Nationals 
The current obligations of a host state to EU migrants vary significantly depending
on whether the migrant in question is (i) in employment, (ii) a job-seeker who
previously worked, (iii) a job-seeker with no work record, (iv) a self-employed
worker, or (v) a person who is not economically active.
Workers
If EU citizens have the status of workers, they have extensive and well-focussed
entitlements for themselves and their families to be treated anywhere in the EU as
Member States treat their own nationals. This has been achieved without the term
‘worker’ ever being defined in an EU Treaty. It is ECJ case law which has
progressively explored the boundaries of what constitutes the employment
relationship (its minimum duration, hours, level of remuneration, etc.) and, thus,
enables a ‘worker’ to be identified.25 Unlike the non-EEA migrant worker, the skill
level of the EU migrant worker makes no difference to her or his rights and
treatment in a host Member State. Once they have the status of worker, no matter
their skill level, they have the protection of an extensive body of EU legislation.
The manner in which this legislation developed serves as a cameo of EU deepening
in general. A single clear principle—viz., that workers of one Member State should
be free to take work and reside in another Member State on an equal footing to its
own nationals—had its implications progressively ‘unpacked’ for the worker’s
family, the breadth and duration of their social protection, and their stage in the
life cycle (when students /trainees, seeking a first job, moving up the career ladder,
during bouts of unemployment, and in retirement).26
Job-Seekers Previously Employed
The situation of job-seekers is particularly complex as, under different circum-
stances, they are viewed alternately as workers without current employment or as
citizens engaged in job-seeking.
Unemployed individuals with a work record have support in EU legislation to
search for employment in other Member States. If a person has built up
entitlement to Unemployment Benefit (UB) in their home country, and been
available to their own Public Employment Service for at least 4 weeks prior to
moving, she can move to another Member State and continue to draw her home
UB for up to 3 months, (extendable on a discretionary basis to 6 months). While
searching for work in the new Member States, her UB is, as it were, ‘exported’.27 If
she does not find work within 3 to 6 months, she must return to her own country
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25. An authoritative summary of ECJ case law specifies that the term ‘worker’ covers any person who (i) undertakes genuine and
effective work (ii) under the direction of someone else (iii) for which he is paid. COM (2002) 694 final.
26. While achieving genuine worker mobility has long been a major objective of the EU and can be considered substantially realised for
salaried and waged people, there is still work to be done. In second tier pensions, for example, it is still under clarification how a
worker who makes voluntary and tax-supported contributions to an occupational and/or personal pension fund while employed in
one Member State can be assured of continuity in the opportunity and support for doing so if she takes employment in another
Member State. The mobility of workers is otherwise restricted if individuals lose out on the occupational and private pension
entitlements they acquire when they confine their switches of employment to within the same Member State rather than carrying
them out across the Member States.
27. She must register with the Public Employment Service in the country she enters (bringing with her a form, E 303, completed by the
Authorities in her home country) and is subject to the rules and conditions governing UB in the host country.
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if she wishes to continue receiving UB. She can, of course, reside and search for
work at her own expense; the normal rules governing the freedom to move and
reside in other Member States of the EU citizen then apply to her. If her own means
should become exhausted after a period of time, she should be able to rely on
social assistance where it is clear that doing so does not constitute ‘an unreason-
able burden on the host Member State’ (the host State ‘should examine whether it
is a case of temporary difficulties and take into account the duration of residence, the
personal circumstances and the amount of aid granted’) (see note 25).
Job-Seekers with no Work Record
An EU national with no contribution record as a worker in their home Member
State but who wants to seek employment in another Member State is in an
intermediate zone. EU legislation has advanced their cause as a job-seeking
‘worker’ but, generally, such a person is still viewed more as a citizen who is job
seeking than a worker who is unemployed. The conditions that attach to the non-
economically active EU citizen then apply fully to her. She is expected not to
‘become an unreasonable burden on the social assistance system of the host
Member State’ and expulsion, should she become so, remains the prerogative of
the Member State. On the one hand, the 2004 Residence Directive reiterates that
it is wholly for the host Member State to decide whether it will grant social
assistance to recently arrived job-seekers (Preamble 21). On the other hand, it
makes it extremely difficult to expel genuine job-seekers who continue to have
real prospects of finding employment (Art. 14 [4] [b]).
Self-Employed
By comparison to salaried workers who are Union citizens, self-employed Union
citizens who wish to engage in activity in another Member State and/or to
establish an undertaking there in order to do so came later into focus for EU policy-
makers and have, currently, lesser supports to be fully mobile across the EU. They
have significant rights to be treated on equal terms to host country nationals.
However, two principal factors continue to make the Internal Market only a partial
achievement for self-employed workers and other service providers. First, there are
derogations for many types of services and, secondly, widely differing sets of
national regulations govern various service activities and provide scope to harbour
obstacles and barriers to cross-border provision of services and restrict the
freedom to carry on a service activity in another Member State. These challenges
are being focussed in the Services Directive currently in preparation (see below).
In-Active Citizens
The right to residence in another Member State of EU citizens not engaged in any
economic activity (as salaried or self-employed) has been relatively clear down
through the years. They are required to support themselves and their family
members without becoming a burden on the social assistance system of the host
Member State and to have sickness insurance. The grey area concerns what
happens if an individual loses this ability after a period in another Member State
and how soon they become entitled to apply for means-tested support on an equal
basis to the host country’s nationals. Generally, it depends crucially on the duration
of stay that has elapsed as to whether and how they are then supported by their
host state.
Some analyses of ECJ case law argue that the post-Maastricht introduction of the
language of citizenship has begun a rich legal exploration by the Court of just how
obligations in solidarity arise toward migrants from other Member States on the
part of nationals of the host State (Barnard, 2004). The argument is that a clear
proportionality has emerged in ECJ jurisprudence between the degree of
integration a migrant has with the host society (largely, but not only, a function of
their length of stay) and the obligations that come on the host state, not just to
protect the migrant from overt or covert nationality-based discrimination, but to
extend to the migrant the positive and substantial conditions of satisfactory
integration (adequate income, housing, education, etc.). When an EU migrant has
just arrived in a host state, they are not yet integrated into the host society, which
is why no EU law imposes an obligation on the host state to provide support to the
migrant out of general taxation (which national legislation obliges nationals of
the same state to do for each other).28 The longer the migrant is in the host state,
however, the clearer the Court has become that access when needed to income
support, student maintenance grants, adequate health services, adequate housing,
etc., must be made available on similar grounds as to host country nationals.29
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28. For example, an Irish national appealed the refusal of Job Seeker’s Allowance for which he had applied immediately on entry to the
UK. He was not supported by the ECJ on the grounds that he lacked any connection with that state or link with its domestic labour
market (the Collins case in 2002: cited in Barnard, 2004).
29. A French national appealed the refusal of Belgian social assistance for which he applied when his sources of income dried up in his
fourth and final year as student in that country. He was supported by the ECJ which ruled that, after 3 years complying with the EU
requirement that EU citizens who moved to be students should be self-supporting, ‘a certain degree of financial solidarity’ existed
between this French national and Belgian citizens (the Grzelczyk case of 1999: cited in Barnard, 2004.).
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Understanding Migration:
Global Change
5
5.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to contribute to an understanding of Irish migration
by examining the global environment in which migration to Ireland is taking place.
A brief overview of historical trends in global migration is provided in Section 5.2.
Section 5.3 discusses the global situation in regard to refugees and asylum seekers.
There are some similarities between the way in which migration and international
trade affect the economy and, consequently, the global increase in trade is
examined in Section 5.4. The future prospects for migration from less-developed
countries are considered in Section 5.5.
5.2 Historical Overview1
International migration has been a recurring phenomenon in human history.
However, as Castles and Miller (2003) point out, it has never been as globally
pervasive as it is today, affecting more and more countries and regions. The 19th
century was a period of essentially open migration. There was a particularly high
level of migration to the US and Australia at the end of the century and continuing
into the early 20th century. In the forty years from 1880, around 30 million
Europeans migrated to the Americas and Australia. After 1914, migration was
disrupted by war, and in the US restrictive legislation in the 1920s was also
significant in limiting migration. Total migration to the US fell from 4.1 million in
the 1920s, to just over 528,000 in the 1930s.
The post-war period was characterised by widespread expansion of migration.
Migration to the US increased to 1 million in the 1940s, 2.5 million in the 1950s
while it had reached 7.4 million in the 1980s. In this period, large-scale migration
to the US was accompanied by large-scale migration to a number of European
countries. Total migration to Germany for the period 1950-1988 was 24.5 million,
while the level of migration to France was almost 22 million for the same period. If
one adds Australia and Canada, then total non-US migration for the period 1945-
1990 was around 80 million. The combined total of migration to OECD countries in
the post-war years was well over 100 million. Hence, the scale migration to OECD
countries in the post-war period was more than three times the trans-Atlantic
migration of the period from the 1880s to 1920. However, O’Rourke (2004) points
out that relative to the native population, even by the 1990s the rates of migration
to the US, Canada and Germany were smaller than those of the late 19th and early
20th centuries.
101
1. This section draws on the following sources: OECD (2003), OECD (2005) and Held et al. (1999)..
From the mid-1980s, there was an intensification of migration flows to OECD
countries. This period was characterised both by economic migration and increas-
ingly large flows of asylum seekers. The crisis in the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe in the late 1980s led to new East-West migration flows. This trend of
increased migration was reversed in the early 1990s; from 1992/1993 entries of
foreign nationals fell significantly. This was partly due to the efforts by the
receiving countries in tightening controls over migration flows. The late 1990s saw
a return to migration growth to OECD countries. This resulted mainly from
increased migration of workers, both temporary and permanent. This was driven
by the emergence of labour shortages in several OECD countries.
5.3 Refugees and Asylum Seekers2
There was a dramatic increase in the number of asylum seekers and refugees
worldwide from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s. A refugee is a person outside her
own country who is unable to return due to a well-founded fear of persecution. An
asylum seeker is a person who has crossed international borders in search of
protection but whose claim for refugee status has not yet been decided. According
to Castles and Miller (2003), refugees come mainly from countries hit by war violence
and chaos, including countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Sierra Leone, Sudan,
Somalia, Bosnia and Angola. It is worth noting that only a small proportion of the
world’s refugees arrive in developed countries; most remain in poorer countries.
The global refugee population rose from 10.5 million in 1985 to a peak of 18.2
million in 1993. Since then there has been a large fall to just over 9 million in 2004.
The current number of refugees is the lowest in 25 years. This fall is attributed by
the UNHCR to a fall in the number of armed conflicts and several large-scale
repatriations. More than 4 million people have returned to Afghanistan alone.
The number of asylum applications globally has been falling since 2001. At the
start of 2005 there were 838,000 asylum seekers worldwide. Most countries,
including Ireland, are now reporting their lowest annual number of asylum
applications for several years. In addition to changed political situations in source
countries, the UNHCR (2006) identifies the introduction of restrictive policies by
destination countries as a significant factor in the fall in the number of asylum
applications.
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2. This section draws on UNHCR (2006) and Castles and Miller (2003).
While the number of refugees and asylum seekers is falling, the number of
‘internally-displaced persons’ has been static in the last few years and has
increased hugely over the past two decades. Internally-displaced persons are
people who have been forced from their homes for the same reasons as refugees
but have not crossed an international border. It is estimated that there are now
around 25 million of such people, almost three times the number of refugees.
Often they are in more serious situations than refugees but do not benefit from
the protection afforded to refugees. No international agency has a formal mandate
to assist them.
The UNHCR (2006) identifies a number of reasons for the recorded growth in the
number of internally-displaced persons. First, there is increased recognition of this
group. Second, it reflects the restricted access that states have created for asylum
seekers; this results in an inverse relationship between the rising number of
internally-displaced persons and the declining number of refugees. Third, inter-
state conflict has become less prevalent than intra-state conflict.
While refugees and asylum seekers represent special categories of migrants, the
UNHCR (2006) notes that the issues of refugee and asylum protection have
become inextricably linked with the question of international migration. This
arises in three main ways. First, many migrants who are seeking employment
rather than protection, apply for refugee status as they have no other legal means
of entry. Second, people coming from a particular country may include both those
who have a genuine claim to refugee status and those seeking to improve their
economic position; this can easily occur where a country is simultaneously affected
by persecution, armed conflict, political instability and economic collapse. Third,
refugees and asylum seekers are often obliged to move illegally across borders
because they have been unable to obtain essential travel documents.
The UNHCR report (2006) notes that states have responded to this situation with
measures to obstruct or deter irregular migrants in general, and asylum seekers in
particular. The report expressed concern that this is making it increasingly difficult
for those with a bona-fide claim to refugee status to effectively seek and obtain
asylum in another state.
5.4 Migration and Trade
5.4.1 The Effects of Trade on the Labour Market
It has long been recognised by economists that trade and migration are potential
substitutes. For example, where a rich country imports labour-intensive products
from a poor country, this may have a similar effect on the rich country’s labour
market as the movement of people from the poor country to the rich country. In
the same way that migration of lower-skilled labour has the potential to bid down
the price of low-skilled labour in rich countries, trade between rich and poor
countries can have this effect. The famous Stopler-Samuelson theorem states that,
under certain assumptions, trade alone will be sufficient to equalise wages and the
return to capital in different countries.
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There has been extensive empirical research on whether trade with less-developed
countries has contributed to the growth of wage inequality in richer countries.
Different research methodologies have yielded different results. Most economists
have concluded that technology, rather than trade, is the main driving force in
increasing inequality in developed countries. Others have argued that trade with
lower-income countries has had a significant effect on income distribution in
richer countries. For example, Palley (2005) points out that over the past two
decades, two and a half billion people—in China, India, Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union—have effectively joined the global economy. This, he
contends, is resulting in a ‘super-sized’ Stopler-Samuelson effect, which is having a
depressing effect on the wages of American worker.
5.4.2 Trade and the Irish Economy
The Irish economy is now highly trade dependent, with exports equivalent to 95
per cent of GNP in 2005. The process of gradually opening the economy to free
trade from the 1960s had profound effects. In conjunction with other policies, it led
to a marked improvement in economic performance. At the same time, there were
very considerable adjustment costs. Irish manufacturing had great difficulty in
adjusting to freer trade, notwithstanding considerable support from public
agencies. Buoyant domestic demand helped maintain employment in indigenous
manufacturing enterprises in the 1960s and 1970s. In the 1980s, global recession
and fiscal adjustment meant a contraction of domestic demand. The economy
performed very poorly in the first half of the 1980s and manufacturing, in
particular, experienced a very large decline in employment between 1979 and 1987.
It could be argued that it is only since 1987 that public policy managed to adopt a
coherent approach that was fully consistent with the realities of a small and very
open economy.
In recent years, pressures of international competitiveness have again been
evident in the manufacturing sector. Between 2000 and 2005, employment in the
sector fell by around 5 per cent. The social and regional impact of this has, to date,
largely been offset by the boom in the construction sector. An ending of the
construction boom is likely to make the loss of manufacturing employment a more
difficult issue.
The effects of migration on the Irish economy have been examined in Chapter 3
above. The analysis found that the effects on the whole were positive, with some
potential negative effects. However, the economic effects identified, either positive
or negative, are modest in comparison to the profound effects of the movement to
free trade, in conjunction with other policies, since the 1960s.
5.4.3 Comparing Trade Liberalisation 
and the Relaxation of Constraints on Migration
Recent research by Walmsley and Winters (2003) used economic modelling to
measure the effects of a possible relaxation of temporary migration controls on
global income. They simulated the effects of increased quotas for temporary
migration (both high-skilled and low-skilled) on a scale sufficient to increase
labour supply by 3 per cent of the labour force in developed countries. They found
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that this would result in a large net increase in income globally; their estimate was
of an increase in global income of US$156 billion (0.6 per cent of global income).
These gains would arise because migrants from less-developed countries have
higher productivity and would generate higher incomes if they moved to
developed countries.
Most of the increased income would go to the temporary migrants. They did not
find gains for the permanent residents in most of the sending countries, since they
would experience a loss of high-skilled labour. In the developed countries to which
people would migrate, wages were estimated to fall due to the increase in labour
supply. There would still be a net gain in developed countries due to the rise in
capital income and tax revenue.
Walmsley and Winters also estimated that the gains from relaxation of restraints
on migration would be 50 per cent higher than the benefits from liberalisation of
all remaining restrictions on trade in goods.
The possible substantial net gains from liberalisation of migration, including low-
skilled migration, merits consideration in deciding policy on migration. There are
other factors to be considered, including the internal distributional effects and
societal effects. Policy on regulation of migration to Ireland is discussed in Chapter 8.
5.5 Future Global Migration Flows
Migration to developed countries results from a combination of policy and
underlying economic and demographic fundamentals. Williamson (2002) points to
strong pressure for increased migration from Africa: ‘Rapid growth in the cohort of
young potential migrants, population pressure on the resource base, and poor
economic performance are the main factors driving African migration’
(Williamson, 2002: 32). Indeed he argues that if Europe were to open its doors to
migration,‘there is an excellent chance that by 2025 Africa would record far greater
mass migrations than did nineteenth century Europe’ (Williamson, 2002: 32).
On the other hand, it is projected by Hatton and Williamson (2005) that
demographic pressures could ease in other key immigration regions: East Asia,
Central America and Eastern Europe. In these three regions, it is projected that
population will age and that there will be either a modest increase (Central
America) or reduction (East Asia and Eastern Europe) in the population aged 15 to 29.
In the world as a whole, there is a continuing trend of economic divergence
between rich and poor countries which increases migration pressures. Notwith-
standing divergence overall, economic development is most likely to release
poverty constraints on immigrants from some of the poorest parts of the world,
thus also adding to pressure for migration. On the other hand, the rapid growth of
income in China and India is likely to reduce migration pressure from two key
emigrating countries. Other factors tending to increase global migration are the
growing share of foreign-born migrants in high-income countries and improved
global transportation and communication networks.
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It is difficult to predict aggregate trends, as demographic and economic pressures
are not all pointing in the same direction. Immigration from Africa looks set to
increase and the overall level of migration is likely to continue at a high level.
5.6 Conclusion
While the current level of non-EU migration to Ireland is modest in the context of
overall Irish migration flows—15 per cent of total migration consisted of non-EU
nationals in the year ending April 2005—it is clear from the discussion above that
international migration is a pervasive feature across the world and that pressure
for migration from poorer countries will be sustained. Hence, it is important for
Ireland to have policies in place both to regulate entry of migrants from outside
the EU in an appropriate way and also to foster the integration of migrants from a
wide range of countries into Irish society. These issues are addressed in Part II of
this report.
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part ii
Policy
Framing Ireland’s Ends and Means6
6.1 Introduction
This chapter is the transition from Part I, ‘Understanding Migration’, to Part II,
‘Policy’. In Part I we have presented evidence, much of it drawn from the IOM
Consultants, designed to provide an understanding of migration. Our starting
point for this chapter is also drawn from the Consultants, their frank assessment
of the need for a clearer statement of Ireland’s vision and policy on migration.
They say:
There is, as yet, no explicit policy statement that:
s Expresses a widely-shared vision of how integration might contribute to a dynamic,
secure and socially-cohesive Irish future;
s Explains how government will manage the costs and benefits of migration;
s States when and under what circumstances migrants are expected to return to
their countries of origin or expected to remain and become integrated in Irish
society; and 
s Thus, provides guidance for employers, unions and civil society regarding Ireland’s
overall approach to immigration (IOM, 2006: XVII-XIX).
Elsewhere, they suggest that it is useful to distinguish three fundamental ques-
tions that require separate discussions in the debate and design of a country’s
labour immigration policy:
1. What are the consequences of international labour migration? 
2. What should be the objectives of labour immigration policies? 
3. What are the policies best suited to achieve these objectives? 
The ordering of the questions makes the obvious but important point that any
policy recommendation on labour immigration has to be preceded by separate
discussions about the impacts of migration and the objectives of labour
immigration policy. Given Ireland’s relatively short history of employing
significant numbers of non-Irish migrant workers, both discussions, about
impacts and objectives, remain seriously underdeveloped at this point in time
(IOM, 2006: 99).
The Council uses these statements as the starting point and agenda for this
chapter.1 Section 6.2 summarises what Part I of the report tells us, distinguishing
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1. Although Skill Needs in the Irish Economy: the Role of Migration, by the Expert Group on Future Skill Needs, is an important contribution.
between three elements of our understanding: awareness of the possible effects
of migration, findings on Ireland’s experience to date, and uncertainties. Section
6.3 outlines Ireland’s economic and social goals, as understood by NESC, and
confronts these with four propositions about migration. This suggests that three
broad goals should inform Ireland’s policies on migration: economic and social
development, the rule of law and integration. Section 6.4 identifies the place of
migration in advancing Ireland’s economic and social goals and explains the
approach taken in Part II of the report.
6.2 Understanding Migration: What Part I tells us
6.2.1 The Nature of Our Understanding
Chapter 2 identified the main channels of migration to Ireland, the trends evident
in recent years and the significance migrants have acquired in the economy.
Chapter 3 reviewed what is known about the causes and effects of migration
generally and gathered what evidence there currently is on the possible effects of
recent migration to Ireland. Chapter 4 placed Ireland’s recent experience in a
European context, and Chapter 5 identified the global changes—in geo-politics,
economy and society—that are driving international migration. What kind of
understanding of migration does this analysis yield? In the Council’s view, there are
three elements to our current understanding of and perspective on migration:
1) Awareness of the range of possible economic and social effects of migration
and of the experience of other countries;
2) Findings on the pattern, scale and effects of migration to Ireland to date; and
3) Uncertainties about some existing elements of migration and many future
trends and effects.
Below, we set out our current understanding and perspective, under these three
headings. In its recent Strategy report, the Council set out some propositions on
migration, drawing on the expert analysis of the IOM consultants and discussion
within NESC. The summary here should be read in conjunction with that text (see
NESC, 2005b: 90-91; 100-101; 104; 133-143).
6.2.2 Awareness of the Possible effects of Migration 
and of the Experience of Other Countries
Total GNP and GNP per Head
One of the factors that drives labour migration is a gap in what workers at a given
skill level can earn in another country, allowing for the costs of migration. If the gap
in earnings is large, then migration can see the arrival of workers willing to work
at wage levels well below those prevailing in the host economy.
Since migration increases both GNP and population, its impact on average
standards, GNP per head, is indeterminate.
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Wages and the Distribution of Income
While the impact of migration on GNP per head is theoretically uncertain, there
are a number of reasons why migration may increase GNP per head somewhat and
strengthen the overall demand for labour (Section 3.2). Indeed, extensive
international research suggests that migration increases total employment and
has limited effects on the wages and employment prospects of native workers.
However, some recent US research suggests that extensive immigration of low-
skilled workers, much of it illegal, has had a negative effect on the earnings and
employment prospects of low-skilled American workers. It is estimated by Borjas
(2006) that a 10 per cent increase in the size of a given skill group reduces the
wages of that group by 3 to 4 per cent.
Labour Market Segmentation: The Trilemma of Low-skilled Migration 
International experience shows that where migrants are denied access to work, or
where they are segmented to particular (often vulnerable) sectors, they can fail to
integrate, with negative consequences for both themselves and the host society in
the long term. Indeed, it seems that many countries have struggled with what
might be called the ‘trilemma of low-skilled migration’2. They want to use
migration to fill perceived shortages of low-skilled labour, they want to minimise
the effects of this on low-skilled members of their own society and they would like
migrants to be integrated into the host society and economy. The trilemma arises
because policies aimed at any two of these objectives can make it harder to
achieve the third.
This is illustrated in Figure 6.1. The US meets much of its demand for low-skilled
labour through migration (legal and illegal) and these migrants generally integrate
fairly well into American society, after a fashion. But the US pays little heed to the
effect of migration on lower earnings and on the opportunities for poor US
citizens. In past decades, Germany and the Netherlands used migration of low-
skilled workers to fill vacancies, but were anxious to minimise the effect on
relatively low-earning natives. The very policies adopted to achieve this, and other
aspects of their approach to migration, meant that migrants were poorly
integrated into the economy and the society and eventually became marginalised.
Canada is a society built by migration and, consequently, puts a particularly high
value on the integration of migrants into its plural culture and society. It pursues
its integration objective by trying to be highly selective about the migrants it
accepts (see IOM, 2006, Chapter 9).
Identity, Social Cohesion and Integration
Migration can undoubtedly alter identity and social cohesion. But these effects are
not recorded in a single body of theoretical and empirical research as is the case
with the economic effects of migration. The conditions in which successful
integration is most likely to take place include buoyant economic growth and
widespread employment opportunities, confidence in the host population towards
globalisation and the future, steady development of social interaction between
migrants and the native population and public policies which govern migration in
a clear and transparent way, adapt services and combat racism.
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2. In a different context, Swenson (1989) and Iverson and Wren (1998) identify a ‘trilemma of the service economy, involving trade-offs
between high employment, equality and budgetary discipline’.
Global Factors Driving International Migration 
Research identifies four fundamental factors that drive migration between low-
income and high-income countries: wage gaps; relaxation of poverty constraints
on migration in low-income countries; the share of young adults in sending and
receiving countries; the size of the migrant population residing in receiving
countries. All of these factors are creating pressure for growth in migration from
Africa to developed countries. Demographic projections imply that migration
pressures could ease in future decades in East Asia and Central America. Strong
economic growth in China and India could also reduce pressure for migration from
these major countries over the next couple of decades.
6.2.3 Findings on the Pattern, Scale and Effects of Migration 
to Ireland and the Role of the EU 
The material in Part I yields a number of findings on the pattern, scale and effects
of the recent increase in migration to Ireland and on the role of the EU in shaping
Ireland’s experience.
The Main Channels of Legal Migration 
The main channels of migration were described in Chapter 2. In the case of
migration from outside the EEA, the most significant channels have been work
permits, student visas, asylum seekers and family reunification. Drawing on their
international experience, the Consultants say that, for some years, Ireland
operated a very liberal approach to both work permits, with no policies for return.
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Figure 6.1 The Trilemma of Low-Skilled Migration
Source NESC Secretariat
Minimise effect on
low-skilled natives
Meet low-skilled labour
needs with migration
Integration
2 Germany/NL
1 United States
3 Canada
The Shifting Scale and Composition of Migration 
Since 1987 there has been approximately a fourfold rise in gross inward migration,
to 70,000 in 2005. Migration is now dominated by EEA nationals; of those who
migrated to Ireland in the year to April 2005, 27 per cent were Irish nationals, 58 per
cent were other EU nationals, with just 15 per cent comprising non-EU nationals.
Nationals from the ten new Member States have responded on a large scale to
opportunities in Ireland’s economy. The vast majority of migrants, especially those
from the new EU Member States, are involved in the economy.
Migration has Coincided with Strong Economic Performance
On balance, much of the evidence surveyed in Chapter 3 suggests that, in the
buoyant economic conditions of recent years, labour migration to Ireland has had
a number of positive effects on economic performance. It is clear that the high
level of migration in recent years coincided with a strong economic performance.
Not only has GNP growth been high, but GNP per head in Ireland has continued to
outpace the EU average.
Earnings and the Skill Composition of Migration 
Research using an econometric model of the Irish economy has estimated that, in
the decade 1993 to 2003, migration to Ireland increased both GNP and GNP per
head and reduced wage dispersion (Barrett et al., 2005). These possible positive
effects were attributed to the fact that the migrants coming to Ireland would seem
to have been mostly skilled, hence moderating wage growth among highly-skilled
workers and increasing Ireland’s competitiveness. This analysis also predicted that
if migration were to consist mostly of lower-skilled workers, then wage dispersion
would increase, low-skilled labour force participation would fall and GNP per head
would be reduced.
The potential impact of migration on wages of native workers is an important
issue. Given the extent of migration to Ireland, we judge that there has probably
been some moderation of wage growth in certain areas. There has certainly been
a noticeable slowdown in wage growth in manufacturing, but this must, at least
in part, be explained by intensified international competition. Between 2002 and
2005 there has been a slight increase in the share of employees earning the full
adult minimum wage or less, but the increase was not statistically significant.
Notwithstanding certain gaps in the data, in the buoyant economic conditions
that have prevailed in recent years, large-scale labour migration to Ireland has
coincided with significant growth in employment and earnings across the
economy, both in sectors which have absorbed large numbers of migrants and in
those which have not.
Occupational Underachievement
Research cited in Chapter 3 suggests than many migrants in Ireland work in jobs
that do not reflect their level of education. In a study of East and Central European
migrants in the UK, the picture that emerges is one of high-quality migrants in
low-wage jobs, working long hours (Anderson et al., 2006). In this respect, there
are clear parallels between Ireland’s experience of emigration in the 1980s and
immigration to Ireland today (NESC, 1991).
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Unemployment and Participation
In a period of strong growth and high migration, unemployment has continued to
be low, participation in the workforce has been rising and employment of Irish
people has increased in most sectors of the economy. An examination of
participation rates for the population aged 25 to 64 does not show any tendency
for participation to fall among those with low educational qualifications. This
evidence suggests that, in these buoyant economic conditions, there has not been
widespread displacement of Irish people.
Surveys of school leavers one year after leaving school show a substantial increase
in unemployment for this group since 1999. However, CSO data for a more broadly
defined group of young people—adults aged 18 to 24—show only a slight increase
in unemployment since 2002. The participation and employment rates for this
group are also increasing. There was an increase in the unemployment rate among
young early school leavers (aged 18 to 24), but the absolute increase was modest
over the same period (700 people). There was a modest rise in the percentage of
young early school leavers (aged 18 to 24) who do not participate in the labour
market, but in absolute terms the numbers of this group not economically active
fell by 1,900 between 2002 and 2005.
The Working Condition Experienced by Migrants
There is evidence that the employment of migrant workers has, in many instances,
not conformed to the labour standards which Irish society considers acceptable. It
is closely connected to another trend, irregular migration, discussed below.
Illegal Migration and Undocumented Status
Internationally, the pressures on irregular migration have grown in recent years.
The attraction of Ireland’s economy and labour market, the ease of air travel, the
use of the English language and a number of features of our migration policy
create conditions in which irregular migration may arise.
The view of the IOM consultants is that illegal work is likely to be more pervasive
than illegal entry. However there is no data on this. As noted in Chapter 2, there are
a number of ways in which people may become irregular migrants. These can
include failed applications for refugee status, people whose work permits have
expired or people who overstay a visitor’s visa. Another source of irregular
migration has been students who overstay the terms of their visa. This is
potentially a significant source since, as the Consultants emphasise, many of the
educational institutions inviting people to Ireland may have been, in reality, a
conduit for labour migration. The scale of irregular migration arising from these
sources is unknown. Recent evidence suggests that these sources of illegal
migration may be very significant in the UK. At the extreme end of illegal
migration is the trafficking of people for sexual exploitation or forced labour.
Although there is limited evidence of this in Ireland, it does occur, and is a growing
threat internationally.
The lack of hard data or any systematic evidence makes it difficult to assess the
extent to which Ireland’s current immigration and employment laws are actually
enforced. The increased level of legislation and deportations suggests that the
government is expanding its efforts to combat illegal immigration. At the same
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time, as the Consultants emphasise, there is no evidence to suggest a serious
crackdown on illegal working. Illegal migrants are particularly vulnerable to
exploitation and illegal migration could undermine public confidence in the ability
of the State to manage migration successfully.
The Demographic Impact of Migration 
Migration has a major influence on the growth and composition of the population.
Over the decade 1995 to 2005, the population grew by over half a million and net
migration was responsible for over half of this growth. Even with what the CSO
considers to be a ‘low’ level of net migration (see Section 3.5.1 above), the population
could exceed 5 million by 2026. If present patterns continue, this migration will be
disproportionately concentrated among prime working-age adults (25 to 44).
Population growth, partly migration-induced, raises considerable challenges for the
provision of public services, infrastructure, housing and sustainable development.
EU Widening and Deepening 
Recent migration to Ireland must be understood in the context of EU enlargement
and deepening. A remarkable feature of the EU—of major historical significance to
Ireland—is its willingness to extend membership to an increasing number of
European states and peoples.
The 2004 enlargement was not unusual in increasing the population of the EU, but
it was unusual in the gap in living standards between the states that joined and
the existing Member States. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe are highly
unusual in that ‘human capital endowments are much richer than in countries at
comparable income levels’ (Boeri et al., 2002: 104). This leads Boeri to conclude that
‘migrants from the East will probably perform better in labour markets and are less
likely to depend on welfare than the recent migrants in Europe’ (2002: 104).
Although the majority of Member States imposed transitional arrangements, the
EU Commission suggests that these have had less impact on migratory flows than
economic factors. Indeed, the Commission argues that transitional arrangements
may have mainly affected the composition of migration: countries with such
arrangements may have attracted a higher proportion of short-term, seasonal and
less qualified workers.
In order to understand Ireland’s recent and likely future migration experience it is
critical to grasp the way in which the EU has shaped the labour market of Europe,
including Ireland. In addition to ‘widening’ the labour market through four major
enlargements, the EU has ‘deepened’. Deepening refers to the intensification of
economic, monetary, social and, to a degree, political integration. When thinking
about migration, one aspect of deepening is particularly relevant. The EU gradually
took steps to make real the freedom of workers to seek and take employment in
other Member States. This required some portability of social security, the right to
some degree of social protection in other Member States and mutual recognition
of qualifications.
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The understanding of a market society that the EC and EU embodied, and still
expresses, is one in which negotiated social standards, health and safety, work-
place relations and balanced regional development are intrinsic. This means that
the EU does not, in any general sense, create a race to the bottom. At the same
time, there is a tension. The accession of Member States at much lower levels of
economic development means that the negotiated harmonisation, closer coordi-
nation and common policies must not be done in such a way as to choke off
economic development in lagging Member States and regions.
6.2.4 Uncertainties about Some Existing Elements of 
Migration and Many Future Trends and Effects
Although we know much about the economic profile of recent migration to
Ireland, we remain uncertain about some of the facts, many of its economic and
social effects and, not surprisingly, about its future scale. Some of these
uncertainties are of considerable importance in determining the economic and
social consequences of migration. Among these are:
s The impact of migration on the distribution of wages;
s The extent to which there is exploitation of migrants;
s The degree to which, and the pace at which, migrants overcome occupational
underachievement;
s The propensity of migrants to return to their own country;
s The longer-term patterns of migration to Ireland from the enlarged European
Union;
s Inter-marriage between migrants and native citizens;
s The desire of migrants from the EU 10 and from outside the EEA for family
reunification;
s The impact of migration on housing demand;
s The scale of irregular migration;
s The impact of migration on future population growth; and
s The effect of migration on Ireland’s long-run growth and prosperity.
Below we briefly explain our uncertainty on each of these factors.
Impact on Wage Dispersion 
Since the 1960s, there has been a long-run trend of widening wage dispersion in
Ireland—a fall in the ratio of low-skilled to average wages.This was briefly reversed
in the late 1990s, and some analysis attributes this to migration of high-skilled
workers. In the more recent period, 2002 to 2004, widening wage dispersion was
again evident. Increased migration of low-skilled labour may have been an influence
on this outcome, but there are clearly other long-run influences.
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Violation of Labour Standards and Exploitation
Although various organisations have documented instances of violation of
employment standards, exploitation of migrant workers and some instances of
trafficking, we remain uncertain on how widespread exploitation is.
Occupational Progression of Migrants
There is uncertainty about how long it will take for migrants to progress to
occupations that reflect their educational qualifications.
Whether Migrants Stay or Return
The evidence suggests that a significant proportion of migrants from the EU 10 do
not stay very long in Ireland—sometimes referred to as ‘churning’. The extent to
which this is occurring has not yet been adequately measured. We do not know
what proportion of the new inflow may settle permanently in Ireland or will return
to their own country.
The Longer-Term Patterns of Migration to Ireland from the Enlarged EU
A major uncertainty is the longer-term patterns of migration to Ireland from the
enlarged EU. A high level of migration from the EU 10 to Ireland occurred after
2004, in the context of very strong economic growth here, weak growth in
continental Europe and transitional arrangements in most EU Member States.
Consequently, we do not know the likely scale of migration to Ireland from the EU
10 when the German economy recovers and transitional arrangements are
removed (see Chapter 4). Furthermore, we do not know the propensity of
Romanians and Bulgarians to migrate to Ireland, nor how many Member States
will adopt transitional arrangements. Some relevant features of these two
countries are identified and discussed in Chapter 7.
Inter-marriage
Inter-marriage (or partnership) between migrants and Irish people has long been
an important aspect of migration, and one important way in which integration
is achieved. It remains to be seen how many of the recent migrants will choose
Irish partners.
Family Reunification
Family reunification is an important component of migration, but we have limited
information on its contribution to migration flows and stocks. Rights to family
reunification for people from outside the EEA have recently been liberalised and
those joining family members have been given improved access to the labour
market, as described in Chapter 2. We do not know the extent to which migrants
from the EU 10 will show interest in family reunification.
Housing 
A high share of migrants are in the key household formation age group, 25 to 44,
so that migrants are an important component of the housing market (Duffy et al.,
2005). In addition, the relationship between migration and the housing market is
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complex: migration undoubtedly increases the demand for housing, some of it
contributes to the supply of housing, and the price of housing can influence
migration decisions.
The Scale of Irregular Migration 
A major area of uncertainty is the scale of illegal or irregular migration. As noted in
Chapter 2, there are a number of channels into the pool of illegal or irregular
migrants—quite apart from illegal entry into Ireland. To date, the most important
of these channels are probably asylum, the work permit system, ‘educational’
migration and visits to non-EEA citizens resident in Ireland.
Impact of Migration on Ireland’s Demography
There is much uncertainty regarding the impact of migration on future population
growth. With high migration, the population could reach 5.4 million by 2026, while
with low migration it could be over 5 million. Notwithstanding this uncertainty,
even the CSO’s lower projection of migration will result in a substantial increase in
population over the next two decades.
The Impact of Migration on Ireland’s Long-Run Prosperity 
We remain uncertain about the effect of migration on Ireland’s long-run economic
development. Both history and analysis show that migration can have a profound
positive effect on a county’s progress. It can do this through its effect on the scale
of economic and business activity, if both labour and capital flow in, through the
stimulus to innovation deriving from new skills, creativity and diversity. Indeed,
economic history suggests that economic dynamism is supported by tolerance,
which may well be correlated with migration and diversity (Mokyr, 1990; Florida,
2002). Important though these long-run dynamic effects probably are, we remain
highly uncertain about them. Combined with our uncertainty about many other
aspects of migration, this means we cannot reach a definitive conclusion on the
impact of migration on Ireland’s economic welfare. In Section 6.4, below, we
discuss the conditions in which migration is most likely to contribute to Ireland’s
economic and social goals.
6.3 Ireland’s Economic and Social Goals
A natural starting point in making public policy on migration is to identify Ireland’s
goals—economic, social and political. Shared economic and social goals have been
outlined in the Council’s work. The core goal is the creation of a successful society.
Identification of what a successful society would consist of in Irish circumstances
clarifies our economic and social goals and the means by which we aim to achieve
them. In the Council’s view, the foundations of a successful society are:
s A dynamic economy;
s A participatory society;
s Incorporating a commitment to social justice;
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s Based on consistent economic development that is socially and environ-
mentally sustainable; and
s Which responds especially to the constantly evolving requirements of
international competitiveness, understood as the necessary condition of
continuing economic and social success.
In its 2006 Strategy report, the Council developed this vision, by updating its
account of the economy and society, factoring the environment more fully into our
understanding, and combining these to offer a better account of the relation
between Ireland’s economy, society and environment. Migration was one of the
most important new factors to be analysed and understood. The modified picture
of Ireland’s economic and social situation, and of opportunities and threats,
suggested that we state our goals in a new way (see NESC, 2005b: 116).
Several features of the Council’s view are relevant in framing Ireland’s goals with
regard to migration and in identifying the means available to reach those goals:
s First, it involves a unified view of economic and social development; and
s Second, it sees membership of the EU, and the success of the EU, as a critical
context in which it is possible to build a successful society in Ireland.
In addition, several core findings of Part I (and the Council’s recent Strategy report)
are relevant in framing Ireland’s basic orientation towards migration:
s Pressure for migration—legal and illegal—is a central and unavoidable feature
of the emerging world order, one to which all societies and states must
respond.
s The enlargement of the EU was a moral, political and economic imperative.
s Migration can, in certain circumstances, enhance economic and social progress
and prosperity (an argument we advance in Section 6.4 below).
s Integration of migrants is one of the core factors determining the overall
success or failure of migration3.
Acceptance of these four propositions suggests that three broad goals should
inform Ireland’s policies on migration:
s Economic and social development: migration should promote the achievement
of a successful society, as understood in the NESC vision;
s The rule of law: migration and migration-related activity should enhance,
rather than erode, the rule of law; and
s Integration: people coming to Ireland, to settle or for a short period, should be
appropriately integrated into the life of Irish society.
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3. The word ‘integration’ is used in international research and policy analysis to refer to the degree of involvement of migrants, and their
families, in the social, economic, educational, cultural and political life of the host country. It does not mean assimilation. Nor does it
imply that ‘integration’ requires adjustment only on the side of migrants. Despite some reservations about the word ‘integration’, the
Council adopts it in this report because of its wide international usage.
These three broad goals might support—and, in turn, be supported by—over-
arching principles and ideals. In its recent Strategy report, the Council argued that
the ‘project of Ireland’—socially, culturally and economically—still commands
allegiance and that Irish people continue to embrace collective projects that are
neither narrow nor focussed on material self-interest (NESC, 2005b: 103). In
addition, Ireland shares core ideals and principles reflected in its international
commitments to third-world development and human right4. These broad goals,
and their relation to possible over-arching principles, are shown in Figure 6.2.
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Figure 6.2 Three Broad Goals of Migration 
4. These include the fundamental values reflected the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Ireland’s ratification of a range of
international declarations, covenants and conventions. These include the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ratified in 1989), the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination (ratified in 2001), the Council of Europe’s
Revised European Social Charter (ratified in 2000), the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (ratified in 1999)
and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (adopted by the European Council at Nice in December 2000).
(A) Economic and Social Progress
Channels of Migration and Eligibility of
Migrants which support Ireland’s economic 
and social strategy
(D) Principles and Ideas
reflecting allegiance to building a successful 
society in Ireland and to fundamental rights
(B) Rule of Law
definition of legal channels for
those allowed to Ireland, policies
and information systems which
minimise illegal migration, prevent
undocumented status, discrimi-
nation and migration-related crime
(C) Integration
measures to ensure that those who
come to Ireland will be sufficiently
integrated into economic, social
and civic life
First, policies for migration should promote the goal of economic and social
development in Ireland (Box A of Figure 6.2). They must define and manage
channels of entry to Ireland, and do so in a way that reflects Ireland’s goals for
business development, employment, education, the family, culture, and its
international commitments, noted above. Policy must also define the eligibility of
different migrants for various services and statuses—such as social welfare,
healthcare, housing, education, training and professional recognition—in ways
that serve the broad goal of economic and social development.
The second broad goal, the Rule of Law, is depicted in Box B of Figure 6.2. Migration
and migration-related activity should enhance, rather than erode, the rule of law.
The term ‘rule of law’ is not ideal, but the goal we have in mind is real and
important. It is important because migration has the potential to undermine the
rule of law in at least three distinct ways. First, it can weaken the ability of the state
institutions to define, control and monitor who resides in Ireland. Second, and
perhaps more important, it can create situations in which relations between
parties in civil society—between individuals or, for example, between employers
and employees—are extremely unequal and, consequently, governed by power,
rather than law or voluntary contract. Third, because of these two, it has the
potential to weaken trust in the ability of public institutions to ensure the rule of
law, which tends to become a self-fulfilling prophesy. Defining the ‘rule of law’ as
the second broad goal which should inform policy in the area of migration has a
number implications. At a most basic level, it requires that government define
legal channels for those allowed to come to Ireland (for the economic and social
reasons emerging from Box A) and define the terms on which some of them may
become citizens5. It requires that government, acting with non-governmental
organisations, devise information systems and policies to minimise irregular
migration, prevent undocumented status and combat migration-related crime. It
requires that public institutions provide individuals and organisations with
protection against these risks.
The third broad goal, integration, is depicted in Box C of Figure 6.2. We want to
ensure that people coming to Ireland, for a short period or to settle, are
appropriately integrated into the life of Irish society. Policies to achieve this are
discussed in the remaining chapters of Part II and particularly in Chapter 10.
Clearly, the ‘appropriate’ level of integration differs for those settling in Ireland and
those here for a shorter time. But this distinction should not be pushed too far;
international experience shows that much ‘temporary’ migration can turn out to
be permanent.
In Chapter 12, we argue that these three broad goals, and the policies necessary to
reach them, are interrelated and need to be coordinated.
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5. Writing in a UK context, Goodhart suggests that it is important to communicate the idea that the public authorities, acting on behalf
of society, are in control of who becomes a fellow citizen (Goodhart, 2006: 43)
6.4 The Place of Migration in Advancing Ireland’s 
Economic and Social Goals 
6.4.1 Migration can Contribute to Ireland’s Economic 
and Social Strategy, but this is not Inevitable
The analysis in Part I yields a significant degree of shared understanding of
migration in the Irish context. This shared understanding contains a number of
positive propositions and recognition of a number of uncertainties. The Council
believes that migration can contribute to Ireland’s goals, but that this is not
inevitable.
If we look in a little more detail at Ireland’s economic and social goals, and draw on
our understanding of migration, we can identify:
s Ways in which migration can make a positive contribution to Ireland’s
economic and social strategy; and 
s Conditions necessary for migration to make this positive contribution.
In outline, migration is most likely to enhance Ireland’s economic and social
development when it:
s Supports an upgrading of the economy, skills and work;
s Is characterised by mobility and integration, rather than segmented labour
markets and social separation;
s Is combined with enhancement of social participation and protection by means
of the Developmental Welfare State; and
s Is associated with a narrowing of the income distribution.
Below we outline in more detail ways in which migration can contribute to
Ireland’s economic and social strategy and some conditions in which this positive
effect to occur.
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6.4.2 Ways in which Migration can Support Ireland’s 
Economic and Social Strategy
Ireland’s economic and social strategy is based on continued upgrading of
capabilities, technologies, knowledge-creation, commercialisation, public services
and infrastructure. This strategy embodies a new understanding of the mutual
dependence of the economy and society. It recognises that the strength of the
economy now depends on effective social policy; but also that social policy must
share responsibility for economic performance and participation. As the Council
argued in its recent Strategy report, in a globalised world, the strength of Ireland’s
economy and the attractiveness of its society will rest on the same foundation—
the human qualities of those who participate in them (NESC, 2005b).
This is reflected in evolving policies for S&T, R&D, business development, inward
investment, training, marketing, infrastructure and regulation. It is also reflected
in proposals to build the Developmental Welfare State (DWS). This strategy
envisages a welfare state committed to facilitating the development of each
individual’s potential and providing comprehensive support packages tailored to
personal circumstances and needs. Access to a wide range of quality services on
affordable terms is seen as supporting productivity and lifetime employment. The
Council envisages substantial progress being made in reducing child poverty,
educational disadvantage, long durations on social assistance, improving mobility
out of low-paying jobs and raising standards of care for people whose capacity for
personal autonomy is constrained.
The Council believes that migration can contribute to this economic and social
strategy in a number of ways:
s Migrants, working at the level of their skills, are important in raising the levels
of performance of many firms.
s High-skilled migrants can play an important role in delivering improved public
services.
s Graduates from abroad will augment the pool of fourth-level researchers
funded by an increased S&T budget.
s Migrants play a role in upgrading our infrastructure. Indeed, through its effect
on total population, migration can strengthen the economic logic for major
infrastructural investments, such as the Dublin metro and an integrated public
transport system.
s Students from overseas who complete accredited third-level programmes can
contribute in a number of ways, including research, working in Ireland after
qualification and strengthening Ireland’s links with their countries.
s Migrants who undertake low-skilled work can contribute to releasing people
(both Irish people and migrants who may be underemployed) for higher-skilled
work. In providing services and goods that are consumed domestically, they can
enhance the standard of living of others. It is important, however, that the
status and conditions of their jobs should improve in line with the economy’s
overall success. In previous work, the Council has pointed out that the learning
and innovating economy does not necessarily ‘shake out’ all lower productivity
employments; it can enhance the status of workers in certain sectors who
perform necessary roles, in which the scope for technology to boost produc-
tivity is inherently constrained (e.g., driving buses, cleaning hotel bedrooms,
minding children, etc.)—allowing them to share in increasing overall prosperity.
s Migration can contribute to Ireland’s economic and social well-being by
increasing diversity.
s Ireland’s approach to migration from the EU 10 supports its EU policy in a
number of ways: it contributes to the success of the 2004 enlargement, and
enhances Ireland’s reputation in both EU policy making and civil society in large
parts of Europe.
Several of these contributions to Ireland’s economic and social progress increase
the probability that migration will strengthen Ireland’s long-term economic and
social progress, in ways noted earlier.
Drawing on the evidence and analysis in Part I, summarised above, the Council
emphasises that these positive effects of migration are not inevitable. Here it
outlines some conditions in which migration is most likely to have these positive
effects.
6.4.3 Conditions in which Migration can Support
Ireland’s Economic and Social Strategy
In Section 6.4.1 we identified four general conditions in which migration is most
likely to enhance Ireland’s economic and social development (conditions reflecting
an upgrading of the economy, skills and work, integration rather than
segmentation, enhanced participation and protection by means of the DWS and a
narrowing of income distribution). More specifically, migration can contribute to
Ireland’s economic and social strategy and progress where:
s Migration is not driven by demand for labour at low levels of wages and
conditions and dominated by low productivity work—for these are among the
conditions in which migration is likely to actually lower GNP per head in Ireland
and widen inequality in incomes.
s Migrants are not confined to low-skilled traded sectors of the Irish economy
which are highly cost sensitive. This would fail to serve Ireland’s goal in two
ways: (1) Given the intensification of international competition, there is very
little prospect of remuneration in these sectors improving and, indeed, a strong
prospect of future sectoral redundancies. Indeed, the sorry story of much
migration to European countries in the second half of the twentieth century
involved precisely the attraction, and confinement, of migrants to low-skilled
sectors which subsequently suffered severe contraction in the face of
international competition and technological change. This left migrants
economically and socially marginalised, giving rise to severe problems in the
second and even third generations; (2) It could lock certain Irish enterprises into
low-value-added, cost sensitive, market segments, weakening their long-run
contribution to Irish prosperity.
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s Migrants are not brought to Ireland to take up jobs on the basis of wages or
working conditions that are below those acceptable to Irish or other workers
from within the EEA area. If migrants are confined to jobs ‘shunned’ by EU
nationals because the terms and conditions are unacceptable, there is a real
risk that the workers doing these jobs also will be shunned, undermining the
goal of integration (see Chapter 9).
s Migrants legally in Ireland—be they workers, the dependants of workers,
students, EU or third country nationals—are protected by employment and
equality legislation as effectively as Irish nationals.
s As the duration of migrants’ legal residence lengthens, they achieve integration
into Irish society, are expected to do so and have access to the necessary supports.
s Ireland’s social inclusion strategies pay close attention to the circumstances of
migrants and ensure that cumulative factors do not interact to cause their
social exclusion.
s All economic migration complements Ireland’s determination to enable more
of its current workforce and resident population to attain higher skills and
competencies, through training or a return to formal education.
s Within the rules governing eligibility, public service providers treat migrants on
an equal basis to the rest of the population (see Chapters 10 and 11).
s Migrants in low-skilled jobs for some defined time are given access to the
training opportunities and supports offered to Irish nationals (see Chapter 9).
s The channel through which a person has entered (work permit, work visa,
family dependant, student, grant of refugee status or ‘leave to remain’, etc.)
does not irrevocably determine their status and tenure in Irish society.
s Irish policy reflects its obligations under the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights and its
commitment to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
6.4.4 What is ‘Migration Policy’? 
‘Migration Policy’ Encompasses Many Areas
The analysis in Part I and the approach to framing Ireland’s ends and means
adopted in this chapter suggest that, for some purposes, ‘migration policy’ should
be thought of in broad terms. For a number of reasons, it should not be confined
to employment permits for non-EEA nationals and visa policy. The most obvious
reason being that employment permits and visas now only apply to a small
proportion of all migrants. To make a success of migration requires effective labour
market policies (Chapter 9), an integration policy (Chapter 10) and adaptation of
social policies (Chapter 11). Indeed, it can be said that migration increases the
urgency of existing policy challenges, especially in social and labour market policy,
more than it creates entirely new policy challenges—although there are some new
policy challenges. Furthermore, successful migration requires appropriate policies
at both national and EU level. Finally, it is argued in Chapter 12 that the three broad
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goals—economic and social progress, the rule of law and integration—must all be
considered together. All policy areas and departments must take some
responsibility for each of the three goals. This poses two somewhat different
challenges: first, a whole-of-government approach to the overall issue of
migration; and, second, inter-departmental coordination on specific parts of policy.
Handling Uncertainty: the Role of Partnership 
Migration is a policy area in which there is considerable uncertainty. It seems
important that these uncertainties be acknowledged; otherwise they will tend to
widen existing, real and perceived, conflicts of interest. Consequently, the Council’s
approach in this chapter has been to outline a shared understanding on migration,
including a shared recognition of many uncertainties. In a partnership context, the
element of uncertainty has one immediate and important implication.
Government, the social partners and other relevant organisations should commit
to jointly monitoring key migration and migration-related trends. This may
increase the possibility of adopting a joint problem-solving approach to problems
that are identified.
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Policy on EU Migration 
and Enlargement
7
7.1 Introduction
Chapter 2 established the extent to which the 2004 enlargement of the EU
boosted migration to Ireland from Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic
States. Chapter 4 placed the recent large migration flows into Ireland in the wider
context of Ireland’s relationship with an EU that has experienced successive
enlargements and a progressive deepening of the ties between its Member States.
This chapter identifies areas where Ireland’s strategies as an EU Member State
should be influenced by its current experience of intra-EU migration. The first three
sections deal with the principle of Community Preference, the monitoring of
labour standards and the effectiveness of the Structural Funds respectively. A final
section discusses the challenge posed by the forthcoming accession of Romania
and Bulgaria.
7.2 Community Preference
It is integral to EU law and practice that Member States give preference to each
other’s nationals in filling vacancies in their labour markets which cannot be filled
domestically. Several reasons support this strategy and practice. Where no loss of
work quality or productivity is entailed, filling a vacancy with an EU worker, rather
than a third-country national, contributes to the efficiency with which human
capital is deployed across the Union, promotes the convergence of earnings and
living standards across the Member States, and minimises the pool of workers
whose employment tenure is subject to special conditions (the lot of most third
country nationals).
The principle of Community Preference is not without its difficulties. A Member
State may find that it is required to introduce a greater degree of control on
employers’ access to what have been traditional sources of migrant labour. These
may have developed on the basis of geographical proximity (e.g., sharing a border
with a non-EU country), close historical and cultural links (e.g., a former colony) or
simply as the cumulative outcome of the activities of existing recruitment
agencies and migrant networks. That employers should first seek to recruit from
elsewhere in the EU is not always an evident step but needs to be consciously
fostered and supported. Since 1993, the Public Employment Services of the EEA
Member States1 have been actively linked through EURES (European Employment
Services), perhaps the first significant institutional arrangement to balance labour
demand and supply within the EU as a whole (Goedings, 1999).
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1. And Switzerland.
The Council believes that, while Ireland faces lesser challenges to established
practices in recruiting third country nationals than many other Member States,
some challenges do exist that should be identified and addressed. The
fundamental purpose of Community Preference is to strengthen the internal
labour market of the EU as a whole and ensure that, while vacancies are filled by
the most apt migrant workers, they are migrant EU nationals wherever possible.
This has the added advantage that they are, thus, also workers on whom the least
constraints need to be placed. Other things being equal, a job in the Irish economy
filled by an EU national, rather than the holder of a work permit, means a worker
with more extensive protection and greater mobility within the Irish labour
market and across the Union.
7.3 Monitoring and Protecting Standards
The 2004 enlargement has raised the profile of a challenge that is, in fact,
constitutive of the commitment to give workers freedom to take employment
anywhere in the Union: how to ensure that the movement of workers from poor to
richer regions is beneficial for all concerned, does not give rise to exploitation of
migrant workers nor undermine the host country’s labour market standards.
Chapter 9 will deal more fully with this challenge. The intention here is to identity
it as an essential concomitant of the enlargement process. Relatively rich
incumbent Member States cannot expect to embrace much poorer populations as
new EU citizens without devoting steadily more attention and resources to
ensuring that migrants from the new Member States are employed on terms and
conditions that reflect the standards of their host societies, rather than of their
countries and regions of origin.
Even among strata of the EU 15’s own populations, there are people whose lives of
hardship make them willing to trade what are widely considered as decent
working conditions for the opportunity to earn more. Twenty years after their own
countries’ accessions, Spanish and Portuguese authorities discovered a network
that was encouraging homeless individuals in Portugal to undertake agricultural
work in Spain in which practically every Spanish labour law was being flouted2.
Some of the exploited individuals nevertheless declared their contentment with
the situation and preference not to return to Portugal (El País, 27/04/06). This
example underscores several key points. Individual migrant workers can accept
working conditions that flout the host country’s labour standards—this is not a
hazard exclusive to enlargements that embrace poor countries but, as the example
illustrates, is associated with entrenched poverty wherever it is to be found. There
will always be unscrupulous employers (and landlords, retailers, recruitment
agencies, etc.) prepared to seek profit on foot of flouting existing standards. Public
authorities have to be pro-active in the face of the greater opportunities presented
to the unscrupulous profit-seeker by the combination of Eastern enlargement,
cheaper travel and more aggressive recruitment agencies. This may be one of the
least appreciated implications of admitting new Member States with significantly
lower living standards to the Union.
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2. The 43 Portuguese workers had no employment contracts, no social insurance had been paid on their behalf, and they had worked a
six-day week with —occasionally —an 18-hour day. In return, they received small amounts of pocket money as most of their wages
were deducted in exchange for bed and board or withheld in case they drank ‘to the extent that they were unable to work’.
Twin strategies are needed and will be developed more fully in Chapter 9. In the
first place, civil society needs to be made more aware and intolerant of abuse. In
preventing it, as in securing the integration of migrants generally, civil society has
the dominant role. Secondly, greater and more effective public investment is
needed in monitoring and enforcing labour market and social standards so that
the likelihood of detection is unacceptably high for the unscrupulous employer,
recruitment agency, landlord, etc. The core perspective must remain that it is not
the EU migrant worker inured to hardship in his own country who undermines
standards in the country to which he comes. The undermining is done by actors in
the host society and/or in the society of origin who seek to profit by exploiting
some migrants’ willingness to accept living and working conditions rejected by the
society to which they have come.
7.4 The Effectiveness of the Structural Funds
The wide differences in living standards between the EU 15 Member States and
most of the new and prospective entrants have given added significance to the EU
Structural Funds.3 They provide mechanisms through which the richer MS and
regions invest in the economic and social development of poorer MS and regions.
The successful use of these Funds contributes to lessening the push factors behind
out-migration from poorer MS and regions.
The size of the funds and the approximate range of support on which each
individual MS—‘old and ‘new’—and Romania and Bulgaria can rely have been
agreed for the seven-year period, 2007-2013. This was part of the lengthy and
difficult negotiations on the EU budget which took place during 2004 and 2005
(the EU Financial Perspective 2007-2013) (European Commission, 2006b). While
there was no attempt to deny the responsibility of this particular EU budget to
provide strong support for the economic and social development of the much
poorer new and acceding Member States, other major concerns and interests were
also in play. Among these were the future of the UK rebate, the level of spending
on the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the prospect of linking the budget more
to the Lisbon Agenda, and the determination of some of the EU’s principal net
contributors not to compound their already weak fiscal positions. Indeed, several
of the new Member States shared Ireland’s position that CAP receipts from the EU
Budget were more substantial than any conceivable Structural Funds allocation,
making the Budget’s ability to implement the 2002 CAP reform their first priority
in the negotiations.
The net result of the two-year negotiations on the Budget is that total EU
spending on the Structural and Cohesion Funds is set to grow by a modest 2.7 per
cent a year over the 2007-2013 period (a cumulative increase of 20 per cent), of
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3. Technically, the term ‘EU Structural Funds’ refers collectively to four individual funds—the European Regional Development Fund
(promoting the development of lagging regions), the European Social Fund (investing in people), the European Agricultural Guidance
and Guarantee Fund (helping structural reform in agriculture and rural areas) and the small Financial Instrument for Fisheries
Guidance (supporting structural reform in the fisheries sector). Regions, rather than Member States as such, qualify for these funds. A
further fund, the Cohesion Fund, was established in 1993 under which Member States as such can be eligible for support with
spending on transport and environmental infrastructure. For the purposes of this discussion, the Cohesion Fund is included as an EU
‘Structural Fund’.
which just over one-half (51.4 per cent) is to go to the new (and acceding) Member
States. The cumulative spending total of c308bn is a 9 per cent reduction on the
initial amount sought by the European Commission when negotiations opened on
the budget in 2004. This indicates how difficult it was for the principle of solidarity
with the poorer new Member and acceding states to remain the first priority.4 It
has also been specified that the maximum a Member State, no matter how poor,
is to receive in EU regional transfers is just under 3.8 per cent of its national GDP
(down from 4 per cent). This is ‘in order to pay regard to the finite capacity of
Member States to utilise effectively the resources available’ (European Council,
2005); though it could also be seen as limiting the encroachment of regional
transfers on funds available for EU spending programmes from which the richer
States benefit (Ackrill and Kay, 2006).
Ireland’s relationship with the EU Structural Funds is being profoundly changed by
two factors: (i) its new status as a relatively wealthy member of the EU 25; (ii) the
extent of migration to the country from Central and Eastern Europe.The first factor
is the more obvious. For example, Ireland’s rising GNP per capita relative to the EU
average made it ineligible for receipts from the Cohesion Fund by the end of 2003.5
Receipts from the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European
Social Fund (ESF) and the Cohesion Fund (CF) peaked as a proportion of GDP in the
early 1990s (at 2.4 per cent) and in absolute terms in 1998 (when Ireland received
c1.138bn) (Department of Finance, 2005). The weaning of Ireland off reliance on EU
Structural Funds for its capital investment programmes will be effectively
completed during the 2007-2013 period. Indicative financial calculations by the
European Commission are based on Ireland having the second highest GDP per
capita (adjusted for purchasing power standards) in the EU 25 in 2004 (after
Luxembourg) and anticipate a total allocation to Ireland over the seven-year
period of c815m (compared with c3.7bn between 2000-2006) (European
Commission, 2006b).
The second factor changing Ireland’s relationship with the EU Structural Funds is
less obvious. The large scale of migration into Ireland from poorer Member States
in Central and Eastern Europe gives the effectiveness of Structural Fund spending
in those countries a potential role in lessening new migrant outflows and even
prompting return migration. It is significant in this regard that Ireland is widely
considered to constitute a good case study in how Structural Fund receipts can be
used to achieve the objective of greater convergence.
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4. By contrast, the Commission’s opening proposal for spending on agricultural price supports was reduced by 2.6 per cent. However,
proposals by the Commission to give the EU Budget more of a role in promoting the Lisbon agenda (via spending on ‘competitiveness
for growth and employment’) were the greatest casualty of the two-year negotiations; they were reduced by 44 per cent (see Ackrill
and Kay, 2006).
5. Hoarding at the Port Tunnel works on the Swords Road to Dublin airport made a point of describing the project as entirely funded by
the Irish Exchequer, a departure from the more ubiquitous acknowledgement of EU Cohesion Fund support on the over 120 transport
and environmental infrastructure projects it supported in Ireland. Eligibility for ERDF and ESF funding has also been affected by
Ireland’s growing wealth. During the first two rounds of Structural Funds’ disbursement (1989-1993, 1994-1999), the whole of the
state was classified as a single Objective One region eligible for support on the grounds of its lagged economic development. During
the third round, 2000-2006, only the newly created Border, Midlands and West (BMW) Region retained an Objective One status, with
the remainder of the state (newly constituted as the Southern and Eastern [S&E] Region) classified as ‘in transition’ out of such a
status and given support on a declining scale.
Since Ireland began to negotiate its own membership through to the present day,
its national interest dictated a triple objective in the country’s approach to the
Structural Funds: (i) they should be resourced as fully as possible by the EU at large,
(ii) the criteria governing eligibility for them should give full recognition to the
nature and circumstances of Ireland’s relative underdevelopment, and (iii) Ireland’s
ability to draw down allocated funds and use them in compliance with their
requirements and conditions should be of a high standard. By and large, these
objectives were successfully met. The Council believes that Ireland should now
formulate its objectives for the EU’s Structural Funds somewhat differently. For
example, (a) advocating and supporting measures designed to enhance the
capacity of the poorest Member States to utilise transfers effectively, (b) helping
prepare the case for giving spending on cohesion greater weight in the next EU
Financial Perspective after 2013, and (c) exploring what can be done to lessen
further the role of national criteria in allocating EU Structural Funds, in favour of
securing the greatest reduction in inter-regional disparities from specific invest-
ments and programmes.
7.5 The Accession of Romania and Bulgaria
The accession of Romania and Bulgaria to the EU, by January 1st 2008 at the latest,
will complete the Eastern Enlargement and add a further 6.5 per cent to the
population of the EU 25.
It is clear that predicting the scale of migration flows from them is difficult, if not
impossible. In addition to weighting correctly the different ‘pull factors’, ‘push
factors’ and ‘network effects’, the potential displacement effect of transitional
arrangements that other Member States may adopt has to be reckoned with.
Nevertheless, the Irish experience after the 2004 enlargement is potentially
revealing. The following discussion, therefore, highlights some key differences and
similarities between Romania and Bulgaria, on the one hand, and Poland and
Lithuania, on the other. The latter countries are chosen because they accounted for
some 70 per cent of the migrants who came to Ireland from Eastern Europe in
2004 and 2005. Seven aspects of Romania and Bulgaria are briefly discussed, based
on the data in Table 7.1: (i) size; (ii) living standards; (iii) demography; (iv) economic
dynamism; (v) labour supply; (vi) human capital; (vii) links with Ireland.
7.5.1 Key Features of Romania and Bulgaria
Their Size 
Romania’s 22 million people will make it the seventh most populous Member State
in the EU, ahead of the Netherlands (16m), but behind Poland, Spain (40m each)
and the big four6. Bulgaria, with 8 million, will become the sixteenth most
populous Member State, similar in size to Austria (8.2m) and Sweden (8.9m).7 An
immediate lesson from Ireland’s experience of the 2004 enlargement is that these
absolute population sizes are of limited relevance. The level of inflows to Ireland
policy on eu migration 
and enlargement 133
6. Germany [82m], France [61m], UK [60m] and Italy [58m].
7. In the EU 27, Ireland will be ranked 20th by population size.
will be the net result of the size of the cohorts in the sending country from which
migrants traditionally come, their propensity to migrate, their preference for
Ireland as a destination, and their ability to act on what their preference is.
Lithuanian and Latvian migration to Ireland has shown that small populations can
make a significant impact on Ireland’s labour market if knowledge of Irish
conditions is disseminated among them, recruitment agencies are active and good
transport links exist. At the same time, lower incidences of the same factors in a
very large population, such as that of Poland, also entail a significant level of in-
migration.
Living Standards
The most remarkable feature of the accession of Romania and Bulgaria is that their
living standards are lower again than in any of the EU 10 countries that entered in
2004. Their GDP per capita was 30 per cent of the EU 25 average (2004, PPS), well
below the 50 per cent of Poland and Lithuania. More formidable evidence still is
the gap in life expectancy. Life expectancy at birth for men is 7.4 years less in
Romania than in Ireland, similar but not as great as the gap with Lithuania (8.6
years). Male life expectancy is 5 years less in Bulgaria. Ireland, in fact, had Romania’s
current life expectancy for males in 1960 and its life expectancy for females in 1980
(CSO, 2004); this provides some indication of the time that may be needed for
social and economic conditions in Romania to catch up with those in Ireland.
These lower living standards are reflected in their relative levels of pay. Romanian
or Bulgarian workers on a minimum wage would increase their purchasing power
4.5 times in Ireland, a bigger improvement than Lithuanians would enjoy (over 3
times more) or Poles (2.5 times more). However, as Ireland’s experience with
emigration in the 1980s serves to underline, migration is more likely on the part of
people in employment who are occupationally dissatisfied than on the part of
people with very constrained resources and whose only prospects are minimum-
wage jobs. However, the disparities in earnings levels are as high or higher when
average earnings are consulted. The average earnings (in PPS-adjusted euros) of
full-time employees in industry and services (excluding the public sector) in
Romania and Bulgaria in 2002 were 20 per cent or less of the corresponding
earnings in Ireland (they were 30 to 40 per cent of the Irish level in Poland and
Lithuania). The disparities were not as large for the subsets of employees with
tertiary education. In Romania and Bulgaria, they earned 36 per cent and 22 per
cent, respectively, of their counterparts in Ireland (35 per cent in Lithuania and 66
per cent in Poland). It is clear that, other things being equal, there are strong
financial incentives for migration from both Romania and Bulgaria to Ireland.
Demography
Romania and Bulgaria each has a fragile demography, a feature shared with the EU
10 in general. Low birth rates have entailed an annual natural decrease in their
populations for some time (births are insufficient to offset deaths) and net
emigration has further eroded their population size. Over the six years 2000-2005,
the combined impact of low births and emigration has reduced Bulgaria’s
population at an annual average rate of –0.85 per cent, similar to Lithuania’s
experience. The population of Romania has fallen at an annual average rate of
134
policy on eu migration 
and enlargement 135
Table 7.1 Ireland and Selected New and Acceding 
EU Member States: Selected Characteristics
Year Ireland Romania Bulgaria Poland Lithuania
Total population (1st Jan 2004) (m.) 2004 4.028 21.711 7.801 38.19 3.446
Living standards
GDP per capita in PPS (EU 25=100) 2004 137 32.2 30.6 48.8 47.8
Life expectancy at birth, males 2000-05 75.1 67.7 68.8 70.2 66.5
Life expectancy at birth, females 2000-05 80.3 75 75.6 78.4 77.8
Minimum wage – euros per month, PPS 2005 1,024 219 232 410 327
Mean Annual Industrial & 
Service Earnings, euros PPS 
(excluding Public Administration) 2002 27,915 5,642 4,649 11,948 8,320
Mean Annual Industrial & 
Service Earnings, euros PPS 
(excluding Public Administration) 
for those with tertiary education 2002 33,200 11,966 7,265 22,240 11,586
Demography
Total fertility rate 2004 1.99 1.29 1.29 1.23 1.26
Average annual population growth rate (%) 2000-05 1.12 -0.23 -0.85 -0.08 -0.85
Proportion of population aged 0-14 2004 20.9 16.4 14.2 17.2 17.7
Proportion of population aged 65+ 2004 11.1 14.4 17.1 13 15
Economic performance
Growth rate in real GDP per capita –
annual average (%) 2000-05 5.8 5.1 4.1 3.2 7.0
Increase in minimum wage,
2002-05 (PPS) 2002=100 2002-05 1.19 1.61 1.83 1.23 1.30
Employment growth rate –
annual average (%) 2000-04 2.9 -0.64 1.18 -0.84 -0.16
Proportion of total employment
in high and medium-high tech 
manufacturing and knowledge 
intensive services (%) 2004 39.9 19.8 26.8 29.2 27.8
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Table 7.1 cont./ Year Ireland Romania Bulgaria Poland Lithuania
Labour supply
Numbers in labour force aged 25-34 ('000) 2004 539 2819 828 4618 422
Harmonised 
unemployment rate (%) 2005 4.3 7.7 9.9 17.7 8.2
Harmonised unemployment
rate – yearly average (%) 2000-04 4.4 7.1 15.9 18.6 14.0
Proportion of total employment
in agriculture and forestry (%) 2005 5.9 32.3 8.9 17.4 14.00
Human capital
Educational attainment
of labour force % with ISCED 0-2 30 30 21 13 11
% with ISCED 3-4 41 60 55 71 63
% with ISCED 5-6 29 10 24 16 25
Participation rate in education 
of 18 year olds (%) 2003 81.3 58.5 67.7 85.4 87.4
School expectancy of pupils 
& students (years) 2003 16.8 14.9 15.1 17.2 17.3
Proportion of students at
ISCED 3 learning English (%) 2004 87.8 80.8 90.6 76.5
Average TOEFL score 
(university applicants) 2004 249 242 229 229
Graduate outflow from ISCED Level 
5A and 6, annual average ('000) 2003-04 33.2 100.3 44.8 466.5 21.7
Links with Ireland
Work permits issued (new and renewals) 2002-03 4986 1621 7950 8367
PPS numbers assigned 2002-03 4035 784 6424 5012
PPS numbers assigned (between 1st May 04 
and 25th March 06) 2004-06 110,342 34,408
Notes
Unless otherwise stated, all data are from Eurostat's data base except for the following rows:
7 & 8. United Nations World Population Prospects, The 2004 Edition
9 & 36. Statistics in Focus, ‘Population and Social Conditions’, 7/2005
37. Eurostat, full-time and part-time employment by sex, age groups and economic activity – NACE A
38. Eurostat, Statistics in Focus, ‘Science & Technology’, 1/2006
–0.23 per cent, while that of Poland’s has been nearly stagnant. The contrast with
Ireland’s annual population growth of +1.12 per cent over the same period is sharp.
In the short to medium term, demographic decline is more likely to add to the push
factors behind migration than reduce the numbers of potential migrants. If a
dynamic is underway in Ireland, in which population and economic growth are
feeding each other, leading to multiple challenges of how to manage expansion
(NESC, 2005), Romania and Bulgaria face the more formidable challenge that
Ireland faced in an earlier period, generating economic dynamism in a context of
demographic decline (NESC, 1992).
Economic Performance
There is, however, no evidence of economic stagnation in either country, rather that
preparations for EU accession have been having a beneficial economic impact.
They have both steadily increased their real GDP per capita over the six-year
period, 2000-2005, by more than Poland but less than Lithuania.This improvement
is reflected in an 83 per cent increase in Bulgaria’s minimum wage in real terms
over the 2002-05 period, and of 61 per cent in that of Romania. In Romania, as in
Poland and Lithuania, economic growth has been accompanied by an employment
‘shake out’ with the absolute level of employment declining. Only Bulgaria has
successfully grown employment, achieving almost half the rate of Ireland.
Romania has, currently, the least ‘modern’ economy of the four countries compared
in Table 7.1, with less than 20 per cent of total employment in what are classed as
either medium- to high-tech manufacturing or knowledge-intensive services.
Ireland has 40 per cent. It should be observed, however, that similarity rather than
difference in economic structure may be the bigger boost to migration (as in trade
of goods). Central and Eastern Europeans with a foot already on the employment
ladder in advanced manufacturing or knowledge-intensive service sectors may be
the most aware of their opportunities to boost earnings by coming to Ireland.
Labour Supply
The peak ages for migration are 25-34. In Romania and Bulgaria these cohorts are
equivalent in size to 62 per cent of the population of similarly aged Poles and
Lithuanians.The propensity to migrate of such age groups is partially influenced by
the unemployment rates of their respective countries (an indicator of the difficulty
of finding opportunities if they remain at home). Both Romania and Bulgaria have
much lower unemployment rates than Poland. At 7.7 per cent (2005), unemploy-
ment in Romania was ten percentage points below the Polish rate and it has
maintained it below 8 per cent since the year 2000. Bulgaria has had very high
unemployment in recent years (peaking at 19 per cent in 2001), but it had come
down to 10 per cent in 2005. The proportion of total employment in agriculture
and forestry is very high in Romania (32 per cent) and lower in Bulgaria (9 per cent).
Taken in conjunction with the unemployment rates, it is evident that both
countries have abundant supplies of low-skilled labour.
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Human Capital
The mobility of unemployed people and of underemployed agricultural workers is
low. Ireland has low demand for workers with these backgrounds, while they
typically have constrained resources, limited networks, poor language skills and
strong ties to rural areas. To date, most migration to Ireland from lower income
countries in Central and Eastern Europe has been of individuals with at least a
completed secondary education. With the exception of Romania, most countries in
the region have higher proportions of their workforces who completed secondary
education than Ireland, but lower proportions who went on to acquire a third-level
qualification. Education after the age of 17 is much less likely in Romania and
Bulgaria than in Poland and Lithuania, in both of which the participation rate of 18
year olds in education is higher than in Ireland. There is evidence that the English
language skills of young Romanians and Bulgarians may be higher than those of
Poles and Lithuanians—they are as likely to study English in secondary school and
those among them who apply to universities abroad record higher scores in
standardised tests of English as a foreign language (TOEFL). The propensity to
migrate is particularly high among graduates. The absolute number of students
graduating is one third greater in Bulgaria than in Ireland and three times the
number in Romania.
Links with Ireland
The numbers of work permits and of PPS numbers issued to Romanian and
Bulgarian nationals provide some pointers to the potential role of network effects
and to the degree of knowledge of, and preference for, Ireland as a destination
among potential migrants in those countries. Table 7.1 provides numbers for the
two years, 2002 and 2003, when Romanians and Bulgarians had access to the Irish
labour market on equal terms to Poles and Lithuanians. Adjusted for population
size, Romanians and Poles had roughly equal representations among work permit
holders and those with PPS numbers in Ireland up to 2003; Bulgarians were not
well represented whereas Lithuanians were exceptionally so. When Poland and
Lithuania joined the EU in May 2004, their nationals already in Ireland, legally or
illegally, as workers, students or in whatever capacity, experienced a ‘change of
status’ and acquired the right to live and work without restrictions, to change
employer, to remain permanently and to be joined by dependants. Table 7.1 shows
the subsequent increases in PPS numbers assigned to Polish and Lithuanian
nationals between May 2004 and March 2006. Some of this increase will have
been a once-off effect occasioned by people illegally present taking the
opportunity to regularise their stay.8 In addition, the stock of PPS numbers is a
crude pointer to the numbers of people actually in Ireland and at work. PPS
numbers have the merit of being unique to individuals, but the people concerned
may have returned to their home country, be a child, a secondary school student or
for other reasons have had some contact with a public service provider in Ireland.
Nevertheless, the large increases recorded for Polish and Lithuanian nationals after
May 2004 suggest that significant numbers of Romanians and Bulgarians can be
expected to have contact with Ireland when they too acquire EU citizenship and if
no transitional arrangements apply.
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8. As many as 30 per cent of the Central and Eastern Europeans who registered in the UK under its Worker Registration Scheme in the
wake of enlargement had been present before May 2004.
7.5.2 Should Transitional Arrangements Apply?
The decision as to whether Ireland should apply transitional arrangements and
temporarily restrict access by Romanian and Bulgarian nationals to its labour
market, when it did not do so for nationals of the EU 10 in 2004, has to be taken in
a context that differs from 2004—primarily in the large presence of EU 10
nationals that developed in the intervening period. The following considerations
should be carefully weighed.
The scale of the inflows from Romania and Bulgaria that would arise in the
absence of transitional arrangements seem unlikely to match those from the EU
10. This is so for several reasons. Romanian and Bulgarian nationals will be gaining
access to a labour market in which those of the EU 10 have had ‘first-mover’
advantage. The wider gap in living standards that provides a greater incentive to
migrate also makes the costs of seeking work in Ireland more formidable. The
preferred destinations of Romanian and Bulgarian potential migrants are currently
shaped by geographic proximity, linguistic accessibility, migrant networks and
cultural connectedness9. For these reasons, Germany, Italy, Spain, France and
Austria feature prominently, but not Ireland (nor even the UK) (Institute for Public
Policy Research, 2006). Romania and Bulgaria are further from Ireland than Poland
and the Baltic States and currently have less developed transport links. Much of the
migration from those countries has historically taken the form of return migration
within a 12-month time frame, which provides a short time period in which to
recover costs.
There are large pools of low- and semi-skilled workers in Romania and Bulgaria
whose limited resources, age and attachments to family and place, other things
being equal, may point to a low propensity to migrate. The mobility of some,
however, could be activated by pro-active, well-resourced recruitment
programmes (as was the case with guest-worker programmes sourcing workers
from rural areas of southern Europe in the 1950s and 1960s). If workers of similar
background are encouraged to come to Ireland, it seems reasonable and
supportive of their prospects in Irish society that they should ‘ideally consist of
people who have attained upper secondary education rather than those with
lower secondary or below’ (Expert Group on Future Skills Needs, 2006: 99). It
should also be ensured that their employment in Ireland is transparently on terms
and conditions that reflect Irish standards. The potential for some part of
migration from Romania and Bulgaria to be composed of individuals inadequately
prepared, poorly resourced and with skills in oversupply in Ireland, appears
stronger than in the case of Poland and the Baltic States. Ireland’s welfare
authorities and social service providers should engage with their counterparts in
Romania and Bulgaria to keep avoidable hardship to a minimum.
It is the better educated young Romanians and Bulgarians who are the more likely
to migrate to Ireland through their own unaided efforts. It is significant that, to
date, Ireland has tended to attract higher-skilled migrants from low-income
countries. In this way, the Irish economy benefits from a resource in which the
sending countries have invested and whose eventual return, with enhanced skills,
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9. Wider cultural differences may be significant—reflected, for example, in Romania’s Christian tradition being orthodox whereas that
of Poland is Latin.
is a legitimate expectation. Ireland’s experience of the contribution made by
returning Irish to its economic resurgence in the 1990s should be reflected in
policies that support the upward mobility of young nationals from Central and
Eastern Europe in its labour market, including by facilitating their access to
language and other training where necessary. Fáilte Ireland’s tailored
programmes for migrant workers in the hotel and catering industry is a valuable
headline in this regard.
Key uncertainties—particularly surrounding the extent of return migration to the
EU 10, the impact of a sustained recovery in the Eurozone’s core economies on
migrants’ preferences for Ireland, and the pace of economic growth in Central and
Eastern Europe itself—do not allow us to conclude that the Irish economy can
count indefinitely on the ready availability of a large pool of workers from within
the EU 27. Over the longer term still, and in the absence of a Turkish entry, the
demographic fragility of the EU 27 as a bloc will become a very significant factor
and lead, in all likelihood, to intra-EU migration being quite minor compared to
migration from third countries. The true strength of the underlying reasons for
Ireland’s current attractiveness as a destination for intra-EU migration would, of
course, emerge more clearly if the transitional arrangements that some Member
States still apply to EU 10 nationals were lifted and none of the EU 25 were to adopt
new ones towards Romanian and Bulgarian nationals. In a less than ideal world,
however, Ireland must balance its pursuit of a long-term strategy with the short-
term management of a labour market that is particularly vibrant, open and small
by current EU standards.
The core flaws in transitional arrangements, however, still remain. Where there is
strong aggregate labour demand, they risk distorting the composition of migrant
inflows rather than effectively limiting their scale. In particular, they can contribute
to making more migration temporary or illegal and reduce the quality of the
labour inflow and of job matching. As transitional arrangements are inherently
temporary, they may also contribute to distorting inter-temporal flows; instead of
inflows being front-loaded in response to the novelty of EU membership, the large
initial response may simply be postponed.
In conclusion, Ireland took a principled and generous stand in immediately
opening its labour market to nationals of the EU 10 in 2004. It is clear that the
short- to medium-term net economic effects of doing so have been positive. The
political capital which the 2004 decision helped to generate in the Baltic States
and Central and Eastern Europe should not be overlooked either. Uncertainties
about the impact of such large-scale migration on infrastructure, and about the
speed with which a comprehensive and integrated set of policies to manage
migration can be put in place, are the principal grounds for caution in judging the
post-2004 scenario an unqualified success.
The impending accession of Romania and Bulgaria constitutes a smaller
enlargement embracing two significantly poorer countries. Adopting some form of
transitional arrangements would not be inconsistent—the context has been
transformed by the 2004 decision itself—and might be considered to assuage
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some of the unease generated by the scale of recent inflows. However, the effective-
ness and benefits of transitional arrangements should not be exaggerated.
The Council believes that the social partners should be consulted in advance of the
Government decision whether to grant nationals of Bulgaria and Romania
immediate access to the labour market or seek to postpone it. The decision, and
reasons behind it, should be actively and widely communicated. Some arrange-
ment for monitoring developments and adjusting policy should be an integral part
of the decision taken.
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Policy on Migration 
from outside the EU
8
8.1 Introduction
Most migrants arriving in Ireland at present are EU nationals who enjoy
unrestricted rights to migrate to and take up employment in Ireland. It remains a
national responsibility to regulate migration to Ireland from outside the EU.
Section 8.2 sets out key characteristics and lessons emerging from past Irish policy
on entry of non-EU nationals. Key lessons from international experience are outlined
in Section 8.3. Section 8.4 presents the Council’s recommendations on this subject.
8.2 Background: Ireland’s Initial Response 
to Non-EEA Migration
Net migration to Ireland became positive in 1997 and from 1999 there was strong
growth in immigration to Ireland from outside the EU; migration to Ireland of non-
EU nationals rose from 7,000 in 1999 to 19,300 in 2003 and fell following
enlargement to 10,600 in 2005. This section describes how Irish policy and practice
generated and managed this increase in non-EU migration in those years.
8.2.1 A Liberal-Entry Regime
Up to 2003, access was facilitated through an employer-led work permit system
that was described by the IOM Consultants as ‘very liberal’ with regard to
regulating the admission and selection of non-EEA workers (IOM, 2006: 42).
Following enlargement of the EU, the policy has become more restrictive, as
discussed below. There is also a more selective visa system for high-skilled workers.
The Consultants do suggest that Ireland’s openness to admitting migrant workers
for employment in a variety of jobs, including low-skill labour, may have helped
avoid the large-scale illegal immigration and/or illegal working of migrants
experienced in the US and, to some extent, also in the UK (IOM, 2006: 43).
Although, as noted below, a number of the other features of Ireland’s regime may
not have prevented illegal migration and particularly illegal working.
8.2.2 Labour Market Test
The granting of work permits has been subject to a labour market test; employers
are required to have sought to find workers within the EU. However, the
Consultants point out that ‘in management of the work permits regime, there has
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been significant and continuing toleration of failure of the labour market test—
demonstrated in the finding by FÁS in its review of the test that, in late 2002, the
majority of work permits were issued for work in unskilled occupations for which
there appeared to be a sizeable supply of local labour’ (IOM, 2006: 31). Failings of
the test are not unique to Ireland; virtually all EU countries acknowledge that their
tests have deficiencies. This test will be strengthened as part of the employment
permit arrangements to be introduced in 2007.
8.2.3 Qualification for Granting of a Work Permit
The jobs for which work permits are required must be paid at least the minimum
wage or where relevant, Joint Labour Committee (JLC)1 rates of pay. Employers are
required to state that the full benefits of Irish employment rights legislation will
be applied to the employee for whom the permit is sought. To obtain a work
permit employers are also required to be tax registered and may be required to
produce a tax clearance certificate. There is no formal systematic vetting of the
extent to which employers are in compliance with regulations and laws governing
employment, health and safety or migration before an initial permit is issued,
although for an application for a renewal permit evidence in relation to pay is
required. The Employment Permits Act 2006 (at Section 12 (1) (c)) prescribes
convictions for offences under employment permit, employment protection or
health and safety legislation as grounds for the Minister to refuse to grant a permit.
8.2.4 An Entry Policy
In their review of Ireland’s migration policy, the IOM Consultants note that the
temporary work permit system includes no policies to encourage migrants to
return. While the Council does not advocate active return policies, it notes that
migrants on temporary work permits for over five years are eligible to apply for
citizenship, subject to evidence of economic self-sufficiency. As the IOM
Consultants note, Ireland’s temporary work permit policies are ‘thus effectively a
first step toward permanent residence status through naturalization’ (IOM, 2006:
45). A significant rise in the number of applications for Irish citizenship should be
expected from persons who have been employed on employment permits in
Ireland for five years or longer, since the big increase in work permits in 19992. For
this and other reasons, the Council argues that Ireland needs to view its labour
migration policies in the context of its overall immigration goals and policies. As
noted in Chapter 6, these should encompass economic and social development,
the rule of law and integration.
8.2.5 Reliance on Temporary Work Programmes
It is argued by the IOM Consultants that Ireland’s reliance on temporary work
programmes had a number of implications. First, the impossibility of gaining
permanent resident status, other than through naturalisation, may have been a
serious obstacle to attracting skilled and high-skilled workers to Ireland. Second, it
tends to puts pressure on the naturalisation system. Third, they observe that, in its
reliance on temporary programmes, Ireland may have repeated the policy mistakes
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1. JLCs determine minimum rates of pay and conditions in certain sectors. There are 19 JLCs in operation, covering sectors such as
contract cleaning, hotels and agriculture. JLCs are established by means of a statutory order made by the Labour Court.
2. After five years of legal residence in Ireland (over a period of nine years), migrant workers may apply for Irish citizenship An important
exception is that legal residence as a student or asylum seeker does not count toward this minimum period of five years.
of guest-worker programmes in other countries, particularly the presumption that
migrant workers are essentially available on tap; i.e., that their numbers could be
increased or decreased as a simple function of the economic needs of the receiving
country. There are plans to introduce a permanent labour migration programme
(see Box 8.1 on the Employment Permits Act below).
8.2.6 Enforcement of Employment and Other Law
As of February 2005, only three employers had been convicted for violating the
Employment Permits Act, 2003. In international policy discussion, the failure to
effectively prosecute employers who illegally employ migrant workers is widely
agreed to be one of the most important factors leading to illegal immigration and
illegal work and, as a potential consequence, to the failure of labour immigration
policies. This is because, in contrast to all other immigration control policies,
employer sanctions serve the important purpose of addressing the demand for
illegal migrant workers. Without policies to minimise demand, the policies aimed
at minimizing supply (border control, deportations) are likely to be much less
effective than they could be (IOM, 2006: 56).
There is evidence that Ireland’s extensive equality and employment legislation
does not always translate into the effective protection of and respect for migrants
employment conditions in practice (IOM, 2006: 45). IOM emphasises that ‘the
violation of minimum employment conditions increases the risk that the
employment of migrant workers will adversely impact the employment prospects
of local workers’ (IOM, 2006: 45). IOM also point out that the restriction of the job
mobility of work permit holders may be a factor in increasing the probability of
violations of minimum wage or other legal standards (IOM, 2006: 47). The
Employment Permits Act 2006 provides legislative underpinning for some
mobility on the expiry of the original permit and, with the agreement of the
Minister, on evidence of abuse or exploitation before then. The new employment
requires a work permit. Employees who become redundant can obtain a new
permit without the normal restrictions.
It is worth noting that employers have access to a large pool of legal labour, in
particular the EU 10 and students with permission to work, and this reduces the
demand for illegally-employed migrants.
8.2.7 Students 
In reviewing Irish policy we must take into account various non-employment
immigration channels that migrants may use to enter Ireland and access the Irish
labour market. The most important of these channels has been for students—in
2005 there were an estimated 27,000 non-EEA students in Ireland. The recent
increase in the number of non-EEA nationals registered as students suggests that
this channel of immigration provides a significant number of workers, working
legally or illegally, for the Irish labour market. In many other high-income
countries, such as the UK, students are a critical source of labour in certain
industries, especially the hospitality sector. A similar development may already be
underway in Ireland. There is clearly a need for more information and data about
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the contribution made by students to employment in Ireland and for this to be
taken into account in determining the number of admissions under the labour
immigration channels. It is proposed in Towards 2016 that students in employment
will become the subject of work permit applications.
8.2.8 Family Reunification: Uneven Progress
The different entitlements and conditions of people legally resident in Ireland to
have family members who are non-EEA nationals join them were outlined in
Chapter 2, Section 2.2.5 above. Developments in this area have been uneven and
driven by pressures to deal with individual components rather than with the issue
as a whole.
For example, Section 2.2.5 above made clear that non-EEA nationals working
legally in Ireland can have family members join them under conditions that differ
on two grounds—whether they are from visa-required States or not, and the type
of job they are holding. The latter distinction has been introduced on foot of the
realisation that high-skilled non-EEA workers—initially nurses employed in
Ireland’s health services—were increasingly difficult to attract and retain because
other countries made it easier for their spouses to join them and also to work.
Thus, the Spousal Work Permits Scheme, introduced in 2004, gave greater ease of
access to employment for the spouses of people holding work authorisations/visas,
certain intra-company transferees, some academics/researchers and some medical
professionals. It expressly did not seek to cover all work permit holders.
A second example is that particularly clear and transparent procedures govern 
the family reunification process for refugees, including their right to 
appeal. This was an achievement of the 1996 Refugee Act and its subsequent
amendments. It was spurred both by Ireland’s incorporation of the Geneva
Convention and the 1967 Protocol into domestic law and the challenge to
administrative arrangements brought on by the surge in the numbers seeking a
declaration as a refugee in the late 1990s. The transparency of family reunification
for refugees, and the associated employment and social rights, is greater than for
Irish nationals themselves, though in practice family reunion procedures for Irish
citizens are experienced positively.
A third and final example is that EU/EEA nationals who have moved to Ireland for
the purposes of work, including Irish nationals returning after a period in
employment in another Member State, have clearer and more expansive rights to
be joined by their non-EEA family members than Irish nationals as such. This has
come about because EU measures strengthening the family reunification rights of
EU migrant workers, and which embrace the situation where the family members
in question are non-EEA nationals, had to be made part of Irish law (are
‘transposed’). There has been no similar motor driving the development of
transparent and accountable procedures enabling non-EEA family members of
Irish nationals—who are returned emigrants from destinations beyond the EU, or
who never emigrated—to join their spouse, partner, parent, or whomever, in Ireland.
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A final reason as to why uneven progress characterises the development of policies
and administrative practice governing family reunification in Ireland is that many
measures the EU adopts, which touch on family reunification, do not have to be
transposed into Irish law. This is explained below.
EU Measures on Asylum and Migration and Ireland
The Treaty of Amsterdam was signed in October 1997 and came into force in May
1999. A new Title IV on ‘visas, asylum, immigration and other policies relating to the
free movement of persons’ gave the European Community its greatest compe-
tence to date in asylum and immigration matters (subsequent developments are
outlined in Box 8.2 below). The application of this Title to Ireland and the UK,
however, was made subject to the provisions of a fourth Protocol to the Treaty. This
was because the two countries had not participated in the development of the
Schengen acquis which abolished border controls between many of the
continental European Member States and because they wished to maintain the
Common Travel Area between them. Under the fourth Protocol, Ireland has three
months from the date a proposal or initiative is presented to the Council by the
Commission to indicate its wish to take part (‘opt in’). There have been several
measures taken at EU level on immigration in recent years with significant
directives agreed, for example, on family reunification, the status of long-term
residents, the victims of trafficking and the admission of students. Quinn (2005: 51-
59) provides a valuable summary of the EU measures to date and of where Ireland
has opted in or out.
As Quinn notes, there are other areas of EU legislation affecting migration in which
Ireland participates fully and that require action and legislative change in Ireland.
For example, measures which Ireland is required to transpose into its legislation
arising from the EU’s commitment to ensure the mobility of workers and free
movement of persons, have major implications for the non-EEA family members of
EU citizens (discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.2.5 and Chapter 4, Appendix 4.1).
Other areas of EU legislation include the introduction of a uniform format of visas
and residence permits (including the incorporation of biometric identifiers),
passenger data obligations on carriers, joint operations on border controls, and the
creation of an immigration liaison officer network. NESC strongly endorses the
current policy approach of protecting the Common Travel Area, contributing as
fully as possible to the development of more effective and fair policies and
procedures for third-country nationals and asylum-seekers across the EU, and
ensuring that new Irish legislation take full account of imminent European
developments.
8.3 International Experience
The experience of a number of countries in regulating migration is discussed by
the IOM Consultants. Key issues emerging from international experience are
highlighted here.
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8.3.1 Migrant Workers in Cost-Sensitive, Internationally-Traded Sectors
International experience demonstrates significant negative effects when migrants
are attracted into a country to work in cost-sensitive, internationally-traded
sectors. Given the intensification of international competition, there is very little
prospect of remuneration in these sectors improving and, indeed, a strong
prospect of future sectoral redundancies. The sorry story of much migration to
European countries in the second half of the twentieth century involved precisely
the attraction, and confinement, of migrants to low-skilled sectors which
subsequently suffered severe contraction in the face of international competition
and technological change. This left migrants economically and socially margin-
alised, giving rise to severe problems in the second and even third generations.
Later, the Council distinguishes between this situation and one in which migrants,
even low-skilled, work in sectors in which remuneration and conditions are likely to
increase with rising prosperity of the Irish economy.
8.3.2 Selective Entry Policies
The IOM Consultants argue that selective entry policies that focus on a range of
characteristics (age, education, occupation, language ability, association with the
country of destination and demand including job offers) support successful
integration for a number of reasons. First, there is extensive research linking these
characteristics to improved labour market outcomes for migrants. Second, there is
a further longer-term effect whereby the migrant communities that are formed
through selective migration are better endowed with human capital and better
placed to assist in the integration of future migrants. Third, selective migration
that is clearly seen to be economically beneficial contributes to positive public
attitudes to migration and this in turn contributes to the success of migration. The
Consultants cite Canada as an example of a country in which selective migration
policies have contributed to these positive outcomes.
8.3.3 Temporary Programmes
The rationale for temporary labour migration programmes (TLMPs) is that they
allow economic gains to both sending and receiving countries and allow host
countries to minimise any adverse effects on wages and employment opportunities,
especially if they restrict the employment of migrants to firms or sectors which
display labour shortages. IOM report that international experience with TLMPs
suggest that their theoretical benefits are hard to achieve in practice. Many of the
past and existing TLMPs—most notably the Bracero programme in the USA (1942-
64) and the Gastarbeiter programme in Germany (1955-73)—failed to meet their
stated policy objectives and instead generated a number of adverse, unintended,
consequences (IOM, 2006: 104). The three most important adverse impacts included:
s The exploitation of migrant workers in both recruitment and employment;
s The emergence of labour market distortions, and the growth of a structural
dependence by certain industries on continued employment of migrant
workers;
s The non-return and eventual settlement of many guest workers.3
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3. The slogan ‘there is nothing more permanent than a temporary foreign workers’ has been a popular summary statement of the
perceived failure of past guest worker programmes.
Proponents of the development of new TLMPs argue that innovative policy designs
could help to avoid past policy mistakes and generate significant benefits for all
sides involved, including migrant workers and their countries of origin.4
8.3.4 Permanent Programmes
A permanent labour migration programme is designed to admit migrant workers
on a permanent basis. Many of the traditional immigration countries, such as
Canada and Australia, have used permanent immigration programmes to attract
high-skilled workers as permanent immigrants with a view to their eventual
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The Employment Permits Act (2006)
provides a framework for a new system for
regulating labour migration. This box
outlines the Government’s proposals for
the new system, drawing on the speech by
the Minister for Enterprise, Trade and
Employment to the Dáil. One of the key
elements of the proposed system is the
issuing of ‘Green Cards’, as explained below.
The term ‘Green Card’ was first used in the
US. There is a difference, however, in what
a Green Card means in Ireland and the US.
In the US, possession of a Green Card
provides one with the right to permanent
residence in the US. In the Irish usage, a
Green Card is a visa which provides the
right to apply for residency after two years.
It is intended that the new system will
have three components:
s Pillar one is a system of Green Cards for
most occupations with an annual salary
over e60,000 and for occupations with
skill shortages and salaries between
e30,000 and e60,000.
s Pillar two is a work permit system for a
very restricted list of occupations with
salaries up to e30,000 and for those
occupations above e30,000 not eligible
for Green Cards.
s Pillar three is a re-established Intra-
Company Transfer scheme for temporary
trans-national management transfers;
Green Card System
The Green Card system will be for
occupations where there are high-level or
strategic skills shortages. The key features
of this new Green Card system will be as
follows:
s These occupations will be identified
after taking advice from the Expert
Group on Future Skill Needs and will be
reviewed on a regular basis.
s Green Cards will be issued for two years
initially, with permanent or long-term
residence normally being granted after
that.
s Green Card holders will be permitted to
bring their spouses and families to join
them immediately, and their spouses
will have the right to work without a
work permit.
With the implementation of the new
Green Card system the existing Work
Visa/Work Authorisation system will be
discontinued.
Box 8.1 Employment Permits Act (2006)
4. For a discussion of the need and policies for new and improved TLMPs see, for example, Schiff (2004) and Martin (2003).
naturalisation. Therefore, permanent immigration programmes are usually
accompanied by measures to facilitate the successful long-term integration of
migrants into the host country’s economy and society.The most common approach
is a points system which evaluates applications according to a range of factors,
including individual characteristics and the labour market needs of the host
economy. The best known and most well-established points systems are operated
by Canada, Australia, New Zealand and, more recently, the UK.
The Consultants suggest that Ireland needs a permanent immigration programme
to regulate both initial entry by newcomers and the allocation of permanent
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Intra-Company Transfer Scheme
This scheme is strictly for temporary
management level transfers within a
company or group of companies. This 
will allow for the temporary transfer 
of key management level staff from
overseas companies to offices in Ireland 
for a period of up to five years.
Work Permit System
The revised work permit system will have
the following features:
s Firstly, work permits will be required
both for occupations in the annual salary
range from e30,000 to e60,000 that are
not eligible for Green Cards and a limited
number of occupations below an annual
salary of e30,000 where there are
significant labour shortages; these
occupations will be identified after
taking the advice of the Expert Group.
s Secondly, in both cases a labour market
test, including advertisements in the
national and/or local press, showing that
the positions could not be filled from
within the EEA, will need to be met.
s Thirdly, work permits will be granted
first for a period of two years, then for 
a further period of three years. The fee
will be the same as now—e500 per
annum: in other words, e1,000 for the
first two year period, and e1,500 for the
following three year period.
s The legislative framework to be created
by the Act allows either the employee
and the employer to apply for an
employment permit, whether it be 
a work permit or a Green Card,
based on an offer of employment.
s The employment permit will be granted
to the employee and will contain a
statement of the rights and
entitlements of the migrant worker,
including that the employee may
change employment through the
application for another permit by a
new employer. This will provide 
migrant workers with greater freedom
and flexibility.
s The Bill prohibits employers from
deducting expenses associated with
recruitment from remuneration and
from retaining personal documents
belonging to the employee.
The Bill will introduce penalties for
breaches of the legislation, comprising
fines to a maximum of e50,000 or terms of
imprisonment not exceeding five years.
Source Based on speech by the Minister of Enterprise, Trade and Employment to the Dáil on 12 October, 2005.
residence status to migrants already employed in Ireland on temporary work
permits. The Government has decided to introduce a permanent migration
programme (see Box 8.1 on the Employment Permits Act).
8.4 NESC Policy Recommendations
8.4.1 EU Preference and its Overall Implications
As outlined in Chapter 7, the Council believes it is important that the principle of
preferential access for EU nationals is respected in Irish labour market. The
availability of potential migrants from other EU countries has been examined by
the Expert Group on Future Skill Needs. The Expert Group concluded that it is
unlikely that Ireland’s demand for graduates would be adequately addressed
entirely by the skilled labour supply from within the countries of the EU over the
period to 2010. They found that graduates in most EU countries did not have a
strong financial incentive to migrate to Ireland, based on relative earnings data.
The situation, however, was different for lower-skilled workers. The Expert Group
estimated that there are 23 million non-graduates in the EU 24 with upper
secondary education and who are resident in countries where the earnings that
those workers can achieve are 60 per cent of those available in Ireland. The Group
estimated that all of Ireland’s needs for low- and unskilled labour are likely to be
met from within the EU up to 20105.
It is worth noting that even with no designated work permits programme, there
would still be considerable legal low-skilled migration from low-income countries.
This would arise from people who can enter the EU as family members, students
with permission to work and people granted refugee status.
With the enlargement of the EU, there was a very large increase in the number of
people available to work in Ireland. The liberal policy on issuing work permits was
noticeably tightened in some respects on enlargement. The number of new work
permits issued has fallen from over 21,965 in 2003 to 7,354 in 2005. The Council
welcomes the reduction in the number of work permits following enlargement.
The protection of EEA nationals’ right to preferential access to the Irish labour
market requires the Government to effectively assess: (i) the current (and future)
skills needs of the Irish economy; and (ii) to what extent this need can be met from
within the EEA. The conclusion of such an analysis would have to determine the
minimum skills requirements for migrants to be admitted.6 However, as the IOM
consultants note ‘given the history of failure, this expanded labour market test
cannot be expected to be any more successful than that implemented before 
1 May 2004’ (IOM, 2006: 106). Below the Council outlines a number of other factors
to be taken into account in setting the level of non-EU migration.
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5. Notwithstanding this position on low-skilled workers, the Expert Group envisaged some continuing role for work permits. The Group
recommended that the absolute number of Green Cards and work permits combined should not exceed the number issued in 2005.
At present work permits are used by both low- and high-skilled workers.
6. The Consultants emphasise, however, that long-term forecasting of future labour and skills needs is highly problematic.
Council sees Limited Role for Low-Skilled Migration
The Council recommends that work permits should play only a limited role in
meeting Ireland’s needs for lower-skilled workers. It understands that the
intention of the Government was, and still remains, that employers would recruit
lower-skilled labour from within the enlarged EU.
A number of reasons can be advanced for issuing a small number of work permits.
First, legal provision for lower-skilled migration can play a role in limiting illegal
migration, although other measures are probably more important. Second, some
labour shortages may not be filled in a satisfactory way from within the EU. Third,
migrants from poor countries benefit from work permit programmes.
However, it should be noted that the Expert Working Group on Future Skills Needs
(2005) argues that migration does not really address labour shortages. While the
entry of migrant labour is initially intended to address labour shortages, migration
also facilitates economic expansion which, in turn, generates further labour
demand and hence continued labour shortages. This is a significant qualification.
Indeed, this mechanism may be one of the reasons why high levels of migration
are generally not found to weaken the labour market prospects of natives.
It is difficult to predict future labour market trends. It will be necessary to review
the future need for non-EU migration in the light of developments.
Creation of a Permanent Labour Migration Programme
The lack of a clearly defined permanent labour market programme for migrants
has been a limitation in Ireland’s migration policy and the Council welcomes the
Government’s proposed introduction of a permanent migration programme. The
new system is primarily a demand-side one in that a job offer is a core
requirement. It also has supply-side features as it is targeted at high-skill
occupations. The fact that Green Card holders will be able to apply for permanent
residence within two years and can immediately bring their spouses, who will have
access to the labour market, is likely to make the programme attractive to high-
skilled migrants. It would be even more attractive to skilled migrants if these
privileges were to extend to partners in stable cohabiting relationships, as is the
case for immigration to Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom.
8.4.2 The Quantity of Work Permits to be Issued
In deciding on the scale of migration to be facilitated through work permits, the
Council proposes that the following considerations be taken into account.
GNP per head and Cost-Sensitive Sectors
In its 2006 Strategy report, the Council argued that public policy should place a
greater value on increasing GNP per head (average income) rather than GNP (total
economic activity). This has implications for the approach to non-EEA migration.
Any migration that assists the viability of economic activity will increase GNP, but
not necessarily GNP per head. In particular, the granting of work permits to employ
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migrants in low-skilled work in cost-based export industries will not necessarily
contribute to GNP per head.7 The negative experience of a number of European
countries with migration of this nature has been referred to above.
Large Inactive Population
In deciding on the quantity of work permits for non-EEA migration, Ireland’s
employment rate and inactive population should be borne in mind. Ireland’s
employment rate has grown hugely to 67.6 per cent in 2005. This is above the EU
15 average of 65.1 per cent in the same year, but below the best performing
countries in the EU (Denmark, 75.9 per cent; Sweden, 72.3 per cent; the
Netherlands, 73.2 per cent and the UK, 71.7 per cent). Analysis of the employment
rates of different groups in the Council’s The Developmental Welfare State report
(NESC, 2005a) showed that Ireland’s relative under-performance compared to the
best practice countries reflected lower employment rates by women in general,
especially for women with lower levels of educational attainment and older
women. There is also a low rate of labour force participation among people with
disabilities. The Council is strongly committed to policies to increase the
participation of those outside the labour force (NESC, 2005a, 2005b) and
emphasises that non-EEA migration should not be on such a scale as to undermine
this objective.
Temporary Migration may become Permanent and/or Illegal
In deciding to issue work permits, it must be borne in mind that in Ireland, as in
many countries, temporary migration may have a tendency to become permanent.
In addition, in the absence of active return policy, work permits can be a route to
illegal or undocumented migration. People who enter on temporary work permits
can have them renewed and after five years in Ireland can apply for citizenship. It
is intended that Green Card holders will be able to apply for permanent residence
after two years. Thus, many of those who enter on a temporary basis may become
permanent citizens or residents. In granting employment permits of all kinds, it
needs to be borne in mind that there are long term implications and that what is
initially deemed temporary migration cannot be turned on and off like a tap.
Impact on Low-Skilled Wages
A large increase in the supply of low-skilled labour is likely to reduce low-skilled
wages and increase wage dispersion. The quantity of work permits should be set in
such a way as to avoid adverse effects on wage dispersion.
Other Channels of Entry
In deciding the quantity of work permits, it is important to adopt an integrated
view of labour market entry and keep in mind that there are several channels of
labour market entry other than work permits, as noted in Chapter 2. In addition to
EU nationals, who have free movement, the following non-EU categories also have
access to the labour market:
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7. There will be exceptions to this where the industry supports higher value-added elsewhere in the economy.
s Some students;
s Non-EU citizens who are family members of EU citizens;
s Spouses of migrant workers when the new scheme is put in place;
s Parents of Irish born children granted leave to remain under the scheme of the
Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform;
s Others granted humanitarian leave to remain by the Minister; and
s Refugees and family members of refugees.
The Interests of Developing Countries
Migration can potentially play a central role in contributing to convergence of
income levels between developed and developing countries. It has been argued by
Williamson (2002), a leading scholar of globalisation, that migration between
Europe and New World played a key role in the income convergence that took place
between 1850 and World War I among the currently-industrialised countries. He
further argues that migration between developing and developed countries could
potentially play a comparable role today:
If the OECD opens its door wider, the mass migrations would almost certainly
have the same influence on levelling world incomes and eradicating poverty
that it did in the first global century. It would help erode between-country
North-South income gaps, and it would improve the lives of millions of poor
Asians and Africans allowed to make the move. And it would help eradicate
poverty among those who would not move, making their labour more scarce at
home and augmenting their incomes by remittances, forces that were powerful
in the pre-quota Europe a century ago (Williamson, 2002: 32-33).
Williamson acknowledges that there is a downside to this process. While reducing
global inequality and poverty, there would be an increase in inequality within
OECD countries arising from a large increase in labour supply from poorer
countries. This was the experience in the New World a century ago:
Are we ready to pay that price? Perhaps not. Indeed we have seen how rising
inequality created an anti-global backlash a century ago, a backlash that
included a retreat into immigration restrictions that still characterize the high-
wage OECD today (Williamson, 2002: 33).
From the perspective of developing countries it would be desirable if Ireland were
to adopt a liberal approach to non-EEA migration. Low-skilled migration is
particularly beneficial for developing countries, in view of the surpluses of low-
skilled labour that they typically possess. On the other hand, the considerations
outlined earlier (including Ireland’s inactive population) all point to the desirability
of limiting low-skilled migration.
What is the appropriate balance to pursue? Ireland’s EU commitments require
giving preference to EU nationals and preclude a very liberal approach to non-EU
migration. A liberal approach to lower-skilled migration from developing countries
by any one country would result in it receiving a disproportionate share of this
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migration. On the other hand, some weight should be given to developing
countries’ concerns in migration policy. In accepting some non-EU lower-skilled
migration, there is potential for gains to developing countries. In addition, in
discussions at EU level on non-EEA migration, the Council recommends that
Ireland should seek to have the interests of developing countries in liberalisation
taken into account.
8.4.3 Improving the Management of Labour Migration
The Council believes that a number of policy and procedural changes could reduce
the risk of exploitation and enhance the experience of migrant workers in the Irish
labour market. The Council notes that the Employment Permits Act provides that
breaches of employment permit, employment protection or health and safety
legislation constitutes grounds for refusing to grant a permit.
Standards
The Council is strongly committed to the effective enforcement of employment
standards. It welcomes the provision in the Employment Permits Act, 2006, that
employment permits will be accompanied by a summary of the principal
employment rights of employees. The Council proposes that this include the right
to join a trade union and information on how to do so. The new social partnership
agreement, Towards 2016, includes significant commitments in relation to
employment rights, including the establishment of a new Office of the Director for
Employment Rights Compliance (ODERC) and the commitment to develop a code
of practice for workers in other peoples’ homes. Innovative possibilities from other
countries experiences to developing more effective compliance with labour
standards are examined in Chapter 9. In developing a new compliance regime,
there is scope to learn from these methods.
Training
Based on extensive international experience, one of the concerns is that migrants
who come initially to undertake low-paid work on a temporary basis may become
trapped in this work on a long-term basis. This can result in economic and social
marginalisation and, in turn, to conflict. The Council recommends that migrants
who are engaged in low-skilled work should, on certain conditions, have the
opportunity to undertake education or training that would facilitate occupational
mobility. It recognises that we do not want access to subsidised education to
become a primary motivation to come to Ireland (see Chapter 10).Tourism is a good
example of a sector in which provision has been made to facilitate migrants in
developing their skills and hence opportunity to advance within the sector.
In the new social partnership agreement, Towards 2016, there is agreement on the
need for a concerted effort to increase the levels of workplace learning and skills.
Furthermore, there is also agreement on the need to examine the availability of
workplace learning for, among others, workers from overseas.
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Sector-Specific Solutions
Most labour shortages are sector-specific, and this opens the possibility for 
sector-specific solutions. Sector-specific strategies are a possibility. For example,
mechanisms could be developed to allow government, employers, and workers
organisations in migrant-dependent sectors such as construction, catering, or
agriculture, to agree on policies to deal with current and projected labour surpluses
and shortages. Such an approach might combine attraction of labour from outside
the EU with policies to retrain local workers and, indeed, planning the supply of
trained workers, in areas such as health care. The Council recommends that the
feasibility of sector-specific solutions be further explored.
Incentives to Explore Alternatives
Ireland’s overall approach should include encouragement to employers to consider
alternatives to employing migrant workers from outside the EU. The Consultants
point out that an employer’s response to a perceived labour shortage will depend
on the relative cost of each of the available options. If the costs of employing
migrant workers are very low, employers will not consider other alternatives. ‘The
level of labour immigration in the interest of individual employers is unlikely to
always coincide with the best interest of the overall economy’ (IOM, 2006: 101).
In its 2005 Strategy report, the Council noted that international experience
suggests that the maintenance and enhancement of standards within the
economy and society can achieve its objective in part by reducing the demand for
labour at unacceptably low wages and conditions and this, in turn, can reduce the
supply of low-wage labour. A more extensive discussion of the maintenance of
standards is provided in Chapter 9 below.
Intra-Company Staff Movement
A particular type of migration to Ireland is the global movement by international
companies of key staff. This includes both senior management, who could be
transferred for a number of years, and specialised staff whose expertise could be
required on a project for a relatively short period. This type of movement had
been facilitated by the Intra-Company Transfer scheme but the formal scheme
was abolished in 2002. Some permits have continued to be issued on a discre-
tionary basis.
The number of people involved in this category is small but the ability to
facilitate staff transfers of this nature is an important aspect of Ireland’s attrac-
tiveness as a location for doing business. Hence it is vital that Ireland put in
place satisfactory arrangements to facilitate this type of movement. The
proposed reintroduction of the Intra-Company Transfer scheme could be a way
of addressing concerns in this area.
Visits Abroad by non-EEA Nationals
Migrants residing in Ireland, who are nationals of countries that are typically
required by other countries to have visas for the purposes of short-term visits, face
particular difficulties when travelling abroad. Such a non-EEA national would
require a visa for the country being visited, a re-entry visa to get back into Ireland
and possibly a visa for transit purposes. The time required to obtain the relevant
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visas can make it impossible for people to travel to meetings at short notice. There
are limits on the capacity of the Irish authorities to deal with these matters. The
aspect that is within the control of the Irish authorities is the re-entry visa. There
have been recent improvements in that applicants for these visas are now being
processing quickly and efficiently. It is now possible to obtain a multiple re-entry
visa for the duration of a migrant’s residence card. It would be desirable to examine
other ways of reducing the obstacles for travel of this nature.
8.4.4 Students from Outside the EEA:
Towards an International Education Policy
The Council believes that the attraction of students from outside the EEA must be
consistent with a well-articulated, international education policy. Within such a
policy, it is indeed beneficial to attract students to Ireland. They may be a source of
academic enrichment, generate fee income and other revenue and establish long-
term links with emerging economies. On completion of their studies, international
students can be a valuable source of high-skilled labour. The report of the Expert
Group on Future Skills Needs on migration endorsed the idea that international
students (both EEA and non-EEA) would account for 12 to 15 per cent of all third-
level enrolments.
The Council is concerned that this objective was—and to some extent still is—
undermined by some of the educational establishments attracting students to
Ireland. In some cases, the education offered falls short of what has been promised
and registration as a student has often been used essentially as a means of
accessing the labour market. Furthermore, attraction of students on those terms
may be a significant channel into illegal or undocumented migration.
Bringing students to Ireland generates both private benefits and external
economies. The external effects include the impact of the new residents on
Ireland’s economy and society (which may be positive or negative) and the impact
on Ireland’s reputation in the international education market. Since the right to
bring students to Ireland is granted by the State—acting on behalf of society at
large—it is appropriate that the education offered should be certified by a public
body (or a private association in which society has trust). This would constitute no
higher a level of regulation than applies to other traded activity. For example,
goods traded internationally must conform to product standards and services
traded must conform to regulatory standards. Consequently, the Council believes
that it is of great importance that public authorities and the education sector
define Ireland’s international education policy and ensure that any courses for
which visas are issued to students conform to it. By this means, they should
eliminate the marketing of sub-standard, non-recognised education from Ireland.
A report on the development of international education in Ireland was published
by an interdepartmental working group at the end of 2004. This report
recommended the development of measures to improve quality assurance in this
sector. It proposed the development of an ‘Education Ireland Quality Mark’ for
public and private education programmes of more than three months duration. It
recommended statutory regulation of English language programmes for courses
lasting more than three months. The Council supports implementation of the
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recommendations of the interdepartmental group. There is a commitment in the
new agreement, Towards 2016, to strengthen regulation and quality assurance of
language schools.
The availability of large numbers of students to undertake low-skilled work may
reduce the probability of building an effective coalition—involving public
agencies, the social partners, individual employers and others—to really address
the obstacles to labour market participation of Ireland’s marginalised citizens. The
urgency of creatively and collectively addressing marginalisation could be less if
the business and economic pressure for doing so is continuously relieved by the
availability of students from outside the EEA.
The Council welcomes the move to restrict the right to work to students who are
completing full-time courses of at least one year’s duration that lead to a
recognised qualification. However, the new measures would not appear to be
effectively implemented and the Council believes that this is one of the areas
where there is a critical need for more effective enforcement.
The Council is concerned at the lack of co-ordination that up to now has been a
feature of the system of student visas and the work permit system. Employers who
are refused a work permit could employ a non-EEA student without satisfying the
usual work permit requirements. Student visas were issued by the Department of
Justice, Equality and Law Reform without reference to the Department of
Enterprise, Trade and Employment.
The Council welcomes the Government plans to:
s Extend the work permit system to students; and
s To introduce a scheme whereby non-EEA students who have studied and
attained a sufficiently high level of educational attainment here, for example, a
primary honours degree or higher qualification, would be permitted to remain
in Ireland for a defined period in order to seek employment. It is envisaged that
on receipt of a job offer in sectors where skill shortages exist, a graduate
student would be eligible for either a Green Card or temporary work permit.
8.4.5 Family Reunification: Proposals
Perhaps the most significant area of Irish migration law and practice requiring
further development is that affecting family reunification rights. Non-EEA
nationals legally resident in Ireland, EU citizens living here and Irish nationals may
have a family member (spouse, partner, dependent child, etc) who is a non-EEA
national. It is, of course, more likely to be the case for non-EEA nationals
themselves and, unsurprisingly, they account for the majority of requests for
information and assistance with the process of family reunification (Immigrant
Council of Ireland, 2006). It has been the experience of many EU countries that an
inflow of third-country nationals for the purposes of work is followed years later
by substantial inflows of third-country nationals for the purposes of family
reunification.
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The Council is aware that family reunification is:
s An area of concern to a growing number of people in Irish society;
s A major influence on the well-being of many people (those in Ireland who are
without some or all of their families; the family members overseas who are
apart from their parent, household head, spouse, partner or whomever; young
mothers and their children in particular);
s A significant gender issue;
s Potentially the single largest channel in future years through which non-EEA
nationals will enter Ireland; and 
s Currently the source of significant anomalies, administrative delays and
inconsistencies in how people are treated.
The Council is also aware, however, that trade-offs can and do exist between
permitting prompt entry to the non-EEA family members of any person legally
resident in Ireland and the broader goal of achieving a managed and sustainable
migration policy which underpins Ireland’s major objectives for its society and
economy. On the one hand, granting prompt permission to non-EEA family
members, understood in a wide sense, to join their loved ones in Ireland—other
things being equal—enhances individual well-being, honours respect for privacy
and an intimate family life, aids the process of integration of migrants into Irish life
and adds to labour supply in a way that is more efficient than sourcing further
non-EEA nationals with no base waiting for them when they arrive in Ireland.
On the other hand, family reunification, which is not regulated as an integral part
of an overall migration policy, can give rise to a number of problems. Chain
migration may be set in motion if family members are admitted who have their
own dependants (e.g., older married children, married siblings, parents still
supporting siblings of the sponsoring migrant). The scale of inflow of dependants
may confine policy to playing catch-up rather than leading; after struggling to
cope—successively—with the surge in asylum seekers, rapid expansion of work
permit holders and major inflows from new EU Member States, family members
would constitute a fourth wave. Marriages of convenience may increasingly be
attempted. The pool of migrants willing to undertake lower-skilled work in the
economy may grow disproportionately. The proportion of the migrant population
with poor language skills and who are inactive could increase sharply,
compounding the challenge of integration. A higher proportion of the migrant
population with family dependants will increase their consumption of public
services. Perhaps this should not be seen as ‘a problem’, but as marking the end of
a period of significant under-consumption of social benefits, when many migrants
were young, recently arrived, and had few family members here.
The Council welcomes the identification of issues concerning family reunification
made in the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform’s 2005 discussion
document, Immigration and Residence in Ireland: Outline policy proposals for an
Immigration and Residence Bill (see Box 8.2) and the rich discussion to which its
proposals have given rise. It makes the following observations in the spirit of
contributing to this discussion.
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Given the complexities outlined above, a preference to rely on secondary
legislation and practice instructions, rather than primary legislation, in order to
respond more effectively to the diversity of individual family situations and  rapid
developments at the national level, is understandable.8 However, primary
legislation has the advantage of benefiting from wide debate within the
Oireachtas and the particular legitimacy that that confers; it also gives rise to
stronger entitlements and to arrangements whose stability and visibility aid
transparency and accessibility. Where secondary legislation, nevertheless, remains
the most sensible approach, the importance of transparency and accessibility
should be major concerns in how the procedures are designed. The more
individuals themselves can predict when their applications will be successful,
the less administrative time and resources are consumed and the less likelihood
there is of delays, inequitable treatment, and the perception of arbitrary or
inequitable treatment.
It is clear that a significant anomaly exists in how non-EEA family members of Irish
nationals are currently treated by immigration law and practice. Where Irish
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s Family reunification provisions to be 
set out in an accessible and transparent
fashion in secondary legislation or
practice instructions.
s A non-national entitled to reside in
Ireland on a long-term or permanent
basis should be entitled to apply to be
joined by his/her spouse and minor
unmarried children where the family
will be economically viable in the State,
subject to public policy and security
issues.
s The admission of family members 
in other cases should be covered by
schemes made by the Minister.
s The issue of non-marital partnerships
and same-sex relationships will be
considered and provision could be made
for schemes to deal with these in
accordance with the treatment of such
relationships in Irish law generally.
s A sponsorship scheme to allow un-
married children over 18 to join their
family members with long term or
permanent residence in Ireland is to 
be considered.
s Other circumstances to be covered in
schemes to be made by the Minister
include: admission of fiancées of
persons resident in Ireland, foreign
adoptions and the situation of family
members in the event of the death of
head of a family, marriage breakdown
or in the event of domestic violence.
s Consideration is to be given as to how
abuses of family reunification, including
marriages of convenience, can be dealt
with. Sanctions should be provided.
8. Primary legislation means Acts passed by the Oireachtas. Secondary legislation is not enacted by the Oireachtas but is the
responsibility of another party to whom the Oireachtas has delegated legislative power by statute, usually Government Ministers.
Secondary legislation usually takes the form of Statutory Instruments: there are five main types—orders, regulations, rules, bye-laws
and schemes. Generally, they facilitate legislation in relation to detailed day-to-day matters arising from the operation of the relevant
primary legislation.
Box 8.2 Proposals on Family Reunification in the 
Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform’s 
April 2005 Discussion Document
people have worked elsewhere in the EU for a period and return to Ireland, they
acquire the status of EU citizens who have moved for the purpose of work; the
definition of their ‘family members’ is broader and their entitlement to join the
Irish citizen stronger and clearer than in the case of Irish citizens who have not
worked for a period elsewhere in the EU (see Chapter 2, Section 2.2.5 above). The
Council supports the early correction of this anomaly and the extension, as far as
possible, to all Irish nationals of similar entitlements and treatment for non-EEA
nationals who are members of their families.
The Council notes the principle advanced that more favourable conditions for
family reunification should apply for people entitled to reside on a long-term or
permanent basis than for shorter-term residents.
The Council is aware that competitiveness considerations have prompted
extending family reunification to high-skilled workers immediately on their being
offered full-time employment in Ireland; while concern at the implications for
public resources mean low-paid migrants—earning less than the FIS threshold—
have to have completed three years legal residence before family members can
join them on similar conditions. While the particular economic and public resource
consequences of welcoming the family members of low-paid migrants have to be
faced, it is obvious that, at the same time, the human need for family reunification
does not vary with the skill or earnings levels of migrants’ jobs. The Council is
concerned at the degree of this difference in treatment. It notes the significant
principle articulated by the European Commission—that integration, generally,
‘involves the development of a balance of rights and obligations over time
(emphasis added) and that, thus, the longer a third-country national resides legally
in a Member State, the more rights and obligations such a person should acquire’
(European Commission, 2003). It believes that further discussion of the FIS
threshold restricting family reunification rights for low-paid migrants is merited.
For example, is it desirable that heads of families from outside the EEA should be
in Ireland for up to three years on earnings below the FIS threshold? If this is
facilitated, should some form of family reunification not be available to them after
12 months?
Legal and administrative support for family reunification should, as far as possible,
reflect considerations of the sponsoring migrant’s well-being and that of the
family member(s) in question. Non-EEA nationals legally resident in Ireland for
long periods for whatever reason (low-skilled employment or PhD students as well
as high-skilled work) should have their need for, and entitlement to, an intimate
family life acknowledged and protected.
The understanding of the family that shapes policies and practices on family
reunification need not be the same as currently shapes Ireland’s laws and public
services generally (e.g., on inheritance, tax, social welfare, etc.). This is already the
case with how the family members of EU migrant workers are understood for the
purposes of migration. In discretionary decision making, due acknowledgement
should be given to differences in the legal and cultural meaning of the family in
other countries (e.g., the recognition and prevalence of unmarried partnerships
and same-sex marriages in countries from which the sponsor of an application for
family reunification has come, the role of the grandparent in those countries, etc.)
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Notwithstanding this, observation of anomalies such as that EU migrant workers
in Ireland enjoy a wider definition of ‘family members’—for migration purposes
than Irish nationals themselves—are an example of the way in which migration
prompts discussion as to whether and how the definition of family in Irish law
should change. However, wider and deeper considerations must settle it.
There is a trade-off between the flexibility and responsiveness of administrative
practices in dealing with the diverse and changing circumstances of applications
for family reunification, on the one hand, and the transparency and clarity that
might be achieved by defining criteria in primary legislation, on the other.
8.4.6 Irregular Migration
The number of irregular or illegal migrants is not known, as noted in Chapter 2.
Very few employers have been prosecuted for employing irregular migrants. Of
particular concern are those who become undocumented through no fault of their
own. This can arise through employers failing to renew work permits, without
clearly signalling this in advance so that the work permit holder was in a position
to seek alternative employment. There are a number of possible ways of
addressing the concerns of irregular migration. One option would be a general
amnesty. This, however, would not prevent the problem re-emerging and would
create an expectation of further amnesties. A more limited reform is the proposal
of the Migrant Rights Council of Ireland (MRCI) to provide a temporary visa for
those who have become undocumented through no fault of their own. This would
provide an opportunity for people to seek employment and work permits and
pursue formal complaints against employers. The situation will be improved by the
fact that under the 2006 Employment Permits Act, the permit will be granted to
the employee so that the employee will know when the permit is due to expire.
The Council supports the recommendation of IOM that there should be clear and
effective procedures that penalise employers who employ migrant workers
without valid permits (IOM, 2006: 101).
8.4.7 Developing Countries: Other Issues
In discussing the quantity of work permits to be issued, we made reference to the
interests of developing countries (see Section 8.4.2 above). This section discusses
other concerns of developing countries.
The IOM Consultants point out that remittances by migrants make a huge
contribution to the developing world (IOM, 2006: 104). In many countries,
migrants’ remittances are more important than official development aid. A World
Bank study identified 36 countries in which remittances were larger than all public
and private capital inflows. One concern is the high cost of making international
money transfers. For example, the IOM consultants found that the cost of
transferring d200 to Nigeria was in the region of 8 to 16 per cent of the transfer,
depending on the institution (IOM, 2006: 186). These costs are substantial for
migrants who send money home on a regular basis. The IOM Consultants point out
that the loss of even d100 a year is the equivalent to the school fees for a child, or
food for a large family for a few weeks.
The international money transfer business is tightly regulated to prevent money
laundering and terrorism. The Financial Services Regulator regularly publishes cost
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comparisons of various financial services. It would be desirable to include the cost
of international money transfers in such surveys. Greater competition is needed to
reduce costs in this area. Efforts could be made to reach a voluntary agreement with
financial institutions to moderate charges as a contribution to international
development. Further research is needed to explore ways of reducing these charges.
There is a potential contradiction between development policy and the recruit-
ment of high-skilled personnel from developing countries. The IOM consultants
compare the ten countries to which Ireland contributes the most development aid
—mainly targeted at the poorest countries—with the top ten countries from
which Ireland receives migrants. These lists do not overlap, with the single
exception of South Africa. Nonetheless, there is potential for Irish recruitment of
skilled personnel to contribute adversely to brain drain in developing countries
(IOM, 2006: 179-180). The UK Department of Health has published a list of
countries from which health employers should not recruit. The Council
recommends the monitoring of the recruitment of high-skilled personnel from
developing countries to avoid adverse effects. One area of potential concern is the
recruitment of nurses from Zimbabwe and Nigeria. It would also be desirable to
encourage the return of experienced people to developing countries.
The IOM report highlights the potential role of migrant communities in
contributing to the developing of sending countries (IOM, 2006: 186-187). For
example, significant remittances have been collected in the US among the
Mexican community through hometown organisations or associations and
directed to specific village and urban or rural projects. Another example is the
Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA) programme. This programme was
established by IOM as a capacity-building programme to mobilise expertise
acquired by African nationals living abroad, making it possible for African nationals
to contribute directly to the development of their countries of origin. It is argued
by the IOM consultants that the potential of migrants to be a resource 
for development remains largely untapped by development agencies in Ireland
(IOM, 2006: 190).
8.4.8 The non-EEA Migration System: Reform Principles
In this section the Council outlines two key principles that it believes should inform
how the administrative system interacts with non-EEA nationals.
Transparency
There is a need for greater transparency in the procedures for dealing with
migrants. Everyone interacting with the system should have clarity about the rules,
rights and obligations. People should have sufficient information with regard to
the criteria for decision making in advance of their applications, so that they are in
a position to make an informed judgement on the likely success of their
application. This is often not the case at present. The Council understands that the
Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform intends to publish policy
guidelines that are used in decision making. This could be a very positive
development.
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Customer Service
There is a need for the departments and agencies that constitute the immigration
system to provide a more satisfactory standard of customer service on a consistent
basis. The need to enhance the level of customer service is acknowledged in the
paper by the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform (2005) on proposals
for the Immigration and Residence Bill. A particular concern is the long delays and
the lack of transparency often faced by non-EEA nationals in the processing of
applications. There is now a two-year delay in the processing of citizenship
applications. The volume of work has placed considerable strains on the system.
The establishment of the Irish Naturalisation and Integration Service (INIS) has the
potential to provide an enhanced level of customer service. Investment is
underway in IT systems that should provide the basis for better services. The
Council proposes the development of a customer service charter covering 
all aspects of the immigration application/registration scheme, along with
mechanisms to ensure its delivery.
8.4.9 Summary of Recommendations
The Council’s recommendations can be summarised as follows:
1. The principle of preferential access for EU nationals to the Irish labour market
should be effectively implemented.
2. The Council welcomes the intention to establish a system of Green Cards that
provide a fast-track to permanent residence for high-skilled workers.
3. Work permits have a very limited role to play in meeting the demand for lower-
skilled labour.
4. In the Council’s view, it is important that Ireland avoid the mistakes of other
countries in operating policies to attract low-skilled workers on a (supposed)
temporary basis. In particular, it is vital to prevent low-skilled migrant workers
being trapped in low-paying, cost-sensitive, vulnerable sectors. Consequently,
the Council proposes that consideration be given to a number of reforms:
• The statement of rights provided to work permit holders should include the
right to join a trade union.
• That migrants in lower-paid work would, on certain conditions, have the
opportunity to undertake training to support upward mobility; and
• Possible sectoral approaches to labour market shortages, training and
business development should be explored.
5. In deciding on the scale of migration to be facilitated through work permits, the
following considerations should be taken into account.
• In certain cost-sensitive traded activities there can be very limited scope for
improving pay and conditions.
• The IOM Consultants point out that ‘the level of labour immigration in the
interest of individual employers is unlikely to always coincide with the best
interest of the overall economy’ (IOM, 2006: 101). Work permits should not be
issued on the assumption that it is always desirable to sustain low-valued,
cost-sensitive export activity.
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• Migration from outside the EEA should not undermine the objective of
increasing Ireland’s rate of labour force participation to the levels that exist in
best-practice countries in the EU;
• People who enter on temporary permits may become permanent and,
consequently, the long-term implications should be considered; and
• Work permits should not be issued on a scale that would undermine work
standards.
6. There should be clear and effective procedures that penalise employers who
employ migrant workers without valid permits or employ people on student
visas contrary to the terms of these visas.
7. An integrated perspective should be maintained on all of the ways in which
people can access the labour market.
8. Ireland’s public authorities and education sector should define Ireland’s
international education policy and ensure that all institutions providing
education to international students comply with it.
9. The Council welcomes the identification of issues concerning family reunifi-
cation made in the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform’s 2005
discussion document, Immigration and Residence in Ireland: Outline policy
proposals for an Immigration and Residence Bill (see Box 8.2) and the rich
discussion to which its proposals have given rise. The Council supports the early
correction of the anomaly in treatment of non-EEA family member of Irish
nationals and those who have acquired the rights of EU citizens; and it supports
the extension, as far as possible, to all Irish nationals of similar entitlements
and treatment for non-EEA nationals who are members of their families. The
Council believes that further discussion of the restrictions on family
reunification rights of low-paid migrants is merited.
10. The Council makes the following recommendations in relation to developing
countries:
• The relationship between overseas development aid from Ireland, and
migration into Ireland from the developing world, should be further explored in
research and policy. Migrant associations should be encouraged to become
partners in development.
• The recruitment of high-skilled personnel from developing countries should be
monitored to avoid adverse impact on the poorest countries.
• The possibilities for reducing the costs of transfers of migrant remittances
should be explored.
11. There should be greater transparency in the treatment of migrants by the
administrative system. A customer service charter should be developed to
ensure a consistent high level of customer service across the administrative
system that deals with migrants.
12. There is a need to improve the availability of data on migration (see Chapter 12).
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Labour Standards and 
Labour Market Policies
9
9.1 Introduction
In Part I we reported the many impacts that labour migration has had on work
patterns and the Irish labour market and identified a range of possible further
effects. Here we discuss the labour market policies that are necessary to ensure
that migration serves Ireland’s goals, as described in Chapter 6.
One of the findings of Part I is that some migrant workers have experienced
unsatisfactory working conditions, including violation of Irish employment law—
although it is very hard to be sure how widespread this is. This is probably the most
widely-discussed aspect of migration and, consequently, we begin by considering
labour standards.
The Council’s analysis of migration and integration suggests that labour standards
are not, however, the only policy issue of concern and should not be considered in
isolation from wider labour market policy. The success or failure of migration
depends on how well the labour market works for both migrants and Irish citizens.
As argued in Chapter 6, it depends on whether migration supports a general
upgrading of the economy, skills and work.
Consequently, the Council believes that in addressing the issue of labour standards
we need to clarify our understanding of the role of the labour market in overall
economic and social strategy, and of the role of institutions and rights in the labour
market. For this reason, Section 9.2 discusses why labour standards are important
within the Council’s unified view of economic and social development and
identifies some implications of this. Section 9.3 outlines the Council’s support for
the ‘New Compliance Regime’ agreed by government and the social partners and
draws attention to some interesting international innovations in monitoring
labour standards and promoting compliance with them.
A central argument of this chapter—indeed, of this whole report—is that labour
market policy, in key areas, is one of the most important policy responses to
migration. Thus, Section 9.4 emphasises that labour market policy is also the key
context determining how we should seek to shape migration. Thus migration
would ideally be of a scale and composition that supports (1) an upskilling of the
resident population and (2) further progress in raising the employment rate.
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9.2 Why Labour Standards?
9.2.1 A Unified View of Economic and Social Development
As noted above, one of the main concerns about migration is that in a number of
employments there are violations of labour standards and employment law. In the
Council’s view, building an effective system for ‘enforcement’ of minimum
standards depends on a widely-shared understanding of why these standards
exist and why the whole of society should want them complied with. We do not
want enforcement merely for the sake of law. Why do we care about payment
below the minimum wage, non-payment of agreed overtime premiums, excess
hours, non-payment of holiday pay, unfair dismissal, unlawful deductions, bullying
and non-issuing of payments slips? Do we see compliance with these as a part of
national progress, or a burden on it? 
The answer to these questions can be found in our core goal—a successful society,
and our shared understanding of how that can be achieved in Ireland. Since that
goal and understanding were discussed in some detail in the Council’s 2006
Strategy report, we merely highlight three relevant aspects of it here.
First is the role of participation, work and the labour market in our vision of a
successful society in Ireland. Participation is seen as vital for individual well-being
and societal success. Work is a key form of participation and most work is
conducted through voluntary contracts of employment. Having made great
progress in increasing employment and reducing unemployment, Ireland has
further to go in increasing the employment rate and removing obstacles to partici-
pation which many face.
Second, given the reality of international competition, a particular challenge for
Ireland now is to upgrade its businesses, technology and skills. While the creation
of employment across the skill spectrum is a genuine part of economic and social
progress, jobs that are reliant on low standards are not.
Third, the two outstanding challenges noted above—further increasing
participation and upgrading—imply a new relationship between social and
economic goals. Now, the medium- and long-term strength of the economy
depend not only on increased investment in physical infrastructure and scientific
research, but also on a deepening of capabilities, still higher participation rates,
internal as well as external connectivity, more social mobility and successful
handling of diversity, including immigration (NESC, 2005b).
From every angle—individual well-being, social cohesion, economic dynamism and
competitive business performance—core labour standards and employment rights
are integral to this understanding of where Ireland’s interest lies. Compliance with
these standards, and enforcement of them where necessary, is a shared agenda of
government, employers, unions, social organisations and Irish society generally.
When framed correctly, they are not a burden on economic success, business
performance and the market order but are supportive of them. Their purpose is to
help businesses, employees and others to see where Ireland’s interest really lies and
help them in getting there (Langille, 2006).
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9.2.2 Implications
The argument developed above has a number of implications. These concern the
role of partnership, the evolving system of employment relations, the importance
of procedural as well as substantive norms, and the importance of wider labour
market policies.
Partnership
The issue of migration and labour standards, and measures proposed to address
them, are sometimes viewed in apocalyptic and dualist terms—as a portent of a
race to the bottom or a major threat to Ireland’s flexible labour market. The unified
view of economic and social development suggests that the apocalyptic and
dualist view is incorrect. The unified perspective accepts that Ireland faces many
challenges in the labour market and workplace governance and suggests that the
issues raised by migration should be seen in this context.
Adopting this shared understanding, Ireland’s economic, social and policy actors
are capable of addressing these problems in a problem-solving way. This is
reflected in the new partnership agreement:
The social partnership process has been reflected in the ongoing practice of
Government and the social partners as well as in the development of legislative
and regulatory frameworks. Insofar as the economy and employment are
concerned, a particular focus has been on improving the employability and
adaptability of employees, both before and during their working life. Similarly,
the positive management of change, dealing equitably with the fallout from
structural and other forms of change, provides a basis for high employment
rates in a competitive global market. The altered circumstances in the Irish
labour market arising from the decision to permit direct access by citizens of the
new Member States can also be addressed through social partnership, through
the attempt to formulate a shared understanding of the issues which arise, the
options for responding to them and the combination of public policy and
procedural responses which are most appropriate (Towards 2016, 2006: 92).
Indeed, not only is it possible to address these issues though partnership, but
national social partnership can be a critical support in finding a constructive
approach. This is so, first, because law and public agencies need to be mobilised to
address the labour market issues thrown up by migration. Consequently, a part-
nership involving government has advantages over alternative approaches. But
beyond that, partnership can be important in linking the actions of employers and
unions to larger and wider national development goals. The labour issues thrown
up by migration and globalisation can sometimes put employers and unions in
uncharted territory; because of this, both risk a loss of reputation and credibility
when they act unilaterally and purely locally on the more difficult labour issues
thrown up by migration. Experience shows that partnership, with government and
with each other, can help them to demonstrate to society that their actions serve
not only their own legitimate self-interest, but also wider social purposes.
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The Evolving System of Employment Relations
As stated above, certain substantive, legally-binding, labour standards are integral
to our idea of a successful economy and society. This has clear implications for
compliance with, and enforcement of, employment law. But the idea of a success-
ful economy—in which innovation and change are pervasive—implies that we
look beyond basic standards to the overall system of employment relations.
Although compliance with basic standards is indispensable, it is the general
quality of opportunities, work and employment relations that will determine
whether we achieve a successful economy and society.
In Ireland and other countries, many dimensions of employment relations are
changing simultaneously, reflecting changes in the economy, organisation,
technology, logistics and society. International research strongly confirms that
there are connections between the many changes in employment relations; these
changes include a move from internal labour markets, a transition from hierarchies
to flatter and networked firms, the changing coverage of collective bargaining, a
growth in the volume and complexity of labour law, greater reliance on individual
employment rights, and new systems of conflict resolution and mediation (Brown
and Oxenbridge, 2004; Teague, 2005; Stone, 2004; Piore and Safford, 2006). If our
guiding star is a particular idea of a successful economy and society (innovative,
participative, flexible), and our main method is joint problem solving (partnership),
then the focus needs to be on these wider open-ended changes in employment
relations, not just on compliance with a number of defined minimum standards,
important though these are.
Indeed, awareness of the overall, inter-related, evolution of employment relations
probably has some implications for how we understand and address the narrower
task of compliance with the basic standards set out in employment law. For
example, it suggests that it would be partial to focus only on the increased burden
of regulation, without acknowledging the declining incidence of collective
bargaining; to see increased non-compliance as purely evidence of deteriorating
behaviour by employers, without acknowledging the increased burden of
regulation and variety of employment relations; and to focus only on the reduced
incidence of collective bargaining, without acknowledging the increase in
individual employment rights. This suggests that the challenge for the social
partners and government is to jointly devise and implement a new compliance
model, focusing on effectiveness in promoting compliance, fairness and
impartiality, and ease of understanding and use.
The Continuing Importance of Procedural Norms and Standards 
As noted above, a number of substantive labour standards and employment rights
are integral to our understanding of where Ireland’s interest lies. But beyond that,
there are good reasons to focus on procedural rather than substantive norms
defined in statute. A central feature of labour law and industrial relations has long
been a combination of a few substantive norms and mainly procedural norms. The
primary procedural norm is, of course, the right to association and collective
bargaining—hence its place among the ILO’s four ‘core labour standards’. As
Langille says, ‘The distinctive point of collective bargaining is that it delivers what
no employer or state, however benign, can…offer to workers—the opportunity to
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participate, to create workplace norms and processes themselves’ (Langille, 2005:
430). Although migration has thrown up concerns about compliance with a
number of substantive, legally-defined, standards, our underlying goal is, in the
main, still best served by seeing labour market directives, regulations and rights as
creating the spaces within which local solutions are sought. This remains true,
despite the undoubted secular trend, noted above, towards legally-mandated
individual employment rights in most Western democracies. In most cases, these
are most meaningful when their real substance is fleshed out within enterprises,
by the joint efforts of managers, unions and employees. Although public institu-
tions have a critical role in securing compliance with those substantive standards
that are defined in law, and in assisting parties to achieve the ‘new’ individual
employment rights (such as non-discrimination), there can never be a substitute
for the participation of employees and employers in finding concrete solutions to
concrete problems.
Wider Labour Market Policy as Important
A final implication of the perspective outlined here is that wider labour market
policy is as important as enforcement of labour standards in making sure that
migration contributes to economic and social development. A number of aspects
of wider labour market policy—principally, the challenge of upskilling and further
raising the employment rate—are discussed in Section 9.4 below.
9.3 Achieving Labour Standards
9.3.1 A New Compliance Regime
The new social partnership agreement, Towards 2016, recognises the broad level of
compliance with employment rights across the economy generally, but emphasises
that there is, nevertheless, a significant shared commitment between the parties
to securing better compliance with legal requirements, underpinned by adequate
enforcement. It is also agreed that an effective employment rights compliance
system must cover:
s The active and responsible contribution of employers, employees and trade
unions;
s The education of vulnerable workers;
s The promotion of entitlements, with a special emphasis on workers from
overseas;
s Information provision to all employees and employers;
s Substantially strengthened arrangements for inspection;
s Adjudication by the Rights Commissioners, Employment Appeals Tribunal and
Labour Court; and 
s Enforcement of adjudication outcomes.
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The overall objective is to secure greatly increased public confidence in the system
of compliance on the basis of an informed and empowered working population,
who will have simple, independent and workable means of redress, underpinned
by the need for fairness and impartiality, with adjudication and, if needs be,
enforcement available to them in a reasonable length of time.
A major package of measures has been agreed by the parties with these aims in
mind, including the establishment of a new statutory Office dedicated to
employment rights compliance; a trebling in the number of Labour Inspectors;
greater coordination among organisations concerned with compliance; new
requirements in respect of record keeping; enhanced employment rights
awareness activity; the introduction of a new and more user friendly system of
employment rights compliance; increased resourcing of the system; and higher
penalties for non-compliance with employment law (see Towards 2016, Part 2,
Sections 13 to 16).
The Council endorses this approach. It sees it as informed by the shared
understanding of a successful economy and society and as providing the basis for
a joint problem-solving approach to both the narrow issue of compliance and the
wider issue of evolving employment relations.
9.3.2 Learning from International Developments
Based on the arguments outlined above, it is not the legitimacy of standards that
is in dispute, but the effectiveness of earlier approaches to monitoring and
enforcing them. In building and operating the new compliance regime, the Office
of the Director of Employment Rights Compliance (ODERC) and the social partners
might learn from some interesting international innovations in monitoring labour
standards and promoting compliance with them.
In a paper published by the Institute of Public Administration of Canada, Saunders
and Dutil review new approaches to achieving compliance with statutory
employment standards in Canada, New Zealand, the UK, the US and a number of
other countries (Saunders and Dutil, 2005). Among the interesting innovations
identified are:
s Partnering with schools boards, business associations, unions and NGOs;
s The promotion of compliance by sectoral business associations and sectoral
training institutions;
s Identification of accountants as a key new audience for employment standards
outreach initiatives, and the use of accounting firms as key monitors (see
below);
s The creation of websites that allow interactive use of information technology
to both assist in achieving compliance and employees in reporting violations;
s New Zealand’s self-audit tool for businesses, with which they can identify their
most important employment relations and Health and Safety issues; and
s Provision of information to students in driving schools, given that transport is
a sector that is traditionally responsible for a high proportion of violations.
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Saunders and Dutil suggest that a mix of tools holds promise for promoting
compliance with employment standards. While moving in new directions ‘will
likely require some temporary increase in resources’, once a culture of compliance
is established the rate of violations should decline; consequently, ‘the additional
resources may be needed only in the process of transition to the new context in
which everyone knows what the standards are, and that they need to be taken
seriously’ (Saunders and Dutil, 2005: vii).
Research by Fung et al. (2001) is interesting because it documents innovative
approaches to labour standards in some inhospitable environments—the
international economy and the informal economy. They argue that two recent
developments in the organisation of work account for many of the shortcomings
of traditional strategies for dealing with the problem of labour standards: first, the
increasing decentralisation of production into tiered networks of supply chains
that span the globe; second, the related recomposition of what is often called the
informal sector. Although these changes undoubtedly undermine traditional
approaches to inspection and sanction, Fung et al. show that they create new
regulatory opportunities. As regulators lose oversight, firms have markedly
increased their ability to monitor suppliers. Indeed, the same logistical and quality
standards that govern global production often govern subcontracting from the
formal sector to the informal sector today. The distance between the formal and
informal sector is thus not as great as it at first appears.
Fung et al. (2001) show that labour, environmental and health and safety regulators
have noted these structural changes and developed innovative programmes that
take into account the organisation of modern supply chains, the vulnerabilities of
firms that result from them, and new forms of public pressure generated in part by
the new regulatory regimes.
One example is the US Department of Labor’s ‘No Sweat’ programme, which has
raised labour standards in the clothing sectors of New York, San Francisco and Los
Angeles—where much of the work is done by immigrants in units employing one
or two dozen workers. Because large retailers and ‘manufacturers’ adopt ‘lean
retailing’ and ‘just-in-time’ production techniques, they open opportunities for
improving labour standards. First, regulators can stop business along the entire
supply chain by stopping it at any one point. The ‘hot cargo’ provision of the US Fair
Labor Standards Act (1938) gave them that power, since it makes it unlawful ‘to
transport, offer for transportation, ship, deliver, or sell …any goods in the
production of which any employee was employed in a violation’ (Fung et al., 2001,
p. 4). Second, the new business methods have greatly increased the information
and control which corporations have on sub-suppliers. A combination of their own
ethical commitment, public policy, consumer power and public pressure can make
them take responsibility for the behaviour of smaller suppliers. Fung et al. argue
that important innovations in environmental regulation and monitoring offer
encouraging lessons for those seeking to improve labour standards (see also Lobel
(2006) on new approaches to health and safety).
Important examples of these new approaches include the response of major
sports clothing labels, Nike and Adidas, to pressure from consumers about labour
standards in the thousands of third-world factories that supply them. They have
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adopted codes of practice, established foundations and instituted systems in
which their sub-suppliers must open their workshops for inspection by a range of
organisations.There has been a proliferation of independent monitoring and third-
party social certification programmes in both the US and Europe. Consulting and
financial auditing firms, such as Ernst and Young, Pricewaterhouse Coopers (PwC),
SGS International Certification Services, Cal Safety Compliance Corportion and
others have recognised this growing market and begun to offer themselves as
social inspectors. They perform thousands of social audits each year. In order to
allay public scepticism about these largely voluntary approaches (given the
international context), it has proven necessary to involve respected NGOs in
evaluating and certifying these monitors1.
The Council believes that, in developing and using the new compliance regime, the
ODERC and the social partners might learn from innovative international
approaches to labour standards and, indeed, innovative Irish approaches to environ-
mental protection,health and safety and food safety. While something can be
gained from more vigorous implementation of traditional approaches, in most
areas of regulation there are new forms of ‘responsive regulation’ (Ayers and
Braithwaite, 1992). These involve less reliance on ‘command and control’—with
clear fixed rules, inspection, condemnation and sanction—and more use 
of sophisticated monitoring with external oversight and, of course, the possibility
of sanction.
9.4 Migration and Labour Market Policy
The previous sections have clarified why and how policy must monitor and protect
labour market standards vigorously in response to migration. This section
examines the implications of migration for two more general goals of Ireland’s
labour market policy—raising the productivity of people at work and raising the
employment rate. It is clearly important that economic migration should
complement these twin objectives and not slow their attainment.
9.4.1 Raising the Productivity of People at Work
There is a growing consensus that the principal goals of labour market policy need
to be refocused in response to Ireland’s ambition to base the competitiveness of its
economy more on knowledge and innovation than on low costs. It is also clear that
a larger proportion of the increase in effective labour supply required to underpin
future economic growth will have to come from increasing the productivity of
people in the workforce than in the past, as the more ready sources of additions to
the workforce (women in the home, former emigrants, the outflow from the
educational system, and the stock of unemployed people) are now smaller. Both
observations imply that policies which raise the skills and competences of people
of working age are growing in importance relative to those which concentrate on
the education and training of young cohorts preparing to enter the workforce.
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1. Among these are the Fair Labor Association, Social Accountability International, Worldwide Responsible Apparel Production, Workers
Rights Consortium and Clean Clothes Campaign, based in the Netherlands.
There have been significant achievements and these should fuel the confidence
and ambition to make more rapid progress.2 However, the challenges ahead in this
area remain formidable. For example, over the 12-year period, 1994-2005, Ireland
doubled the proportion of its population aged 25-64 receiving education and
training to 8 per cent, but the Lisbon target is for 12.5 per cent by 2010 and the
Nordic countries are attaining rates of 20 to 30 per cent (Eurostat).3 Structural
features compound the challenge.
s Ireland’s relatively late expansion of secondary education by northern
European standards has bequeathed us cohorts of older workers with low
levels of formal educational attainment who are disproportionately employed
in sectors and occupations that make them vulnerable to redundancy.
s Our educational institutions have traditionally focussed on young people with
the result, for example, that mature students remain a small part of Ireland’s
third-level population by international standards and the average age of entry
to third level in Ireland is one of the youngest in the OECD.
s The average age of people in the workforce is rising and set to do so more
markedly as the large ‘baby-boom’ generation of the 1970s gets older. In the
2001 Census, for example, those on the verge of entering the workforce (young
people aged 15-19) outnumbered those close to retiring from it (adults in the 55-
59 age group) by 75 per cent. By 2036, the latter will outnumber the former by
15 per cent (even under the CSO’s most favourable scenario for births). While
this older workforce will be significantly better educated, the onus on it will
also be greater to assimilate new technology, respond to training, redeploy
within firms and move between jobs.
9.4.2 Raising the Employment Rate 
By early 2006, nearly two million people were at work in the Irish economy
(1.998m), almost twice the number of 1986 (1.075m). While ‘make-work-pay’
policies have played an important role in assisting this expansion, the availability
of a large labour supply was crucial. Up to 2003, the principal sources of additional
labour supply were women (particularly those with a Leaving Certificate) who left
home duties to take jobs, unemployed people who ‘signed off’, former emigrants
who returned home, and students leaving the educational system for the labour
market. Each of these sources of additional workers is smaller now while migrants
who are nationals of other states, particularly from new Member States of the EU
post-2004, have opened a ‘new frontier’ for expanding the workforce.
The largely indigenous sources of additional labour supply up to 2004 caused the
employment rate (proportion of the population aged 15-64 in employment) in
Ireland to rise markedly, from 53 per cent in 1994 to 67.6 per cent in 2005, a level
already above the EU 15 average (65.2 per cent). If it is to advance further, however,
to the Lisbon target of 70 per cent and beyond (it is 76 per cent in Denmark), there
are signs that the easier ground has been covered and the harder yards remain.
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2. For example, the ‘One-Step-Up’ initiative envisages every employee, starting with those who did not complete secondary school,
getting the opportunity to obtain a recognised qualification that raises them one rung on the National Quality Authority of Ireland’s
(NQAI) scaling framework; the National Training Fund and Skillnets; the development of a private training industry; etc
3. Based on respondents in EU Labour Force Surveys who state that they received education or training in the four weeks prior to the
survey (all education and training, whether relevant to the respondent’s main job or not).
Significant groups have been identified in the indigenous population, many of
whose members have a capacity, interest and need to work but who will only be in
a position to do so if policies actively and imaginatively address specific obstacles
in their way. These groups include people of working age in receipt of social
assistance for a status outside the labour force, persons with disabilities, particular
sub-groups of women, early school leavers, older workers, members of the Traveller
community and ex-prisoners. The first three of these are briefly reviewed below.
Social Welfare Dependency
The actual proportion of the population of working age in receipt of means-tested
social assistance has not changed despite the massive expansion in employment
(NESC, 2005a: 53). The numbers of recipients of the One-Parent Family Payment
and of Disability Allowance have grown by more than was sufficient to offset the fall
in the numbers receiving Unemployment Benefit and Assistance. The Council has
developed its case for social welfare reform in its 2005 study, The Developmental
Welfare State, pointing to the ways in which the assumptions and conditions
governing welfare payments to people of working age that developed during an
era of chronic labour surplus do not serve recipients in at all the same way in the
new conditions that now surround them. Much valuable work is now underway to
embody more positive expectations of people of working age who are able to
work. This aims to ensure that ‘work pays’ for them (including by identifying and
redressing new benefit traps) and that engagement with service providers
(childcare, education and training, etc.) is phased and required as the duration of
their welfare receipt lengthens (Department of Social and Family Affairs, 2006).
Persons with Disabilities
Some 11 per cent of the population of working age have a long-standing health
problem or disability and they are only half as likely to be in employment as the
total population in the same age category. Some of their lower employment rate is
inherent to their condition, but some is because education, training, transport,
workplaces and employers’ recruitment practices do not adequately support them
to exercise the work capability they do have. The National Disability Strategy is a
comprehensive effort by the public system to address the physical, institutional
and attitudinal obstacles in Irish life that have kept this large number of Irish
people from participating to their potential in society and the economy.
Employment data suggest that participation in the workforce of those with a
longstanding health problem or disability remains significantly lower in Ireland
than in Finland, France or the UK (Statistics in Focus, Eurostat, 26/2003).
Women’s Employment Rates
Further policy initiatives are targeting smaller groups in the working-age
population (early school leavers, older people, members of the Traveller
community, ex-prisoners, etc.). However, the single largest indigenous group
among which there is considerable potential for raising the employment rate
continue to be women.
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The rise in women’s employment rates from levels that were extremely low by
advanced country standards accounts for a major part of the growth in Ireland’s
labour force and employment levels since the early 1990s. By 2005, 42 per cent of
the people in employment in Ireland were women. Yet the rise in women’s
employment rates has more to run, particularly if Ireland were to aspire to reach
the level of the best-performing EU countries; the female employment rate was
58.3 per cent in Ireland in 2005, but 8 to 13 percentage points higher in Denmark,
Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands and the UK (Eurostat). Women’s employment
rates in Ireland are particularly low among women who did not complete
secondary school, for women aged 35-54, and one of the lowest in the OECD world
for women with two or more children below age 16.4 Several major policy areas
need vigorous development if more women are to have equal opportunities with
men in accessing employment and following a career. The commitment to add
another four weeks to both paid and unpaid maternity leave in 2006 and again in
2007, improves Ireland’s poor comparative position in this regard. Momentum
must be maintained in making Irish workplaces more family-friendly and
accommodating to people with caring responsibilities. The gender pay gap and
women’s occupational segregation still need to be tackled with, for example, more
strenuous efforts made to identify and redress the factors that cause women to be
concentrated in lower paying occupations and to have career paths that do not
reflect their educational attainments.5 Most important of all, the availability and
affordability of childcare must be significantly improved. This is without prejudice
to women who decide to look after their children themselves and for whom the
availability and quality of refresher and return-to-work programmes at a later
stage in their lives assume greater importance. Slow progress in addressing
childcare can impact on migration in two ways: it may make some migration
necessary simply to compensate for the potential Irish workers kept from
employment by their caring responsibilities; it may fuel the demand for migrants
to work as childminders at wages that price their services significantly below the
cost of formal childcare. Because of the importance of these issues, the Council
makes a specific recommendation on childcare below.
9.4.3 The Contribution of Migration
It is important that economic migration should complement the major long-term
goals of labour market policy—raising the productivity of people at work and
raising the employment rate. This complimentarity can and does occur, in multiple
ways, but it is also important to be alert to possible dynamics of a different sort
that could slow Ireland’s progress in meeting these longer-term objectives for its
labour market.
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4. On women’s employment rates by educational attainment, see NESC (2005b). On employment rates by number of children, see OECD,
2006: 34.
5. The issues are well reviewed in Chapter 3, ‘Gender Pay Gaps’, The Irish Labour Market Review 2005 (FÁS, 2006).
The positive dynamics can be simply stated and, in fact, they describe much of
Ireland’s experience with migration in recent years. High-skilled migrants who
work at the level of their skills, enhance the performances of private and public
bodies operating in Ireland in a way that is beneficial to the customer/client base
in question and, thus, to the full workforce. In Ireland, in particular, high-skilled
migrants have augmented the capabilities of internationally-trading firms (in
manufacturing and services), added to the capacity of public service delivery
systems (principally in health), speeded the delivery of programmes for upgrading
our infrastructure (civil engineers), and increased the scale and quality of R&D that
can be carried out in the country (fourth-level researchers).
Migrants who undertake low-skilled work also contribute to Ireland’s longer-term
goals for its labour market. They release Irish people—and, indeed, other migrants
employed in jobs below their potential—for higher-skilled work, including by
performing caring activities that otherwise keep people from realising the value of
their education in the formal labour market. In relatively low-skilled manufac-
turing, they enable export activities to remain competitive for longer and provide
additional time in which exposed sectors can restructure in a more managed
manner. In tourism, they enable Ireland’s largest indigenous industry to attain
scale and productivity levels that domestic labour supply alone would have
constrained. In construction, they contribute to restraining costs and cushion, to
some extent, the distortionary impact on Irish people’s career choices of unusually
high levels of construction activity.
Finally, migrants at work in both high-skilled and low-skilled employments
contribute to the achievement of a higher economic growth rate and stronger
public finances. They contribute indirectly, therefore, to making more resources
available for investment in labour market programmes of every type.
Negative interactions between migration and long-term goals of labour market
policy, however, can also arise.
The ready availability of high-skilled workers from overseas to perform key roles in
the economy and public services may reduce the level of investment in, and
pressure for reform of, domestic training systems. For example, while a welcome
expansion and reform of medical training is now underway, the large recourse to
migration to increase the numbers of junior hospital doctors enabled the
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Figure 9.1  Complementarity in Labour Market Objectives
More workers from abroad Raise skills and competences Raise the employment rate
implications of a major skill shortage to be avoided for longer. The Council
endorses FÁS’ observation that migration to meet skill shortages should not be
allowed to weaken longer-term policies for skills development:
It is crucial that immigration is not seen as the total solution to any skilled
labour shortage. An over-reliance on immigration may help support our
economy in the short-term but at the potential cost of hiding weaknesses in the
skills of the indigenous labour force which would prove detrimental in the
longer term. Instead, immigration should be used as a medium-term solution to
address labour shortages whilst allowing the Irish enterprise sector and labour
force to up-skill (FÁS, The Irish Labour Market Review 2005: 33. Italics added) 
The ready availability of migrants to do low-skilled work may make the attainment
of key labour market policy objectives more difficult in two ways. In the first place,
they can introduce a new element of competition for entry-level and other lower-
paid jobs in which the weakest indigenous applicants lose out. The migrants may
have higher educational attainments and the confidence that gives them, the
motivation to improve their English, the absence of family commitments
increasing their availability to work non-standard working hours, the greater
mobility within the country that is characteristic of migrants in general, and no
reliance on social assistance and—thus—vulnerability to benefit withdrawal rates.
Finally, they may more confidently view a relatively low-paid job as a starting point
than indigenous applicants. These qualities of migrants, in themselves, are
admirable and bring benefits to both employers and consumers/customers.
Labour market authorities, however, have to appreciate that migration increases
the urgency of reforms to address the difficulties of the weaker groups in the
resident working-age population.
In second place, the ready availability of migrants to do low-skilled work may slow
the process by which pay and conditions in certain jobs—where the scope for
technology to boost productivity is inherently constrained (e.g., driving buses,
cleaning hotel bedrooms, caring for children or older people, etc.)—come to share
in the overall success of an economy. The result can be a widening of the earnings
dispersion and the emergence of a two-tier labour market. This may have major
consequences for labour market policies seeking to influence the welfare/work
alternative (e.g., a growing demand for in-work benefits, pressures to reduce the
‘reservation wage’ of social welfare recipients, more ‘wait unemployment’ on the
part of young job-seekers, a lower take-up of training by people having to work
long hours or double-job). Even in jobs where there is scope for automation and
organisational restructuring to boost labour productivity (e.g., assembly-type
manufacturing, horticulture), ready supplies of migrant workers at a low wage
may postpone the necessary measures and contribute to the retention of activities
or sectors for which automation, outsourcing or relocation would be alternatives
more in keeping with trends in the economy at large.
Finally, while migrants contribute to economic growth and fiscal revenues, they
also generate a need for public spending, including on education and training. For
example, while the pressure on resources limits support for adult literacy to two
hours tuition a week over 30 weeks, new pressures develop to provide additional
English language teachers for the children of migrants in the school system.
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Improving the Productivity of Migrants
The Council commends the work of the National Qualifications Authority of
Ireland (NQAI) and FÁS in helping EU migrants meet Irish certification standards
and, thus, obtain jobs commensurate with their skills and abilities. It supports the
immediate access of EU nationals to FÁS employment services on arrival in Ireland,
but believes their participation on FÁS training courses needs to be monitored to
ensure that the up-skilling of the resident population and access to quality
training on the part of disadvantaged job seekers are not adversely affected. It
believes educational and training bodies should provide interpretation services
and, where necessary, technical English language training to ensure that migrants
entitled to their services get full benefit from them. However, priority access to
general English-language training at taxpayers’ expense should be for migrants at
particular risk of social exclusion (e.g., the legally resident family members of low-
waged workers) and in instances where the State formally assumes responsibility
for the integration of migrants—as when it grants refugee status or is supporting
their education as minors.
Childcare
The Council has noted the developed expertise and comprehensive coverage of the
City and County Childcare Committees and the solid improvements in quality and
training that specialist national bodies have achieved with and through them
(NESC, 2005b: 170-173). The supply of places was augmented significantly by 
the Equal Opportunities Childcare Programme of the 2000-2006 National
Development Plan (NDP) and the Council welcomes the speed with which the new
National Childcare Investment Programme (NCIP) 2006-2010 has taken over from
the EOCP, even before the latter’s completion. The Council, however, notes the
evidence which suggests that the availability and affordability of childcare is likely
to remain a significant constraint on the expansion of Ireland’s indigenous labour
supply over the coming years;
s As the numbers of older women available as informal carers gets smaller, the
provision of affordable formal childcare becomes a more critical variable
affecting the labour market participation of younger women (NESC, 2005b: 171).
s Over the five years that the NCIP aims to create 50,000 new childcare places,
it is estimated that the population of children under 15 will grow by 93,000 
(the M1F1 scenario in the CSO’s 2006-2036 projections). The expansion of
capacity in the community and voluntary sector, on which hinges the draw-
down of most of the NCIP funding, is a slow process and accounted for the slow
delivery of the EOCP.
s The necessary improvements in training and the development of career
trajectories for childcare staff, and in Ireland’s lowest wages relative to median
earnings, will, other things being equal, increase the relative cost of childcare.
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s Parents in Ireland faced the highest level of net childcare costs in the OECD in
2001 (Immervoll and Barber, 2005) and there is little evidence of any improve-
ment since—average household expenditure on paid childcare increased by 23
per cent over the two year period, 2003-2004, while Gross Average Industrial
Earnings (GAIE) grew by 10 per cent (CSO).
The Council urges the Office of the Minister for Children to keep childcare provision
under review and to remain open to exploring even bolder initiatives with all
interested parties should the availability and affordability of quality childcare not
show marked improvement in the next few years.
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The Challenge of Integration10
Immigration policy can never remain still because there are no durable solutions
in immigration, only trajectories. These are shaped by history and context, but
also by strategic choices, responses to situations that arise spontaneously, and
by the economic, social and institutional capacities that exist, or that society is
prepared to create. (IOM, 2006: 146, emphasis added)
10.1 Introduction
Critical to the integration challenge, in the view of the IOM Consultants, is building
a widely-shared vision of how migration might contribute to a dynamic, secure
and socially-cohesive Irish future. From this base, stakeholder alliances will emerge
and coherent planning can take place. In the absence of such a vision, policy will
remain fragmented and integration will be impaired.
10.2 The Consultants’ Approach to Integration
As noted in Chapter 6, integration can best be seen as a multi-dimensional process,
unfolding over a long time-horizon, generally seen as extending into the second
and possibly even the third generation.
Ultimately it requires the formation of some shared values and norms, but to
focus on this misses the point that integration is a process, and is not static. The
manner in which this process is conducted is as important as its results. Implicit
in this is the idea that values are by-products and not ends; the result, and not
the precursor, of living, working and playing together, particularly on projects in
the public domain (IOM, 2006: 170).
Furthermore they assert: Rather than focusing exclusively on such questions as
‘how do we become the same?’ or ‘how similar do we need to be?’—questions that
lead in the direction of social engineering—the government needs to pay
attention to the question ‘how might we best live together?’ (IOM, 2006: 169)
Beyond the high-level objectives that must inform strategic oversight lie the
practical tasks of integration, the everyday realities for migrant and host alike.
National government undoubtedly has a critical role in addressing the integration
challenge through the creation of overarching and symbolic frameworks that set
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out the rights and responsibilities of societal membership. It must also address the
nuts and bolts of the task, since the stuff of genuine integration is the stuff of
making a life, in all its aspects.
Accordingly, the Consultants contend that, at a minimum, social and economic
integration requires that immigrants:
s Be able to communicate well in the language of the host community;
s Be economically independent and able to find work commensurate with their
abilities and qualifications;
s Have access to adequate housing and transportation;
s Have access to critical services, especially health and education;
s Obey the law, respect democratic institutions, pay taxes and participate in the
political process; and
s Seek to develop an empathy with the society they wish to join.
The Council accepts these as a useful way of viewing the migrant integration process.
Given the scope and nature of the integration challenge, its lengthy time-horizon
and cross-cutting policy dimensions, overarching and active public policy
management will be required. Rather than define integration, the Consultants
identify three dimensions along which progress towards integration can be
measured:
1. Measures relating to socio-economic performance and civic behaviour that
focus on egalitarianism and equal opportunity, essentially measures of
conformity, comparing immigrant and minority outcomes with those of
‘mainstream’ residents;
2. Measures of structural integration that focus on the extent to which people live
together in a common civic space, and whether they rely on common or parallel
institutions, and 
3. Measures of values, attitudes and behaviours that compare migrants with
members of the host society in order to determine the degree of social
cohesion and solidarity that exists in society.
As the Consultants point out, social change invariably creates discomfort. It is
hardly surprising, therefore, that the profound changes introduced by immigration
and growing ethnic, racial, cultural and religious diversity can generate conflict and
reduce overall levels of trust within society, trust being a key ingredient of social
cohesion. Coping with these changes and with their effects constitutes a major
policy challenge for all multi-cultural societies. Ireland now faces this challenge.
Clearly there are many phases of integration, from the initial decision to migrate,
arrival, finding work and accommodation, to the longer-term process of family
formation and raising and educating children. At each stage within this long time
horizon, integration can be impaired or indeed stalled. Therefore, it should not be
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presumed that because the early phases of labour market integration have been
negotiated successfully, the later phases of integration will follow in some
necessary or logical fashion.
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Since 1999, the European Union’s
competence with respect to integration
issues has been enlarged. At the request
of the European Council, the European
Commission reviewed policy options for 
an EU integration strategy in its
Communication Immigration, Integration
and Employment (European Commission,
2003), and produced its first Annual Report
on Migration and Integration (European
Commission, 2004). This report mapped
the integration policies of Member States
and found that, despite diverse policies to
tackle integration, Member States faced
common challenges and needs.
Most recently, the European Council
announced a new five-year programme
(2005-2010) of work towards Strengthening
Freedom, Security and Justice Within the
European Union, known as the Hague
Programme (European Council, 2004).
Integration is one of five migration-related
areas of work, and calls for the ‘creation of
equal opportunities [for migrants] to fully
participate in society’. In addition, the
Hague Programme set out six common
basic principles for a European framework
on integration (European Council, 2004,
19). According to these, integration:
s is a continuous, two-way process
involving both legally resident third-
country nationals and the host society;
s includes, but goes beyond, anti-
discrimination policy;
s implies respect for the basic values of
the European Union and  
s fundamental human rights;
s requires basic skills for participation in
society;
s relies on frequent interaction and
intercultural dialogue between all
members of society within common
forums and activities in order to
improve mutual understanding; and
s extends to a variety of policy areas,
including employment and education.
Whether this new five-year programme 
to develop a comprehensive and coherent
approach to integration at the EU level
involving stakeholders at the local,
regional and national levels will be
successful, remains to be seen. Spencer
(2003) has noted that fear of public
resistance to migrants (and EU control over
their conditions of stay), the difficulties
involved in coordinating a large number of
directorates-general, committees and
national ministries, and the diverse
strategies being employed by member
states at the moment, are all potential
barriers to agreement on a common
strategy (ibid.). However, the Hague
Programme does provide impetus and
direction for national governments to
focus on integration as part of an overall
migration policy.
Box 10.1 EU Migration and Integration Policy
Ultimately, as the Consultants assert, for integration to succeed, migrants will
have to be seen as potential assets and not as charitable works or temporary aids
to facilitate labour adjustment. Anti-racism measures can, at best, produce
tolerance, which is undeniably important. But such measures are unlikely to
produce integration, which cannot be compelled or achieved through exhortation
or sanction.
As the Consultants point out, the recently produced National Action Plan Against
Racism (NPAR) offers a valuable contribution from which integration policy may
move forward. In this context, the Consultants are clear that anti-racism or anti-
discrimination policies, valuable as they are, are insufficient to encompass the
scope of the integration challenge. To be successful, integration requires
widespread societal commitment and this cannot be compelled.
10.3 The European Union Context for Integration
The question of integration has become an urgent concern of many EU
governments, with the EU gaining a degree of competence in the area of migration
and integration policy since 1999. Box 10.1 gives a brief account of the evolution of
this process. At the end of this chapter, Box 10.2 sets out a set of basic principles
adopted to inform the integration policies of EU Member States. They provide a
useful context within which Ireland may frame its approach to integration.
10.4 The Irish Migration Context:
A Favourable Time to Address the Integration Challenge
The Irish migration context has been set out in Part I of this report. It is one in
which migration is likely to be primarily shaped by EU free movement and, only
secondarily, by migration from outside the EEA. As noted below, this significantly
qualifies Ireland’s freedom to adopt migration and integration policies of the kind
used in the traditional countries of migration, such as Canada and Australia. These
countries see selective migration policy, focused on skills, as critical to setting the
context for successful integration policy. However, while accepting the very
different setting in which Irish migration must be managed, it may, nevertheless,
be useful to draw further on the experience of countries like Canada and Australia
which have such lengthy histories of migration.
While the Consultants consider that migration and integration policies always
pose complex challenges, they consider Ireland fortunate (and wise) to be tackling
these issues in the present economic circumstances. They assert that considerable
evidence correlates public acceptance of migration and tolerance of diversity with
a strong economy. Indeed, even the Canadian experience shows that public
support for immigration is inversely related to unemployment. The higher
unemployment rises, the more immigration is seen as a zero-sum game—that
there is a fixed pool of jobs and that immigrant gains occur at the expense of
employment of the locally-born population.
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Ireland’s recent economic success has increased the diversity of cultures in its
society. Ireland necessarily faces a steep learning curve, regarding the challenges
and tensions which arise for such societies. In this context, however, it should not
be forgotten that the process of transformation and development which has taken
place over recent decades in Ireland has, at times, itself involved significant
conflict, as well as unease with respect to social change. In many ways, migration
may best be understood as the latest phase of this process of transformation. If this
view is accepted, migration and the integration challenge which it entails, must
receive the requisite degree of policy focus, and indeed resources.
The story of Ireland’s own development over recent decades is critical to
understanding the dynamics now driving migration. Ireland, once a place people
were compelled to leave through lack of opportunity, is now a place to which they
come because of the opportunities which exist. People come to participate; in
doing so, they assist in building opportunity for themselves and the country as a
whole. Just as for generations Irish people have gone to America seeking
opportunities unavailable to them at home, Ireland has now become, in its own
way, a place of opportunity. This need not be a threat but a demonstration of how
far we have already travelled along the road of transformation and development.
Adjustment and change are a prerequisite of integration. However, in and of
themselves, adjustment and change are not new. They have been central
throughout Ireland’s transformation.
Perhaps it is also useful to note that the greatest adjustment is that experienced
by migrants themselves. For integration to genuinely occur, however, the challenge
of adjustment and adaptation must be met by the host community also.
10.5 The Elements of Integration Policy
The role of government is critical to meeting the challenge of integration.
Government must actively lead the process of creating the broad vision and
widespread ‘buy in’ which is essential to making a success of integration. However,
as the Consultants point out, genuine integration is truly the achievement of civil
society. Therefore, a range of actors must work together to achieve this outcome:
public bodies, employers, trade unions, non-governmental organisations (NGOs),
families and individuals.
10.5.1 The Role of Civil Society
Integration happens in the workplace, in schools, in the context of social and
sporting events, and in the places where people live. Given its scope and context, it
is beyond the capacity of government to ‘make integration happen’; it cannot
compel integration nor can it legislate for it. It will happen because people, long-
term resident and newcomer alike, consider it essential to ensure a worthwhile
and cohesive future. The process which will give rise to integration will take time,
given the rapidity of the transformation which has occurred in the country, and
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time and space should be given for people to understand the changes taking place
and to appreciate their potential to assist in further enhancing the opportunities
and quality of life for everyone.
The Taskforce on Active Citizenship has been established to consider the level and
nature of active citizenship in different areas of Irish life and what it means to be
a citizen in today’s Ireland. One of the questions posed in its consultation
document is ‘how can active citizenship help to include newcomers in a changing
Ireland?’1 Growing diversity of cultures, lifestyles and backgrounds calls for greater
attention to the underlying common purpose and shared values which are critical
to democracy and social cohesion, and the nature of rights and responsibilities that
accompany citizenship. The conclusions of the Taskforce are also likely to be
relevant in framing policy to assist the integration of newcomers.
10.5.2 The Role of Non-Governmental Organisations and Local Action
State support is often secondary to the actions of local migrant organisations and
other NGOs. These play a role in welcoming immigrants and helping them to
integrate, i.e. to find work, to learn the language of the host community, to register
children for school and so forth. Given these realities, the Consultants advise the
devolution of settlement services to the local level. They consider that this
approach tends to achieve better results than those achieved by government
working alone. For this reason, one of the main tasks for government in the area of
integration is to facilitate community action.
If community organisations are to play a larger role in migrant integration, their
capacity to consult, to plan, to implement ideas and to deliver services will need to
be expanded. This will require sustained support by government and the develop-
ment of a more mature working relationship across the sector, characterized by
better coordination among NGOs and more effective ties with government
departments and agencies.
In its engagement with the NGO sector, as in its policy making within the public
services generally, the Government must maintain a strategic overview of its
objectives regarding integration; this overview should inform decisions regarding
service provision.
10.5.3 Migrant Families and Communities as the Focus of Policy Effort
In the Consultant’s view, migration policy largely addresses itself to individuals, but
they consider that a strong case can be made for policy to focus also on family
units and communities. Migration decisions tend to be made by families who send
their ‘strongest’ applicants ahead in order to establish a foothold. Other members
then follow within a period of some five years. Research also confirms that the
family is the principal medium that newcomers rely on for information about jobs,
location and services (Ruddick, 2003). This suggests that, in some instances, the
family, rather than individual migrants, is the more appropriate unit of analysis for
gauging the success of integration policy.
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1. www.activecitizen.ie
The Consultants also highlight recent suggestions that policy should target
communities as a whole rather than just individuals or even families. There is a
clear logic to this approach, since established members of immigrant communi-
ties, having been in the country for some time, are aware of local conditions, have
amassed physical and social capital and have established ties with the native
population. These assets are important for integrating new arrivals. Canadian
longitudinal research shows that migrants rely on friends and family above all
other sources in choosing their destinations, locating housing, securing jobs,
obtaining information about educational opportunities and accessing healthcare
(Ruddick, 2003). Thus, with the necessary supports migrant communities can
greatly assist the integration effort.
10.6 Mainstream Service Provision
The elements of integration policy as already outlined have clear implications for
the provision of services to migrants. Most fundamental of all is the need to ensure
that migrants are enabled to access mainstream services.
10.6.1 Adaptation and Capacity Building in Mainstream Services
Integration poses specific challenges for social policy. Public services, indeed all
services supported by public funds, should be widely accessible to migrant and host
alike. Mainstream provision must be the primary goal of policy. In order to make this
approach meaningful, significant capacity building within mainstream provision
will be necessary. This issue is more fully explored in Chapter 11.
The overarching goal of integration in all its dimensions should inform and shape
the provision of public services. This, of necessity, requires that services be accessed
by, and accessible to, migrants on broadly the same terms as they are available to
the host community. Every effort should be made to avoid funding or service
provision models which encourage the establishment of separate services, since
this runs counter to the whole thrust of the integration effort.
Another risk is that certain services or institutions, while officially part of the
mainstream, become associated in the public mind, largely with migrants, such
that certain schools, localities or indeed employments are seen as migrant services,
areas or employments. International experience suggests that such outcomes, if
they were to persist, would fundamentally damage the prospects for integration
resulting in the type of segmentation and spatial separation which has become
common across Europe.
Only if a widespread ‘buy in’ is achieved, actively led by the Government and the
social partners, will it be possible to ensure that migration meets wider economic
and societal goals.
A delicate balancing of rights and obligations will be required, one, moreover,
which we will not always get right. Integration is a policy with a long and ever-
expanding horizon. It lacks a terminus, but its progress can nevertheless be
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managed and evaluated. In the simplest terms, we will know integration when we
see it, it will have delivered an increasingly prosperous and fulfilling future in
which all, migrant and host, can share.
10.6.2 Language Competency
A compelling case exists for viewing language competency as a fundamental
cornerstone of integration policy. Inability to communicate in the local language
makes all other integration efforts difficult to execute and of limited value.
Language competency is, therefore, an essential prerequisite of integration.
Language training has begun to receive greater attention even in countries with
long traditions of migration, such as the USA, Canada and Australia. Several
countries, including the USA, have committed increased resources to ensuring
greater migrant competence in English.
Research in Australia supports the importance of language competency in
sustaining good labour market outcomes for migrants as well as assisting with the
broader integration effort. In line with Australian experience, the Canadian
authorities have recently adjusted their entry requirements, giving language
competency a higher priority for those wishing to migrate.
Given this well-documented experience, it may be advisable, in the case of non-
EEA migration, to make English language competency an entry requirement, or, at
the very least to place a strong onus on employers, wishing to recruit non-EEA
workers, to ensure that language training is made available. Indeed, much of the
literature on this issue emphasises the role of employer-based language training
as critical to language acquisition.
Given Ireland’s strong reliance on EEA migrants, mainly from the new Member
States of the EU, a focus on raising language competency amongst migrants
already in the country should be a priority.
The Consultants emphasise the importance of addressing the needs of all
migrants, and not simply those currently in the labour force. Therefore, language
training should be available as widely as possible, with a strong focus on the
language training needs of migrant family members not currently in the
workforce. Indeed, for many, increased competency in the local language may have
the all important by-product of opening up labour market participation.
The NGO sector will be a critical partner in the task of providing teaching and
services to support language training, perhaps particularly for those currently
outside the workforce. It will be important to see that these organisations
receive the necessary support to ensure the quality of language instruction
which they offer.
Given the centrality of language to the integration effort it may be wise to co-
ordinate and streamline funding, to achieve best outcomes with the resources
applied. Broadening and strengthening the skills and expertise required to achieve
good outcomes for adult learners, particularly those learning English as a second
language, will be essential.
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A somewhat separate challenge faces schools in addressing the needs of migrant
children who require specific language support and training; this is addressed in
Chapter 11.
10.7 Citizenship and Long-Term Residency
Currently, naturalisation, after a period of five years residence, is the sole route to
legitimate long-term residency in Ireland. Naturalisation is the process by which an
individual becomes an Irish citizen. A possible consequence of naturalisation for
the applicant is the loss of legal ties to their country of origin, since many countries
do not allow their nationals to hold citizenship of another state.
It is also important to avoid a situation where administrative processes result in
the devaluation of the status of citizenship. In this context, it is perhaps wise to
have a route to long-term residency which does not require the applicant to
become a citizen. The Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform’s discussion
document (Immigration and Residency in Ireland, 2005) proposes the introduction
of a long-term residency status, for which an individual could apply after five years
residence in the State. It would confer on its holder a high level of entitlement to
public services. In addition holders could only be removed from the State in clearly
specified circumstances.
The Council endorse these proposals, viewing this as an important way in which
the status of long-term residents can be protected.
Voting Rights in Ireland
Participation in the various levels of the political process is a powerful demon-
stration of growing integration into the life of a society. Currently, UK citizens in
Ireland can vote in all elections other than those to elect the president. EU
nationals may vote in European Parliamentary elections and local elections. Non-
EEA nationals can vote in local elections. It is important to ensure that people are
fully aware of their voting rights and that they are actively encouraged to use the
franchise and participate in this vital area of civic life.
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1. Integration is a dynamic, two-way
process of mutual accommodation by
all immigrants and residents of
Member States.
2. Integration implies respect for the basic
values of the European Union.
3. Employment is a key part of the
integration process and is central to 
the participation of immigrants, to 
the contributions immigrants make 
to the host society, and to making 
such contributions visible.
4. Basic knowledge of the host society’s
language, history, and institutions is
indispensable to integration; enabling
immigrants to acquire this basic
knowledge is essential to successful
integration.
5. Efforts in education are critical to
preparing immigrants, and particularly
their descendants, to be more successful
and more active participants in society.
6. Access for immigrants to institutions,
as well as to public and private 
goods and services, on a basis equal 
to national citizens and in a non-
discriminatory way is a critical
foundation for better integration.
7. Frequent interaction between
immigrants and Member State 
citizens is a fundamental mechanism
for integration. Shared forums,
intercultural dialogue, education about
immigrants and immigrant cultures,
and stimulating living conditions in
urban environments enhance the
interactions between immigrants and
Member State citizens.
8. The practice of diverse cultures and
religions is guaranteed under the
Charter of Fundamental Rights and
must be safeguarded, unless practices
conflict with other inviolable European
rights or with national law.
9. The participation of immigrants in 
the democratic process and in the
formulation of integration policies and
measures, especially at the local level,
supports their integration.
10. Mainstreaming integration policies
and measures in all relevant policy
portfolios and levels of government
and public services is an important
consideration in public-policy
formation and implementation
11. Developing clear goals, indicators and
evaluation mechanisms are necessary
to adjust policy, evaluate progress on
integration and to make the exchange
of information more effective.
Box 10.2 The Common Basic Principles adopted by the European Union
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Adapting Social Policy11
11.1 Introduction
Successfully adapting social policy to the needs of a growing and increasingly
diverse population will be critical to the success of migration. It is essential that
social policy adaptation conforms with Ireland’s wider goals as set out in Chapter 6.
How do we plan services and address infrastructural deficits in a context of
substantial uncertainty? This is the challenge facing Irish public policy. We do not
currently know the long-term settlement intentions of migrants, nor what the
scale of future migration flows may be. Recent CSO estimates of population up to
2036 contain a variance, due to migration, of between 535,000 and 561,000.
It is too early to know how long most migrants will remain or if they will settle
permanently. A wide range of factors, yet to be clarified, are likely to impact on
their decisions in this regard, including improvements in the economic prospects
in their home country, future EU enlargements, as well as the economic outlook in
the larger EU economies, particularly Germany.
Clearly policy cannot await the resolution of these uncertainties. Nor can they be
allowed to paralyse decision making with respect to the development of new
services or the broadening of current provision to address the needs of migrants.
Indeed it should perhaps now be acknowledged that problems with services and
infrastructure, frequently highlighted in recent years, can in part be attributed to
an overly cautious and conservative approach to public provision. This has resulted
in substantial ongoing service bottlenecks.
A weak tradition of planning, a poor recent track-record on project delivery,
coupled with the uncertainties which migration itself generates, may risk a policy
response which is lacking in ambition. The consequences of such an approach will
be felt throughout the population as we continually play catch-up regarding the
provision of services and infrastructure, in the face of a public perception that our
increased prosperity may never generate a quality dividend.
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11.2 Overarching Policy Challenges
The social policy challenge of migration can be assessed along two key dimensions.
The first is the challenge of scale; how many school places, health facilities etc will
be required? Secondly, the challenge of diversity; how do we build services which
are culturally competent and responsive to the needs of an increasingly diverse
population? These challenges will present themselves differently across the
spectrum of service provision. Table 11.1 below sets out a template onto which the
challenges in each service area may be mapped.
In education, the immediate challenge will be building for diversity. However,
challenges of scale, while localised, will also arise. By contrast, issues of scale will
be more acutely felt with regard to the provision of adequate housing.
Using the framework of scale and diversity, this chapter addresses the broad
challenges for successful social policy adaptation. The intention is not to offer
prescriptions for specific fields, but rather to highlight the overall context for policy
making, as well as address some emerging cross-cutting policy issues.
The growing scale and diversity of the population provide the overarching context
for future policy making. It will provide many opportunities for the development of
services and facilities which Ireland’s small, and until quite recently, largely static
or declining population could not support. It is an exciting moment of
transformation which, if well managed, can bring better, more adaptable services,
staffed by people who feel increasingly confident in their ability to address the
needs of a more diverse Ireland.
If the requirements of integration, set out in Chapter 10, are to be met then the
Irish social policy system faces a clear challenge. Mainstream services must
become increasingly adaptable and culturally competent in their response to
service users. To facilitate the achievement of such change, significant new
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Table 11.1 Mapping the Adaptation Challenge for Social Policy
Scale Diversity
Ways in which increased Ways in which diversity 
population requires requires adaptation 
changes in social policy of social policy
Education
Health and welfare
Housing
Social Welfare
training inputs for current, as well as future, staff will be required. In addition, the
scope and nature of many services will need to be broadened to take account of
growing diversity in the population.
Much of the social policy adaptation to meet the migration challenge can improve
the quality of services for the population as a whole. Thus, improved data
gathering and service planning, clarity about service entitlement and provision,
will all assist both migrant and indigenous service users. In addition, greater
cultural adaptation and sensitivity will improve the way in which all public service
users experience their encounter with service providers.
11.2.2 Data Gathering 
There is a definite need to increase the quality and flow of data across the public
policy system. As with much else, this represents a requirement for an increasingly
complex society. However, migration strongly underlines the urgency with which
this task must be tackled. Ways must be developed to ensure that not only central
government systems can and do talk to one another, but that those of local
government as well as the voluntary sector are closely integrated into system-wide
approaches, increasingly seen to provide well-planned and timely services at all
levels. In this regard it should be noted that the Department of Environment,
Heritage and Local Government is committed, under the terms of the new
partnership agreement, Towards 2016, to improvements in consumer information
in relation to housing, along with development of a more comprehensive and
objective means of assessing need on an on-going basis. This will be done in
conjunction with local government as well as the voluntary and co-operative
housing sector.
Many of the issues raised here have already been dealt with in research
undertaken by the CSO on behalf of the National Statistics Board (CSO, 2003).
Perhaps the urgency of the migration challenge and the vital importance of quality
data systems and channels required to address migration, will provide the
necessary impetus to ensure that this important project moves ahead rapidly. This
issue is returned to in Chapter 12, Section 12.3.5 below.
11.2.3 Information on Services and Entitlements
In addition to the data issue, there is an information challenge in respect of service
users. Given their predominantly recent arrival in Ireland, migrants may be at a
disadvantage in attempting to access services. From the perspective of the migrant
it is essential that they have a clear idea of what services are available to them and
what are the conditions of eligibility. Increased transparency and clarity regarding
entitlements is essential.
The picture regarding service entitlements is complex. However, this complexity in
the main mirrors the complex system of entitlements which exists for social
provision in Ireland, regardless of status. As it makes clear in The Developmental
Welfare State, (NESC, 2005a), the Council favours this differentiated entitlement
structure, seeing it as a broadly beneficial feature of Ireland’s social policy mix; this
is, of course, subject to all citizens having access to core services. Issues of
migration do, however, add a further layer of complexity to this picture. Given this
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complexity, however, it is essential that staff making decisions in respect of service
entitlement are themselves fully informed and that they ensure that decision
making is seen as fair, consistent and transparent.1
While the goal of local language competency is a core principle of integration,
some translation requirements, particularly for certain critical services, do exist.
This requirement is particularly acute within the fields of health, policing and
justice and labour standards (but may on occasion arise for other services). Clearly,
it is essential that medical and other health staff can establish an accurate and
timely diagnosis of a person’s illness or other service requirements. Equally, in the
field of policing and justice it is essential that those who may be questioned,
arrested or charged fully understand the nature of the proceedings. A pilot
translation project, to meet the needs of general practitioners, is already in place in
the Health Services Executive (HSE) Eastern region. Given the need to ensure the
quality and consistency of translation services it may be necessary to establish a
translation unit. Models of provision will need to be explored2.
Regarding the translation of documentation, while certain essential documents
undoubtedly require translation, such as information on medical emergencies,
health and safety information, census forms, the norm should be to ensure that
documents are written in clear and understandable English rather than expending
resources on widespread translation.
11.2.4 Management, Staffing and Training in the Public Services 
Managers in the public services must lead the process of adaptation, informing
themselves in the first instance regarding its requirements, as well as shaping the
nature of the responses forthcoming from their organisations.
The widening of staff recruitment along with the development of cultural
competency for all staff is a priority. While different cultural practices regarding
health and childcare suggest this will be an area requiring particular training
inputs, raising cultural awareness and building cultural competency should
become a priority across all services. It is important that staff are provided with the
information, training and resources to assist them in dealing with these issues,
and that frontline staff in particular, feel they are well equipped and supported in
their efforts to respond to increasingly diverse service users. A stronger customer
focus is critical; it will result in a more satisfactory outcome for all service users.
Government departments and agencies must make cultural awareness and
diversity a key component in their induction and ongoing staff training. Such
training is by no means solely an issue for frontline staff, or those at the lower
levels of organisations. Widening staff recruitment is valuable, and in the longer
term essential. However, it is not advisable to hope that wider recruitment policies
alone can deliver the required increase in capacity and diversity in organisations.
The management of organisations must ensure that they are well informed
regarding the nature of the integration and service adaptation challenges and are
active in leading processes of capacity building in their organisations.
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1. The creation of a ‘one-stop-shop’ migration website may assist the wider information dissemination strategy.
2. The authorities in Northern Ireland have recently established a service; it may be useful to obtain information on how this service
operates (Watt and McGaughey, 2006).
11.2.5 Gender
Gender is a key issue in migration. Migration impacts differently on women and
men. Frequently migration compounds issues of gender inequality and/or
discrimination. In many cases migrant women are in industries or work settings
where poor labour standards may make them more vulnerable to exploitation.
Equally frequently they are employed in private or semi-private settings where
it is more difficult to set the conventional boundaries within employer-
employee relations; accommodation which is tied to employment is a key
example of this reality.
The new national partnership agreement, Towards 2016, highlights the issue of
migrants working in a domestic setting. Accordingly, the Labour Relations
Commission is being asked to draw up a code of practice for those employing
people in such settings. A commitment has been given in the agreement to have
this code in place by the end of 2006.
Unplanned pregnancy is a particularly difficult issue for migrant women, with
some migrant women claiming that when they became pregnant they
experienced difficulties and uncertainty in establishing what services and
supports they could access3. Some NGOs, providing advice services to migrants,
have highlighted cases of migrant women who claim that their employer
dismissed them because they became pregnant. Others claim that they have been
discouraged from forming relationships or even friendships with the indigenous
population of the area in which they are working, or they have been advised not to
become pregnant during the period of their employment. Such allegations, if true,
are clearly matters of concern, and should alert policy makers to the particular
vulnerabilities of women migrants, factoring this into service planning and
development.
11.3 Policy Fields
Each policy field generates specific issues as well as policy dilemmas. The following
section will provide a brief sketch of some of these issues, before concluding with
a range of cross-cutting policy concerns.
11.3.1 Education 
The challenge of diversity will be acutely felt in the education system since
education is central to the success of integration. This is true, firstly, with respect to
its role in fostering an environment in which the experience of difference is
increasingly seen as a normal part of human life and Irish society. Secondly, it has
a key role in ensuring that factors, such as language fluency, do not impair the
educational prospects of migrant children.
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3. In this context it should be noted that Treoir in conjunction with the Crisis Pregnancy Agency have recently produced a pack on
reproductive health for migrant women which is available in six languages including English, Reproductive Health Information for
Migrant Women (2006).
While building for diversity will be the primary challenge, it is also becoming clear
that in particular parts of the country issues of scale also arise. Currently, there is a
mismatch in some of the areas of high migrant concentration between demand
for and availability of school places. This issue requires speedy resolution in the
interests of all children requiring schooling. These problems are symptomatic of
the poorly integrated planning process alluded to earlier. It is vital that such
perspectives are rapidly superseded by more flexible, imaginative and far-sighted
approaches. These issues also point to a land-use planning system which is poorly
integrated with wider issues of service development (NESC, 2004). Resolution of
these issues would ensure that infrastructure and services are provided in a co-
ordinated and timely manner.
The Department of Education and Science already has a small number of regional
offices, which may form the basis of a more developed regional dimension in
education. Migration, and the complex challenges which it poses for education,
may give an important impetus to necessary reform in this area.
The primary challenge, however, will be the management of growing diversity
within the school setting. This can be addressed through in-service training as well
as the provision of tailored modules for those still in training. It will also be
achieved through supporting school principals and boards of management in their
efforts to make the school community a place which is welcoming of diversity.
New teaching materials should increasingly reflect diversity both in the student
body and the wider society, while balancing this with a continued strong
appreciation of the Irish cultural context within which adaptation and integration
will be achieved.
There are specific challenges to be met in respect of the learning needs of migrant
children. These are particularly acute for those lacking full fluency in English.
Language fluency is critical to achieving good educational outcomes for migrant
children. It is impossible for a child to benefit fully from their education if they lack
full mastery of the language of instruction. This becomes more difficult to address
the later a child enters the school cycle. A recent OECD report (2006) examined the
experience of 17 countries with significant migrant populations and found that
migrant children, despite being highly motivated, perform less well in the standard
tests applicable for their age-group than children of non-migrant backgrounds.
Some language-support teachers are currently in place in schools with children
requiring language tuition. However, numbers are capped. The current ceiling is 28
children requiring language support, after which no additional staffing support is
available. This system is currently under review by the Department of Education
and Science and a report is due shortly.
A wealth of experience and research has been developed in other jurisdictions with
respect to best practice in language instruction for non-native speakers and it may
be useful to draw on this material (OECD, 2006; Slavin and Cheung, 2003).
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Concern has been expressed by some policy makers regarding the need to ensure
a greater engagement across the education sector as a whole with the issue of
migration and the demands it is making on schools. Some evidence is already
emerging that certain schools appear to be catering for large numbers of migrant
children, while others, also in areas of large migrant concentration, have few
migrants amongst their student body. There is a need for the partners in education
to ensure that genuine integration is achieved within the school setting. Migrant
children, particularly those who require language support, present additional
challenges. However, these are challenges for the sector as a whole, and not for a
small number of schools that bear the entire responsibility. Integration will not be
achieved in the vital context of the schools if only a small number of schools
shoulder the burden of adaptation.
Finally, it should be noted that migration may present a long-term challenge
regarding Ireland’s denominational system of education. It is possible to
underestimate the significant extent to which a formally denominational system
is currently being overseen, by the Department of Education and Science, to
discharge public responsibilities. Nevertheless, migration may pose challenges for
this system, firstly, with respect to the potential for new faith-based communities
to seek separate schooling for their children. Several issues arise here, not least the
economic viability of such an approach, but also the danger that schools, rather
than being places where critical steps toward integration can occur, may become
locales of separation. Secondly, it is equally possible that migration may drive the
already well-developed trend toward non-denominational schooling as a growing
segment of the population, migrant and indigenous, seek alternatives to the
present system.
Education for Adults
Education, in particular language proficiency, also impacts on adults. Lack of
proficiency in the language of the host country represents a major obstacle to
integration at all levels, limiting a migrant’s work opportunities and the benefit
they may derive from what education or specialist training they have. Indeed,
research in Ireland has already shown that significant numbers of migrants are
being employed below their educational and skill levels (Barrett et al., 2006a). This
raises issues for public policy with respect to ‘brain waste’. It should also be a
matter of concern to employers as they seek to fill skill vacancies. It is in no one’s
interests for scarce skills and education to remain unavailable to the economy
because of limited language fluency. Furthermore, international research places a
strong emphasis on the importance of job-specific language training. This research
makes clear that job- or vocationally-based language instruction makes the
acquisition of language skills immediately relevant to both migrant and employer.
The international evidence regarding the labour market impact of language
fluency is very strong (Glover et al., 2001; Haskins et al., 2004; Lazear, 2005). The
research is particularly clear as to the poor labour market outcomes of those who
fail to master the local language.
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It should be noted that Fáilte Ireland, in conjunction with the Tourism sector, has
produced a report on the challenges of integration including the issue of language
fluency for the tourism sector (Fáilte Ireland, 2005). Their work may provide a
useful template for other sectors regarding language and other training needs of
migrant staff.4
Language Training for Those not Currently in the Workforce
The language needs of migrants not currently in the workforce also require
attention. The Council’s recent report, The Developmental Welfare State (NESC,
2005a), gives clear priority to the goal of maximising labour-force participation for
all those of working age. Language skills are, in the case of migrants, critical to the
achievement of this objective. There are a number of initiatives already in place.
Perhaps it may now be a good time to take stock of current provision and assess
how services might develop in the future.
11.3.2 Health 
Given the age-profile of migrants, the demands they make on health services may
initially be quite modest; in addition, it is important to note their substantial
contribution to addressing the current staffing needs of the health services5.
Once again the diversity challenge will be to the fore in this culturally-sensitive
area of public services. Frontline staff, both in medical and social care settings,
must have the supports and training necessary to confidently undertake their
work with an increasingly diverse patient/client group. Assessment and diagnosis
must be supported to ensure an optimal outcome for all service users. The issue of
translation services has already been dealt with, but broader issues of training and
support must also be tackled.
Migration represents only one manifestation of the wider issue of increased
population movement across the globe. In this context, health services will need
an increased capacity to manage communicable diseases as well as a broadening
of the knowledge base of staff to ensure that they can address the management
of conditions not traditionally encountered in Ireland.
As the IOM Consultants point out, a variety of issues arise for both migrants and
hosts in the health domain. The major issues include access to the health system;
how well the health system is equipped to deal with the health concerns of
migrants; how well it is equipped to deal with gender issues (this refers to cultural
sensitivities regarding treatment); and how well it is equipped to deal with public
health and safety issues (immigrants travel to and from locations with disease
profiles less well known in Ireland). This last item raises the question of prepared-
ness by the health authorities to diagnose and deal with various transmitted
diseases. This later point relates also to migration and patterns of travel which also
apply to the indigenous population. A final point concerns population health and
the manner in which immigrant health is affected by environmental and socio-
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4. Wider training issues are dealt with in Chapter 9.
5. A clear need now arises to ensure better skills and personnel planning in respect of social and health services.
economic conditions and stresses. The issue is health, but the remedies lie in and
beyond the health field. Given the sectors in which many migrants work they may
be particularly prone to poor health outcomes.
The health service has over the past decade been particularly involved in the
provision of services to asylum seekers. Following the Government decision to
institute direct provision of services for asylum seekers, it became necessary in
many cases to establish separate services for this group. Asylum flows have now
declined substantially. As a consequence, this system of provision is already
changing with staff being redeployed and resources reallocated to other areas of
more pressing need. In undertaking this task it is important to appreciate the
differences which exist between migrant workers and asylum seekers or refugees.
Most migrants now coming to Ireland are EU nationals with established rights and
privileges. For the most part, therefore, migrant workers, will, in contrast with
asylum seekers or indeed refugees, require access to services commonly used by
and shared with the general population. As such, the provision of services exclusive
to migrants should as a norm be avoided. Such provision tends to highlight
difference and could, in some instances, create the perception of special treatment
unavailable to mainstream service users.
An important consideration will be the need to ensure that migrants in low-wage
employment have adequate access to health services.
11.3.3 Housing and Accommodation
Given recent demand in the Irish housing market it will come as little surprise that
the scale challenge is to the fore with regard to housing. Uncertainty with respect
to long-term settlement intentions are particularly acute in housing, since
development planning must, even in optimal conditions, operate over a lengthy
time-horizon. Given the predominance of the private sector in the provision of
housing in Ireland, the role of the State will be primarily one of supporting private
sector providers. However, as the Council’s housing study (NESC, 2004) points out,
what is required is not simply more output but rather the creation of high quality
sustainable neighbourhoods. The challenge of scale can actually assist in driving
this approach, as when the public system is active in shaping the context for
provision. The Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government is
currently in the process of drawing up its policy in this regard and has already
issued a briefing document, Housing Policy Framework, Building Sustainable
Communities (2005). The recently completed partnership agreement, Towards
2016 states:
The longer timeframe of a ten-year framework agreement allows for pathways
to be developed to transform the Irish housing environment: to improve not
only responsiveness of services but also quality of services. In this context, the
core objective of housing policy is to enable every household to have available
an affordable dwelling of good quality, suited to its needs, in a good environ-
ment and, as far as possible, at the tenure of its choice (Towards 2016, 2006: 26)
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Most migrants, on arrival at least, are accommodated in the private rental sector,
although evidence is increasing of migrants seeking to take out mortgages (AIB
Global Treasury, 2006).6 Indeed, in the Dublin area in particular, it is becoming clear
that migrants already form a growing proportion of first time buyers. In the
longer-term context of settlement, and in line with the pattern in the indigenous
population, most migrants are likely to address their housing need through
purchase. This has strong potential to further fuel demand in this already
overstretched sector. However, it must be acknowledged that the construction
industry has demonstrated a growing capacity to address the issue of supply;
nevertheless demand continues to run ahead (NESC, 2004).
Social Housing
Given the extent to which issues of housing affordability have come to the fore in
recent years it is possible that migration may add to the challenges facing this
sector. The new national partnership agreement, Towards 2016, has given clear
commitments to addressing the issue of housing affordability and, in this regard,
the Department of Environment, Heritage and Local Government is considering
initiatives for the development of affordable homes for rent (Department of
Environment, Heritage and Local Government, 2005). The issue of housing
affordability as it affects migrants must now be factored into this wider planning
process. The Housing Forum, set up under the last national partnership, Sustaining
Progress, 2003-2005, may provide a context in which migrant housing needs could
be addressed.
Migrant Concentration
Other issues with respect to the settlement and housing of migrants also arise,
one of which is migrant concentration. Many Irish cities are already seeing a
significant degree of concentration. The emergence of migrant communities is a
readily understandable phenomenon and a feature of migration across the globe.
Indeed it is important to appreciate the richness and diversity that such new
communities are already bringing to parts of our cities. Nevertheless, concen-
trations, particularly if associated with deprivation, would be counterproductive
and are likely to impede the progress of integration. It is important therefore that
such issues are factored into the public policy efforts to ensure the long-term
success of migrant integration.
The primary driver of concentration in the Irish context is the availability of
affordable rental housing coupled with migrant preference. It is difficult to see
what public policy can, or indeed should, do to address either issue. Perhaps all that
can be done is to ensure that other public services—health, education etc.—are
supported to address the needs of migrants in a manner that is supportive of a
wider integration effort, rather than exacerbating tendencies toward separation in
living space and in service use.
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6. EBS, the building society, has recently decided to produce a guide for home buyers in Polish and plans further such initiatives as the
need arises.
‘Tied’ or Employer-Provided Accommodation
Several NGOs dealing with migrant workers have expressed concerns regarding
the phenomena of ‘tied’ accommodation, provided by or on behalf of an employer.
Such arrangements, particularly in the case of temporary or seasonal work, may
suit all parties, including migrant workers. It is important to note that many such
cases of employer-provided accommodation may result in a de facto tenancy being
created. Such tenants are free to avail of the dispute resolution mechanism
provided by the Private Residential Tenancies Board (PRTB) under the Residential
Tenancies Act (2004). If, however, the accommodation is linked to a contract of
employment the tenancy will end with the termination of that contract. The
security of tenure provisions of the Act do not apply in such circumstances.
Some accommodation provided to migrant workers may nevertheless fall outside
the terms of the Residential Tenancies Act (2004). Such accommodation for legal
purposes is viewed as a private arrangement and the PRTB has no role in disputes
in these circumstances.
While certain sectors of employment may need to offer accommodation as an
integral part of their employment package, it is possible that safeguards may 
need to be put in place to protect workers in such employment. It is also important
to note that such accommodation arrangements place unhelpful barriers in 
the path of integration, encouraging the recruitment of workers with little 
English and making it more likely that they will remain separate from the
indigenous population.
Homeless Services and the Application of the HRC
Following the accession of the new member states from Eastern Europe in 2004,
and the subsequent influx of migrant workers from these countries, some concern
was expressed regarding the numbers of such migrants accessing homeless
services. Subsequent research has demonstrated that numbers actually seeking to
access homeless accommodation were small (Bergin and Lalor, 2006). Despite this,
given the scale of current migration, particularly from Eastern Europe, some
thought should be given to the management of this issue.
It is the view of the Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government
that it is necessary that the Habitual Residency Condition (HRC) is applied
consistently across the range of statutory services. Homeless persons who fail to
meet the HRC are referred to the Reception and Integration Agency (RIA) of the
Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform. They are briefly accommodated
by RIA pending their return to their home country.
Bergin and Lalor (2006), having examined the application of the HRC to homeless
services, considered there was a need to review current practice. The Council
concurs with this view while acknowledging the complexity of the issues involved.
The Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government is aware of
the recommendation to review current practices for homeless immigrants arising
from the HRC and agrees that it poses complex problems. The matter is being
pursued with the RIA with a view to putting in place a transparent system to deal
with the accommodation issues arising.
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Inspection of Private Rented Accommodation
Other more general issues concerning standards of accommodation within the
private rented sector also arise. The Consultants’ report (IOM, 2006) specifically
highlighted this issue. Inspection of the private rented sector is a local authority
function, funded through the subscriptions paid by private landlords registered
with the PRTB. The latest inspection figures, for 2005, reveal a picture which can at
best be described as weak and patchy. Of the 6,815 dwellings inspected in 2005,
some 3,735 were in the Dublin City Council area. By contrast Fingal Council carried
out 719, South Dublin Council 314, Galway City Council 113, Limerick City Council 0
and Waterford City Council 3 (Department of Environment, Heritage and Local
Government, 2006: 83).
The inspection of private rented accommodation is a general concern with regard
to the quality of housing available to those who live in rented accommodation,
regardless of status. As such, any improvement in the number and frequency of
inspections will benefit all those living in private accommodation. Migrants may
nevertheless be somewhat more vulnerable through ignorance as to their rights,
or a greater willingness, in some cases, to accept substandard or overcrowded
accommodation.
11.3.4 Social Welfare
The Department of Social and Family Affairs was one of the first departments
required to give close consideration to the potential implications of EU migration
for the provision of its services. In May 2004, at the time of the accession of the 10
new Member States, Ireland took the decision to impose an Habitual Residency
Condition in respect of social assistance payments from the Department of Social
and Family Affairs. This decision was taken because of fears, widely expressed at
the time, that Ireland’s welfare system might become the object of ‘welfare
tourism’. The residence condition requires a person claiming a social assistance
payment to be habitually resident in the State or the rest of the Common Travel
Area.7 All decisions relating to habitual residence are based on the five criteria set
down in European Court of Justice case law.8
The situation is further complicated with regard to EU citizens since EU law takes
precedence over national law (e.g. HRC provisions). As chapter 4 makes clear,
persons from an EU member state (EEA and Swiss nationals have the same rights),
have a range of rights to access services and social protection measures. For
present purposes, the relevant distinction is between EU workers and job seekers.9
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7. The Common Travel Area consists of The Republic of Ireland, Great Britain, Northern Ireland, the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man.
8. The following factors, as set down by ECJ case law are considered in the determination of a person’s habitual residence: length and
continuity of residence; employment prospects; reasons for coming to Ireland; future intentions and centre of interest. The following
payments are subject to the habitual residency condition:
Unemployment Assistance 
Old Age Non-Contributory Pension 
Blind Pension 
Widow(er)'s and Orphan's Non-Contributory Pensions 
Carer's Allowance 
Disability Allowance
Child Benefit
One Parent Family Payment
Supplementary Welfare Allowance (other than once-off exceptional and urgent needs payments) 
9. An EU worker, a person who has worked for a time in Ireland, following which their employment has ceased, can avail of the
provisions of the Regulation 1408/71 to establish entitlement to Unemployment Benefit through the aggregation of social insurance
records in Ireland and their country of origin. Pending the establishment of that possible entitlement to benefit they can claim
Supplementary Welfare Allowance without the need to satisfy the habitual residence condition.
The European Court of Justice in its various judgements regarding the rights of EU
migrant workers take the view that they must enjoy the same social and tax
advantages as those workers who are nationals of the Member State. The practical
implications of this judgement are that EU workers are deemed entitled to seek a
payment under Supplementary Welfare Allowance (SWA) since this ‘last resort’
payment acts as a guarantee of the minimum means of subsistence and is
considered an ‘advantage’ which must be available to all EU workers.10
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Table 11.2 Housing Entitlements for Each Class of Migrant.
Class of Migrant Right of Access to Housing Services
Migrant within the Common The same right of access to social and
Travel Area of Ireland and the UK affordable housing as Irish nationals.
(non-treaty arrangement)
EU 15 nationals plus EEA and The same right of access to social 
Swiss Nationals affordable housing and as Irish nationals.
EU 10 nationals The same right of access to social and 
affordable housing as Irish nationals.
Job-seekers would not have entitlement
to rent supplement and would not come 
within the target group for RAS.
Access to homeless services would also 
be impacted upon by the application of 
the Habitual Residency Condition.
Non–EEA nationals: No entitlement to social and affordable 
housing unless have been granted Refugee 
Status or Leave to Remain. For example 
Students and Non-EU Work Permit holders 
are not entitled to access social and 
affordable housing.
Asylum Seeker Only entitled to direct provision of housing – 
provided by RIA.
Parents of Irish born children given Policy for such applicants is still being 
leave to stay for two years, renewable formulated, but generally only entitled 
for three years after that, as long as to rent supplement and do not as yet have 
can show economic viability and non a determined long term housing need.
criminal activity.
All people here more than five years. Once naturalised, people are then 
entitled to go onto the social housing 
waiting list and entitled to apply for
affordable housing schemes.
10. In addition, Child Benefit and One Parent Family Payment are classified under Regulation 1408/71 as “family Benefits” and are
available to all EU workers including the self-employed. The residency requirement under the HRC is overruled by the EU legislative
provisions.
By contrast, an EU citizen who is a job seeker, a person who has no substantial
previous employment record in their home country11, or any record of employment
in Ireland, and who presents seeking a social assistance payment, will be considered
to have failed the HRC. In this situation the person will be directed to the RIA of the
Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform. They will be provided with
emergency accommodation and assistance to return to their home country.
Migrant workers from outside the EEA who become unemployed or ill are entitled
to claim unemployment benefit or disability benefit if they satisfy the social
insurance contributions for such schemes. Payment of unemployment benefit will
only be made in respect of the unexpired part of their work permits. It is possible
for such workers to satisfy the HRC for unemployment assistance purposes if it is
deemed that their centre of interest is in the State. However payment of assistance
would only be made in respect of the unexpired part of their work permits. Such
persons could also satisfy the habitual residence condition for child benefit
purposes. The Department has issued detailed guidance, under Freedom of
Information legislation (FOI), regarding the operation of the HRC; these are
available on the Department’s website.
An internal administrative review of the operation of the HRC is currently underway.
This review will be completed shortly.
The experience in developing, and subsequently fine tuning, the operation of the
HRC illustrates the new context which migration now brings to bear with respect
to the provision of social welfare services. This issue has been further underscored
by the recent introduction of the Early Child Care Supplement for children under
six, as well as the eligibility for Child Benefit of EU workers working in Ireland in
respect of children resident outside the State. Migration, particularly in the context
of Ireland’s EU membership, must form an increasing consideration regarding the
design and qualifying criteria for social protection systems. A delicate balance
must be struck between protecting the rights of EU workers and their families to
necessary social provision while at the same time avoiding qualifying criteria
which may act to distort migration decisions.
There is a need to ensure that all potential beneficiaries are made aware of their
entitlements and are given all necessary assistance to access payments due to them.
11.3.5 Policing and Justice
Providing a policing and justice system for an increasingly diverse society is a vital
challenge. International experience shows that policing and justice systems
frequently find themselves managing the consequences of failures in other
spheres of public policy.
In terms of the justice system, as such, and how it deals with migrants and
minorities, the Consultants consider much of the international evidence troubling.
They assert that robust empirical evidence from various jurisdictions, including
Canada, show that at every step of the way, initial interception, laying of charges,
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11. A person having a social insurance record in their home country which would entitle them to a benefit payment is free to avail of
provision in Ireland as they seek work, see chapter 4 for full details on this issue.
conviction and sentencing, visible minorities tend to fare worse (Wortley, 1994).
Despite this, immigrants in Canada, unlike Ireland (or Europe), are under-
represented in prisons.12 This suggests that crime in Europe may be related to the
exclusionary conditions under which migrants live.
There is a further point concerning relations between the justice system and
migrant communities. Often, these are a major source of friction, especially in the
area of policing. Preventing this will require particular attention and investments
in training, in recruitment (of co-ethnics) and in community relations. The
Consultants conclude that while ‘numerous “best practice models” exist, the area
is likely to remain troublesome’ (IOM, 2006: 152).
Some recent Garda initiatives in this area are noteworthy. The Gardaí have set up
a Racial and Intercultural Office within the Community Policing Section. In addition
some 145 Ethnic Liaison Officers have been appointed across the country to liaise
with minority communities on issues of concern.
11.4 Cross-cutting Policy Concerns
Given the wider history of migration, not least that of the Irish in Britain (NESC,
1991), the possibility of ‘casualties’—those who come ill-prepared or who find the
cultural transition too difficult—must be given serious consideration. What is
required of the public system is a flexible response which deals humanely with
cases of individual need, as well as keeping an important watch on key indicators,
such as over-representation within mental health or homeless services or in the
prison population. In this context, it will also be important to support the
initiatives of migrant NGOs, church-based groups or other, emerging civil society
bodies, who seek to assist vulnerable migrants. The experience of Irish migrant
organisations may also be valuable. In this context, the failures as well as the
successes of the Irish experience in Britain, detailed in the Council’s 1991 study,
(NESC, 1991), can provide an important backdrop for policy makers as they attempt
to come to grips with our own migration challenge.
An important recent initiative by FÁS, the ‘know before you go’ DVD, will, it is
hoped, assist efforts to present a more realistic picture of the demands associated
with migration to Ireland. Assistance is already in place to support the return home
of EU migrants who present to homeless services and fail the HRC. Despite these
important initiatives migration, on the scale currently being experienced in
Ireland, will doubtless generate some who will find it difficult to cope or
successfully make their way in a new country. While the provision of support for
those who wish to return home is useful, it should not be assumed that all
difficulties will necessarily arise in the short term, so that, a long-term perspective
will be needed.
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12. It is interesting to speculate on possible explanations for the discrepancy in immigrant criminality between Canada and Europe. The
Consultants suggest that in the absence of compelling evidence showing that European immigrants are more criminally inclined, the
explanation is likely to be found in the treatment of migrants and the access they are given to mainstream institutions (Thomas, 1993)
11.4.1 ‘Tied’ Accommodation
As already highlighted, ‘tied’ accommodation is a possible matter of concern. Such
provision arises in several key sectors employing migrant workers—hotels and
catering, work in family homes as well as seasonal work in the horticultural and
agricultural sectors. It is clear that responsibility lies with employers, whether
private households, horticultural enterprises or hoteliers and restauranteurs, to
ensure that they are conforming to proper standards for the accommodation of
their workers, and furthermore that any wage deductions made for such
accommodation do not exceed the market cost of the accommodation provided. It
is in the interests of all good employers in a sector to ensure that high standards
are adhered to. Not only will this enhance the profile of the sector, it will prevent
those who might otherwise flout standards deriving competitive advantage from
their actions.
As detailed earlier, issues affecting those living and working in their employer’s
home are being addressed under the terms of the new partnership agreement,
Towards 2016. Specifically, the issue of deductions from pay, in respect of accom-
modation, will be addressed in a new code of practice for all such employments.
However, ‘tied’ accommodation is not solely an issue for those living and working
in their employer’s home. The needs of this wider group must also be addressed.
11.4.2 Migrant Concentration
The issue of migrant concentration is complex and, moreover, is not readily
amenable to public policy influence.The emerging trends in migrant concentration
are a consequence of the forces of the market in the housing sector, over which
public policy has limited influence. They are in the main driven by the availability
of rental accommodation at the lower end of the market. The primary concern for
public policy would be the clustering of deprived migrant communities.
11.4.3 Racism and Equality
In recent years there has been an extensive development of Ireland’s institutional
framework regarding issues of equality and human rights, with the establishment
of the Equality Authority and the Equality Tribunal, as well as The Human Rights
Commission. As the Consultants point out, such structures provide a critical starting
point for efforts to tackle overt discrimination.
National Action Plan Against Racism
In 2004, the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform produced the National
Action Plan Against Racism (NPAR). It was the outcome of a public consultation
process that took place between March 2002 and February 2003. The aims of 
the NPAR are to combat racism and develop a more inclusive, intercultural society
in Ireland.
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While the primary focus of the NPAR (described in Box 11.3) is anti-racism and inter-
culturalism, it makes reference to other dimensions of the integration challenge.
This is evident in its discussion of service provision, economic inclusion and
equality of opportunity. In the Council’s view, a key challenge now is to determine
how these integration aspects of policy can best be delivered.
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The plan outlines an ‘intercultural
framework’ for the development of ‘a 
more inclusive, intercultural society in
Ireland…based on policies that promote
interaction, equality of opportunity,
understanding and respect’ (2005: 27).
It contains five objectives:
1. Protection: Effective protection and
redress against racism.
2. Inclusion: Economic inclusion and
equality of opportunity.
3. Provision: Accommodating diversity 
in service provision.
4. Recognition: Recognition and awareness
of diversity.
5. Participation: Full participation in Irish
society.
It proposes a ‘whole-system approach’,
involving four key strategies:
1. Mainstreaming: linking with existing
policy processes and infusing
intercultural/anti-racism approaches
into all relevant policy areas;
2. Targeting: specific policy priorities, and
additional resources, to meet the needs
of specific groups;
3. Benchmarking: progress through
targets, timescales and data;
4. Engagement of key stakeholders,
including bodies involved in policy
making, the social partners, specialised
bodies, local communities and groups
representing cultural and ethnic
minorities.
The plan describes the outcomes expected
to be achieved under each of the framework
objectives. In the case of the objectives 
of inclusion and provision, the plan
recognises the overlap with important
existing strategies for social inclusion,
equality, employment rights, training,
public service modernisation, social
partnership, education, health, social
services and childcare, accommodation
justice and international development.
There is no statutory basis nor a specific
budget allocated for the implementation
of the actions contained in the NPAR.
Overall, the plan calls for the reasonable
accommodation of diversity and positive
action in the design and implementation 
of policies, programmes and organisational
practices. (p. 118).
Box 11.3 The National Plan Against Racism (NPAR)
11.4 Conclusion
Migration is a reality of contemporary global transformation. While states are by
no means powerless, their policy discretion is constrained by the international
context in which they must operate. In attempting to address the challenge of
migration, states must be aware of this global context which bounds policy
making. The challenge for policy makers is to achieve an optimal outcome. In the
area of social policy, this will involve major capacity building and service develop-
ment to cater for growing diversity. It will also involve an honest assessment of
current systems of provision, across the full spectrum of services, to determine
their capacity to deliver the best outcome, for migrants, and non-migrants alike.
There should be no naivety as to the tendencies which all of these systems have
demonstrated with respect to vulnerable groups in the Irish population. The
systems of social protection, in key areas, have failed to achieve optimal outcomes
for significant groups within the Irish population. Ireland has a poor record of
achieving good outcomes in its public services for those unable to supplement
public provision from their own resources. In light of this, clear challenges exist
regarding the capacity of the public system to deliver an optimal outcome with
respect to migration.
Migrants come not simply as labour units, useful for a while, but ultimately
dispensable; to paraphrase one author’s realisation regarding the Continental
European experience of the 1960s:‘we wanted workers and we got people.’We also
have got people with a range of family and other commitments. They come with
hopes for the future which may involve remaining and settling in Ireland or it may
not. Insofar as migrants and their families may come to Ireland and for as long as
they remain in Ireland, it is important that the wider reality of migrants’ lives form
part of the focus of public policy and service adaptation. It is in all our interests
that the quality of migrants’ experience of life in Ireland is positive and they enjoy
a sense that they can both contribute to and benefit from living and working in
Ireland. In this way, no matter how long they remain, their presence will contribute
to the achievement of Ireland’s wider economic and societal goals.
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Policy Development
and Management
12
12.1. Introduction
This chapter discusses the challenge of developing and implementing a whole-of-
government approach to migration and integration. Section 12.2 describes the
existing institutional and policy landscape. Section 12.3 argues that the three goals
outlined in Chapter 6—economic and social development, the rule of law and
integration—are interdependent and discusses the challenges that this poses to
the policy system. These include building a widely-shared understanding of the
role of immigration in Ireland’s development, a whole-of-government approach to
migration and integration policy and more effective and integrated data gathering
and management. In Section 12.4, the Council suggests that in designing institu-
tional arrangements, government can draw on a number of recent experiences in
policy making and coordination. In that context, the Council canvasses the possibility
of a specialised unit on migration data.
12.2. The Institutional and Policy Landscape 
12.2.1 Overview of Policy Responsibilities
Ireland’s policy system for migration has been shaped by two main factors: the
increase in the number of refugees and asylum seekers in the late 1990s and the
perceived need to meet labour shortages by issuing work permits. Since the
enlargement of the EU in mid-2004, the emphasis has shifted significantly since
most inward migration is now from the EU, particularly the new member states.
The following are the main departmental responsibilities for migration policy and
migration-related issues:
s The Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform (DJELR) is the lead
Department for immigration and citizenship policy and, in that context, had the
major responsibility for dealing with asylum matters, operational responsibility
for visa policy and processing, leave to remain, and security issues.
s The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) has responsibility for processing and
issuing visas, although this is now shared significantly with DJELR (see below).
s The Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment (DETE) has responsibility
for labour migration policy and for monitoring and enforcement of employ-
ment law.
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s The Garda National Immigration Bureau, GNIB, (established in 2001) has
responsibility for the enforcement of Employment Permits legislation, border
controls, registration of non-nationals, and deportation, anti-trafficking
measures and investigations.
s The Department of Social and Family Affairs (DSFA) has responsibility for social
assistance for migrants.
In addition, a number of other public bodies have some role in the overall policy
response to migration. These include the Equality Authority and related bodies,
which promote non-discrimination, and the Central Statistics Office (CSO), which
has played an important role in measuring migration and adapting existing
surveys to gather information on migration.
12.2.2 The Evolving Role of the Department
of Justice, Equality and Law Reform 
The Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service
As noted above, the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform (DJELR) is the
lead department for immigration and citizenship policy. An important institutional
development in the DJELR is the establishment of the Irish Naturalisation and
Immigration Service (INIS).
INIS was established following a Government decision in March 2005. The Service
incorporates the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform’s existing
structures dealing with asylum, immigration and citizenship and the Visa Section
of the Department of Foreign Affairs, which transferred to INIS1. INIS aims to
contribute to a cohesive system for the issuing of work permits and visas through a
virtual link with the work permit system in DETE. INIS is responsible for developing
the government’s response to immigration, citizenship and asylum issues. The
economic migration policy function remains with the Minister for Enterprise Trade
and Employment. The overall effectiveness of these arrangements is to be
reviewed within 2 years.
In creating INIS, government aimed to both improve customer service and
strengthen the effectiveness and integrity of Ireland’s immigration system. In
particular, it aimed to provide:
s A single contact point or ‘one-stop shop’ for applications for entry to the State,
combining the work permit and visa application processes;
s A clearer system involving more streamlined processes;
s Improved sharing of information to simplify decision making;
s Improved service times; and 
s Improved control and enforcement mechanisms.
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1. Responsibility for the provision of visa services at diplomatic and consular missions abroad remains with the Department of Foreign
Affairs.
INIS is establishing a new Integration Unit to promote and co-ordinate social and
organisational measures across government for the acceptance of lawful immi-
grants into Irish economic and cultural life. Its initial focus was on the integration
of refugees and others from outside the EEA given leave to remain. However, it
subsequently acquired the task of leading government thinking on the wider
challenge of integration and the building of a comprehensive integration policy.
The Reception and Integration Agency (RIA) was established in April 2001 with the
merger of the Directorate for Asylum Support Services and the former Refugee
Agency of the Department of Foreign Affairs. It is now located within the structure
of INIS. RIA is responsible for coordinating the provision of services and integration
policy to asylum seekers, refugees and persons granted leave to remain in the State.
It also has responsibility for responding to crisis situations abroad which result in
large numbers of refugees arriving in Ireland within a short period of time.
On foot of a Government Decision of 2nd March 2004, the Reception and
Integration Agency was also assigned responsibility for supporting the repatria-
tion, for the Department of Social and Family Affairs, of nationals of the ten new
EU Member States who fail the Habitual Residency Condition attaching to Social
Assistance payments.
The National Action Plan against Racism 
As described in Chapter 11, the National Action Plan Against Racism (NPAR) was
published by the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform in 2004. The aims
of the NPAR are to combat racism and to develop a more inclusive, intercultural
society in Ireland (DJELR, 2004). While the primary focus of the NPAR (described in
Box 11.1) is anti-racism and interculturalism, it does make reference to other
dimensions of the integration challenge. This is evident in its discussion of service
provision, economic inclusion and equality of opportunity. In the Council’s view, a
key challenge now is how these integration aspects of policy can best be delivered.
The Forthcoming Immigration and Residence Bill
In April 2005, the DJELR published a discussion document, Outline Policy Proposals
for an Immigration and Residence Bill (DJELR, 2005a). It proposes to provide a
comprehensive framework within which immigration policy will be developed
and implemented. This will include provisions on visas and pre-entry clearance,
border controls, admission for the purposes of work, self-employment, research,
study, family reunification, admission for non-economically active persons, and
residence status and residence permits. The Bill will also make provision for
monitoring and compliance, mechanisms for removing people from the state and
the reorganisation of immigration and citizenship services in the context of the
establishment of INIS.
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The National Consultative Committee on Racism and Interculturalism (NCCRI)
In 1998, the DJELR established the National Consultative Committee on Racism and
Interculturalism (NCCRI). Its role was to work with government and non-
government organisations to develop an inclusive and strategic approach to
combat racism by focusing on its prevention and promoting an intercultural
society and to contribute to policy and legislative developments. It played a role in
the consultation process leading to the National Action Plan Against Racism
(NPAR), mentioned above and described in Chapter 11. Although it is not a state-
sponsored body, it receives its core funding from the DJELR (IPA, 2006).
12.2.3 The DETE: Work Permits and Labour Standards
The DETE has the main responsibility for labour migration policy. New economic
migration arrangements including a new green-card system will be introduced in
2007. The revised approach will include a role for the Expert Future Skill Needs
Group, based in Forfás. It will provide analysis of labour shortages and skill
shortages for the Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Employment.
As discussed in Chapter 9, under the terms of the partnership agreement, Towards
2016, a new approach is to be adopted to the monitoring and enforcement of
employment law. These new measures include the establishment of a new,
statutory Office dedicated to employment rights compliance; a trebling in the
number of Labour Inspectors; greater coordination among organisations con-
cerned with compliance; new requirements in respect of record keeping; enhanced
employment rights awareness activity; the introduction of a new and more user-
friendly system of employment rights compliance; increased resourcing of the
system; and higher penalties for non-compliance with employment law (see
Towards 2016: 92–107).
12.2.4 Education Ireland
In 1993, the Government established the International Education Board of Ireland
(IEBI). Its remit is to facilitate and support the development of Ireland as an
international education centre. The Board has representation from all interested
sections of Irish education—universities, institutes of technology, independent
colleges and language schools—as well as from other government departments
and agencies. IEBI is actively supported by Enterprise Ireland, Irish embassies and
Fáilte Ireland.
IEBI’s mandate is to promote Ireland as a quality destination for students and
trainees and to support the international activities of Irish education institutions.
It acts as a national point of contact and referral to and from Irish suppliers of
education services and the international market place. It is to liaise with education
interests and government to identify and remove barriers to the development of
the international education sector.
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The IEBI responds to enquiries from overseas students interested in the study
options available in Ireland. It promotes Irish education overseas via advertising,
developing and circulating generic information and by participating at education
fairs, seminars and workshops.
12.3 The Policy Challenge
12.3.1 The Three Broad Goals are Interdependent
In Chapter 6, the Council identified three broad goals which should inform policy
in this area:
1. Economic and social development: migration should promote the achievement
of a successful society, as defined in the NESC vision.
2. The rule of law: migration and migration-related activity should enhance,
rather than erode, the rule of law.
3. Integration: people coming to Ireland, to settle or for a short period, should be
appropriately integrated into the life of Irish society.
Achievement of effective and coherent approaches to these three broad goals
might be made easier if all three were informed by some over-arching principles
and ideals.
Each of these goals were explained in Chapter 6 and illustrated in Figure 6.1. Here
we are interested in the inter-relationship between these goals and the challenge
this poses to the policy system. The arrows in Figure in 12.1 suggest that each of
these goals and policies must be informed by the other two. This way of framing
Ireland’s ends and means suggests that the challenge of consistent, joined-up,
policy and implementation arises in a number of different areas and guises.
Consider economic and social development, as described in the central Box A. It is
clear that policies defining channels of migration and the eligibility of migrants—
devised to promote economic and social development—must inform, and be
coordinated with, the policies in Box B, the Rule of Law. At a most basic level, legal
channels must be defined and managed to facilitate the arrival of various kinds of
migrants. But there should also be an influence in the other direction. A concern for
the rule of law (Box B) should inform the approach to admission of migrants and
their eligibility for services (Box A). A country that ignored that connection could
adopt migration policies—for perceived economic, social or political purposes—
which unwittingly undermined the rule of law. It could do this by giving rise to
illegal migration, undocumented status, migration-related crime or by creating
relations between parties in civil society which are extremely unequal and,
consequently, governed by power rather than law or voluntary contract. To take an
hypothetical example, imagine a country that adopted an approach to labour
migration or educational migration which unintentionally created a stock or flow
of illegal migrants or people with irregular status. Although that approach to
labour or educational migration might serve economic or other purposes, it could
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undermine the rule of law in the ways cited above. Since both goals are valid, a
balance needs to be struck between the economic and social benefits of
different channels of migration, on the one hand, and protection of the rule of
law, on the other.
Likewise, policies aimed at economic and social development (Box A) and at
integration (Box C) should inform each other. The need for policy on channels of
migration and eligibility to influence, and be coordinated with, integration policy
is obvious, if hard to achieve. The former policy determines the demographic,
occupational and ethnic composition of the migrant population, as well as its
scale, and thus shapes the integration policy challenge. But it is also appropriate
that the concern for integration should influence the design of migration channels
and eligibility. While commercial or budgetary concerns motivate a particular
approach to migration (e.g. who should be allowed to come and what services they
should be eligible for), a concern to ensure integration might qualify this. It might,
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Figure 12.1. The Goals of Migration Policy are Inter-dependent
(A) Economic and Social Progress 
channels of migration (employment,
education, political, family policy, culture etc.) 
eligibility of migrants (for social welfare,
housing, education, training, recognition)
(D) Principles and Ideas
reflecting allegiance to building a successful 
society in Ireland and to fundamental rights
(B) Rule of Law
define legal channels for those we
allow to Ireland, devise policies and
information systems to minimise
illegal migration, prevent undocu-
mented status, discrimination and
migration-related crime
(C) Integration
measures to ensure that those who
come to Ireland participate
sufficiently in economic, social 
and civic life
for example, suggest that certain migration channels, or certain restrictions on
eligibility, would make integration harder to achieve. Indeed, as noted in Chapter
6, in the second half of the twentieth century, several European countries, such as
Germany and the Netherlands, adopted approaches to economic migration which
were inimical to long-term integration, or at least paid insufficient attent to the
issue of integration.
In like manner, the goal of integration (Box C) and goal of ensuring the rule of law
(Box B) need to be coordinated. For example, integration concerns might suggest
that certain approaches to protecting the rule of law, even if they were effective in
a narrow sense, might undermine integration by stigmatising or harassing certain
migrants. But equally, a focus on the rule of law might suggest that certain
approaches to migration or integration, if they were perceived to undermine the
rule of law, could weaken support for migration (among either the indigenous or
migrant population) and consequently weaken the commitment to integration.
12.3.2 The Challenge of Policy Coherence and Coordination
This discussion suggests that the challenge of coherent, joined-up, policy is
formidable; but it also suggests ways in which it can be made more tractable.
First, we can identify some general, widely-shared, principles and ideals—such as
allegiance to what might be called the ‘project of Ireland’—that can inform policy
in different spheres (as depicted in Box D of Figure 12.1). While we should not
exaggerate the power of over-arching principles to inform practice, it is important
that the ‘project of Ireland’—social, cultural, economic and political—commands
allegiance among the indigenous population and those settling here.
Second, some of the policy challenges are relatively well-defined, even if they pose
complex problems for both policy-making and implementation. Thus, integration
policy, as depicted in Box C of Figure 12.1, is a task that can now be addressed by all
the relevant departments, provided there is a clear lead department and sufficient
coordination across departments and agencies (see below).
Third, the analysis suggests that, within a coherent overall approach, much of the
policy coordination can be done by sub-sets of departments and agencies, working
on the interactions described above (and depicted by the arrows in Figure 12.1).
Occasionally, work on these interactions will throw up policy choices which require
a wider discussion. An actual example was the move to amend the constitutional
provision on the parents of Irish-born children in 2004. More hypothetically, work
on how to combine migration, integration and the rule of law might, for example,
throw up a suggestion for a single identifier or possibly an identity card, a sugges-
tion which would inevitably require wider debate.
A number of questions must be answered in designing a coherent and coordinated
approach to migration policy, broadly defined:
s How can a whole-of-government approach to migration policy, broadly defined,
be created within the next year or two?
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s How can sufficient shared understanding of migration and its implications be
created—across government and civil society—to ensure an effective partner-
ship approach to making and implementing policy?
s How can the integration challenge be inserted into the mainstream work of
departments and agencies?
s How can the adaptation of information systems be achieved to support
individual policy spheres and to allow sufficient connection between them?
As emphasised in Chapter 6, migration makes urgent a range of existing policy
challenges, more than it creates entirely new ones, although it does create some of
these. In particular, migration underlines the urgency of ensuring that labour
market policy and social policy really support both Irish citizens and migrants in
accessing employment and achieving career progression. Here we briefly explain
why Ireland’s policy institutions must answer each of the questions listed above.
12.3.3 Need for a Shared Understanding on Migration 
The importance of the first two of these tasks—the need for a clearly articulated
shared understanding—emerges strongly in the Consultants’ report:
The requirement to mobilise interests across the board dictates the need for a
compelling rationale that is able to cut through complexity and resonate with
numerous, diverse groups. Such a rationale has yet to be constructed in Ireland,
though a number of important new initiatives indicate that the process has
begun (IOM, 2006: 173).
12.3.4 Placing the Integration Challenge in the Mainstream of Government
Delivery
Likewise the need for migration and integration policy to include anti-racism
measures, but to go beyond to them, is a central theme of the IOM report. It notes
that the NPAR expands the integration debate to the critical areas of housing,
health, education and justice, while the forthcoming Immigration and Residence
Bill will offer a machinery for reconfiguring the admission system to address a
broader set of strategic interests (IOM, 2006: 173).
Ultimately, for integration to succeed migrants will have to be seen as potential
assets and not as charitable works or temporary aids to facilitate labour
adjustment. This will require going beyond the NPAR’s asylum-inspired
approach. Anti-racism measures can, at best, produce tolerance, which is
undeniably important. But such measures are unlikely to produce integration,
which cannot be compelled or achieved through sanctions. For integration to
occur, support will need to be built on a widely shared vision of how integration
might contribute to a dynamic, secure and socially cohesive Irish future. The
creation of such a vision would provide a basis for stakeholder alliances and
would permit the development of coherent plans. In the absence of such a
vision policy will inevitably remain fragmented and integration will be impaired.
(IOM, 2006: 169)
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The Development of Better Data On Migration
In the Council’s view, the fourth question listed above, concerning data, is critical.
The formulation of migration policy, broadly defined, is made more difficult by the
limited availability of the data and paucity of research. The situation is acute in
Ireland because much of its immigration is recent and an awareness of the
importance of capturing the required data, and of how to do so, is insufficiently
developed across the public system. In addition, sufficient time has not yet elapsed
to generate data on the experience of migrants. The Consultants repeatedly refer
to the paucity of data in Ireland; for example, they say ‘there are virtually no
empirical data concerning the social, or even economic, integration of minorities in
Ireland, and scant academic analysis of the social impacts of migration’ (IOM,
2006: 150).
The Council believes that these data deficits must be addressed in three ways:
1. By making more use of existing data sources;
2. By incorporating migration and migration information into standard procedures;
and
3. By undertaking new data-gathering exercises.
Making More Use of Existing Data Sets
Some important steps are underway to make better use of existing information.
INIS is completing the procurement phase of a major IT project covering asylum,
immigration, repatriation and citizenship in order to give a ‘whole organisation’
view of clients throughout the process. This will join up data in the justice sector
and will have considerable potential both within the sector and in terms of wider
integration. In addition, virtual links are being explored between the Work Permits
System of the Department of Enterprise Trade and Employment and the Visa
System in INIS.
Nevertheless, across a wide front, better use can be made of existing procedures
for gathering and entering data. For example, where the nationality of
respondents, applicants or service users is, in fact, asked for in regular procedures,
it is important that it is subsequently entered into the relevant dataset
(‘captured’), and that nationality as recorded can be linked across datasets2. The
CSO says:
Given the importance of immigration to understanding recent social change in
Ireland, there is a clear need to be able to reliably classify information by
nationality (CSO, 2003: 113).
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2. When the CSO examined the data holdings in six government departments (approximately 120 datasets in all), it found that details
on nationality were provided in 37 instances using nine different nationality-coding systems. However, only two of the 37 cases used
what the CSO would regard as a standard classification. By contrast, the situation was more favourable for age coding. 65 data
sources recorded data on age, also used nine different age coding systems but 51 of the 65 instances were consistent with CSO best
practice.
In other instances, particularly where social welfare claim forms are concerned, the
CSO describes as ‘a common feature and a key weakness’ the fact that the answers
provided to several questions are not captured in the Service Delivery Model (SDM)
system (ibid.: 87). This arises in applications for Child Benefit and other areas3.
More ambitious use could be made of existing datasets. For example, both the CSO
and the Consultants rate highly the potential of the ‘Database of non-EEA
Nationals’ maintained by the Garda National Immigration Bureau (GNIB) since
2001 (CSO, 2003: 73-74; IOM, 2006: 10). The CSO believe ‘it should be possible to
compile accurate stocks and flow figures for the relevant target populations from
the registered non-EEA nationals database’ (ibid.: 77). However, other than the
head count, little information from this dataset is publicly communicated. In
addition, the Quarterly National Household Survey (QNHS) collects data on
nationality, place of birth and length of time resident in Ireland but, usually, they
are ‘not reported, and are thought to be too scanty for analysis’ (IOM, 2006: 70). An
Annex to the QNHS in May 2006 was a welcome departure (other than the private
release of QNHS Q2 2003 to Barrett et al., 2002) and provided valuable indications
of the sizes of the migrant workforce and resident working age population4.
Eurostat are to add a significant migration module to the Labour Force Survey for
2008, which will provide data thoroughly comparable across the Member States.
A good example of how to exploit the potential of existing datasets was the access
the DETE gave an independent researcher to its database on work permits. This
generated some of the more important empirical evidence on which the
Consultants were able to rely in their report to the Council as well as producing
several suggestions as to how the dataset could be improved5.
Statistical information relating to the issue of visas should be computerised. This
information could give an early indication of future immigration patterns (CSO,
2003, Recommendation 18).
There may be reasons, such as the security of the state or the protection of small
and, therefore, identifiable minorities, why some data on migration should be not
be publicly disclosed6. However, the default position should be to put data on
migration regularly into the public domain rather than wait for FOI requests or
once-off requests from independent researchers before gathering and communi-
cating it. A comprehensive picture of what migration is doing to Ireland will need
the multiple contributions of researchers in many different fields working over
several years if it is to be reliably established.
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3. In the case of child benefit, what is in fact asked on all CB forms but not captured includes details of benefits received from other
countries (country, name of payment, date of payment), employment details from work abroad (social security number, country, date
last worked) and immigration details if arrived from abroad (date arrived, address abroad, nationality, spouse’s nationality) (CSO,
2003: 87). It is not unique to social welfare procedures that relevant information on country of birth and nationality is asked for but
not captured (ibid.: 74).
4. While the CSO acknowledged ‘concerns … based on international experience, around the extent to which (such a general purpose
household survey) captures minority communities in a proportionate and representative manner’, it, nevertheless, described the
Annex findings as ‘a broadly accurate picture of the current situation and recent trends’.
5. For example, no data are available on the length of stay of permit holders though it can be assumed that a significant proportion of
foreign nationals return home after the expiry of their work permits. The database includes information on earnings but not on
education or work experience (IOM, 2006: 23, 68).
6. For example, it is more important that the relevant authorities have accurate data on border apprehensions or the public health risks
associated with some source areas of migrants than that all such data is available to the media
Incorporating Migration and Migration Information into Standard Procedures
There is a need to be more aware of the importance of individual characteristics—
such as nationality, place of birth, duration of residence in Ireland and ethnicity—
when routine surveys, application forms for public services and questionnaires are
being designed. A number of examples illustrate this:
s To date, the periodic report on perinatal statistics has not featured data on the
nationality, duration of residence, place of birth or ethnicity of the mother and
father. Among other things, the population projections of the CSO would benefit
from information on the birth rate of different nationalities (CSO, 2003: 113/4).
s The proposals by the DJELR to use biometric data in border controls, and by the
Department of Health and Children to use an ethnic identifier for all health
data, are examples of useful innovations that would assist the public system in
meeting its growing responsibilities.
s The National Disease Surveillance Centre has begun collecting data on the
country of origin of Irish residents with certain infectious diseases, largely in
response to moves to improve epidemiological surveillance at the European
level.7
s Official estimates of the number of irregular migrants in Ireland are lacking,
and there is little data on which to base estimates of those irregularly working
and residing in Ireland. Data on border apprehensions are not publicly available,
though information is collected by the Garda on its border activities. It is
difficult, therefore, to estimate the number of migrants entering the country
irregularly, and whether they arrive independently or through smugglers and
traffickers. The increased level of legislation and deportations suggests that the
government is expanding its efforts to combat irregular immigration; however,
the lack of reliable data or systematic evidence hamper any assessment of the
extent to which Ireland’s current immigration and employment laws are in fact
enforced (IOM, 2006: 30, 45).
Undertaking New-Data Gathering Exercises
Going further, the Council believes that new data should be gathered in order to
deepen our understanding of the dynamics of migration. In particular:
s There is virtually no data on the labour market status of the almost 7,000
people who were officially recognised as refugees between 1995 and 2004
(IOM, 2006: 74).
s Dependants may be expected to rapidly become a significant immigration
category. Data and research into the numbers, labour market participation and
employment of dependants are urgently needed (IOM, 2006: 114).
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7. The Consultants observe that, while these data show that foreign-born residents in Ireland are over-represented as regards HIV and
tuberculosis, it is hard to determine whether the high proportion of foreign-born in the dataset demonstrates that surveillance of the
health status of the migrant population is working, or whether it is evidence of the urgency to focus on the needs of some migrant
populations (CSO, 2006: 134).
s There is clearly a need for more information and data about the contribution
made by ‘students’ to employment in Ireland and for this to be taken account
of in determining the number of admissions under the labour immigration
channels (IOM, 2006: 115).
s On-going research is needed on the implications of migration for housing
demand and supply8. As more migrants are joined by family dependants, some
of their housing need might shift from the private rental sector to social housing
(IOM, 2006: 127).
s The numbers of migrant children in primary and secondary education are not
known, and mechanisms for collecting information on the ethnicity and
nationality of pupils in the Irish education system still need to be developed
(IOM, 2006: 137).
12.4. Institutional Arrangements to Achieve 
Policy Coherence and Coordination
In some respects, the immediate and long-term location of many policy
responsibilities is clear. And, once the integration goal has been internalised in the
policy system, responsibility for its components will naturally lie with line depart-
ments, such as Education and Science, and their agencies.
12.4.1 The Consultant’s Recommendations on Policy Coordination
The Consultants note that ‘the administration of a system involving so many policy
actors is a complex process and requires a great deal of coordination, consultation
and sharing of information’ (IOM, 2006; 4).‘Horizontal policy development requires
horizontal coordinating machinery’. They note that this is gradually being
developed and that a ‘new, combined service delivery agency is nearing completion
(the Integration Unit9) and several high-level committees have started to operate’.
IOM argue that a sense of urgency will need to be injected into the work of these
structures and their mandates will need to be framed more clearly and more
publicly. They suggest that ‘consideration should also be given to a single
migration agency that could exercise leadership and drive the combined
enterprise’. (IOM, 2006: 168)
12.4.2 The Report of the Joint Oireachtas Committee on European Affairs
In its recent report on migration, the Joint Oireachtas Committee on European
Affairs makes a number of recommendations on policy development and policy
coordination. It suggests that ongoing efforts to coordinate information should be
progressed with as much speed as possible. It proposes that Irish agencies should
be asked to work even more closely with the governments of the sending counties,
to publicise the appropriate routes for finding jobs in Ireland and restricting the
activities of unscrupulous or careless agencies.
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8. Available work permit data suggest that nearly half of migrant workers are employed in the Greater Dublin Area. Even by the year
2000, it was estimated that migrants were increasing housing demand by 8,000 to 10,000 units a year (IOM, 2006: 126).
9. This service is being developed as part of the work of INIS.
The Committee agrees that there should be greater cooperation and coordination
between the bodies involved in inspecting and enforcing the range of legislation
already enacted to protect worker’s rights. Finally, the Committee considers that
clear responsibility to support social and economic integration of migrants should
be given to one government agency.
12.4.3 The Council’s Recommendation 
The Council does not interpret the recommendation of the Consultants or the Joint
Oireachtas Committee to mean that the formulation and implementation of
migration and integration policy can be allocated to a single, existing or new,
department or agency. The range of policies and services involved is so great that
no feasible institutional reallocation could encompass them. Consequently, even if
a new entity is created to assist policy development, there will remain the challenge
of coordinating policy across several departments and agencies.
As noted above, in thinking about institutional approaches, the Council sees four
main challenges:
1. To achieve a whole-of-government approach to the cross-cutting challenges
depicted in Figure 12.1;
2. To ensure that the integration agenda is firmly mainstreamed in key service-
delivery departments;
3. To communicate a clear vision of the role of migration in Ireland’s long-term
economic and social development; and 
4. To create information systems to support individual policy spheres and to allow
sufficient connection between them.
Given the importance of these tasks, the Council recommends that government
focus on the institutional arrangements to achieve them. Considerable
consultation has already been undertaken, through the NCCRI, the preparation of
the NPAR10, discussion in NESC and the social partnership talks and other processes.
In addition, government has defined some of the main parameters of both
migration and integration policy. But there are parts of both migration and
integration policy—and their harmony with the third broad goal, the rule of law—
which do seem to require a more coordinated and articulated approach. In
designing this, government can draw on a number of recent experiences in policy
making and coordination. Among these are the Cabinet Committee on Social
Inclusion (serviced by the Senior Officials Group on Social Inclusion), the National
Disability Strategy, and the National Children’s Strategy, which includes the
creation of the Office of the Minister for Children.
The Council’s recommendation on policy development combines a more focused
and authoritative approach to the integration challenge at national government
level, with significant partnership. On the one hand, integration policy needs to
become more centred in government, so that the requirements of integration can
be delivered by the machinery of public administration in key service departments
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10. Although the Council believes that more consultation might be undertaken on aspects beyond the remit of National Consultative
Committee on Racism and Interculturalism (NCCRI)
and agencies. On the other hand, as integration policy becomes established and
mainstreamed, appropriate partnership arrangements with non-government
organisations need to be further developed. This is necessary because of the
limited ability of government, acting on its own, to achieve integration and make
a success of migration.
12.4.4 A Specialised Unit on Migration Data 
The data developments discussed above will require specific oversight and
commitment from a dedicated unit. Its remit should be to ensure that the data to
enable migration to be monitored and understood is generated and made avail-
able in an appropriate way. The Council considers that this is likely to be situated in
whatever office or inter-departmental body is charged with monitoring and
implementing migration policy generally. It should have a clear leadership role in
influencing how departments and public agencies gather data, as well as in
communicating vigorously their data requirements in respect of migration. It
would work closely with the CSO, providing it with dedicated resources when
necessary, to improve the statistical collection, storage and transferability of data
relevant to migration, including the manner in which data on nationality, ethnicity
and residence would be available via a central repository, such as the Central
Records System (CRS) (see Recommendation 6 of CSO, 2003: 124).
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